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ABSTRACT
The issue of effective management accounting systems, and especially the 
resource allocation procedures, have attracted considerable interest among higher 
education institutions in recent yeai's.
Relevant previous research indicates that several universities adopt different 
approaches to the resource allocation problem, employing models and procedures that 
reflect their organisational arrangements and their internal socio-political dynamics. 
The present study argues that while studying accounting processes in their 
organisational context, the role of trust should also be considered carefully. In 
particular, it is very important to consider the attitudes of the individuals involved and 
interacting within organisational processes, and especially the trust between them, 
which plays an important role to the overall good governance of the processes.
Specifically, the role of interpersonal trust in an old Scottish University 
resource allocation process is examined. An in-depth case study investigation 
employed an organisational trust inventory (Cummings and Bromiley, 1996) and semi 
structured interviews with the senior personnel of the institution who were involved in 
the resource allocation process.
The study indicates that trust is a very necessary insight to the facilitation of 
social structures of accountability, that enhance a better governance of the resource 
allocation process.
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As you set out for Ithaka 
hope the voyage is long, 
full of adventure, full of discovery. 
Laistrygonians and Cyclops, 
angry Poseidon - don’t be afraid of them: 
you’ll never find such things on your way 
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high, 
as long as wistful emotions 
stir your spirit and body.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops, 
wild Poseidon - you won’t encounter them 
unless they dwell your soul, 
unless your soul raises them up in front of you.
Hope the voyage is a long one.
May there be many summer mornings when, 
with what pleasure and joy, 
you come into harbors seen for the first time; 
may you stop at Phoenician 
to buy fine things, 
mother of peaii and coral, amber and ebony, 
sensual perfume of every kind - 
as many sensual perfumes as you can; 
and may you visit many Egyptian cities 
to gather stores of wisdom from their scholars.
Keep Ithaka always in your thoughts.
Your arrival is your destiny.
But don’t ever hurry the journey.
Better if it lasts for years, 
so you are old by the time you reach the island, 
enriched with what you have gained on the way, 
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich.
Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey.
Without her you would have not sailed away.
She has nothing left to give you now.
And if you find her poor, Ithaka won’t have fooled you.
This way, wise as you will have become, so full of experience, 
you will have understood by then what these Ithakas mean
Ithaka, Konstantinos Kavafis (1911)
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Chapter I: Introduction
Chapter 1 -  Introduction 
1.1 Introduction
This dissertation is a report of a research undertaken to explore the role of trust 
in the resource allocation process of a British University. The thesis develops through 
the investigation and interpretation of the conditions of interaction between the 
members of the resource allocation committee, who are senior personnel of a 
traditional Scottish University. In that respect, the research enquiry of how trust 
relates to the management of the process of resource allocation generated during the 
study. The research methodology of the study involves a combination of methods, 
such as an Organisational Trust Inventory and semi-structured interviews, to facilitate 
the in depth understanding of the phenomenon of trust in the particular organisational 
context.
1.2 Background
The research inquiry draws insights from the British Higher Education 
environment, with a consideration of the public sector reforming trend (during the last 
decades) and the challenge facing the British Universities to reconsider their 
governing processes and structures. The in-depth study of the resource allocation 
process of an old Scottish university and the importance of trust between The 
University’s senior personnel interacting in the process, outlines the considerable 
importance of the socio-political interferences, specifically in the resource allocation 
process, and generally in the governance style of The University.
In particular, as chapter 2 sketches, the impact of the general public sector 
reform to the British Higher education expressed in both institutional^ (administrative)
‘ The UK government promoted, since the late eighties, the public sector reform doctrine as an attempt 
to reform the public services provision from a bureaucratic organisation to a ‘flexible, accountable and 
devolved sector, capable of offering choices of uses to the public’ (Office of Public Services Reform -  
http:www.pm.gov.uk)
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and ideological^ (as reflected into the sector’s values) reorganisation of the 
Universities’ status. The institutional reform involved changes such as an 
administrative devolution, consumer focus service, the development of codes of 
standards and quality, and the implementation of performance measurement methods^. 
The ideological reform imposed the reinvention of the role of individuals and groups 
in the sector, outlining the desired principles and values that should be foimd to public 
 ^servants and the orientation of ‘new managerialism’ as a professional trend.
Subsequently, the entire sector had to respond to the reform challenges. 
However, the British Universities demonstrated a diverse picture of responses which 
where tuned more with the universities’ social and political internal dynamics and 
external historical and cultural actuality, than with the proposed economic 
performance of the sector (Bourn, 1994; Ackroyd and Ackroyd, 1999; Jarzabkowsky, 
2002). In line with their broader organisational refoim, British Universities faced the 
challenge to reconsider the ways they had to generate, and efficiently allocate 
internally, the limited financial resources of the sector. A wide range of resource 
allocation procedures and models were implied in various Universities, but every 
system reflected the unique organisational characteristics of each individual Higher 
Education Institution, which produced a difficulty to draw a unified picture for the 
whole sector (Jones, 1994; Scapens, 1994; Whittington, 2000). The research inquiry 
considers this context and explores the resource allocation process of an old traditional 
Scottish University. A considerable attention is placed on the role of trust between the 
members of The University’s resource allocation process. The study’s approach aligns
 ^ In 1994 the Committee on Standards in Public Life, chaired by Lord Nolan, published the ‘Seven 
Principles of Public Life’, suggesting that ‘the public sector provision should meet the principles of 
Selflessness, Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty and Leadership 
(http://www.public-standards.gov.uk/about_us/sevenjprinciples.htm).
 ^ As indicated with the development of regional Fimding Councils at England (HEFCE), Scotland 
(SHEFC) and Wales (HEFCW); the introduction of quality assessment mechanisms such as the 
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and the Teaching Quality Assurance (QAA); the Higher 
Education Performance Indicators and the Transparency and Accountability Review 
(http://www.jcpsg.ac.uk/).
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with the suggestion that in organisational challenges, as the Higher Education reform, 
it is necessary to consider accounting processes in the organisational context where 
they occur (Hopwood, 1974; Roberts and Scapens, 1985).
Trust has been increasingly considered as a crucial social prerequisite to 
almost all interactions in modem societies (Blomqvist, 1997). Hollis (1998) argues 
that without trust social life would be impossible and every day is an adventure in 
trusting thousands of others, seen and unseen, to act reliably. Among the advantages 
that tmst contributes to social life is that helps governing arrangements to work better 
(Uslanner, 2002). However, a ‘great deal of conceptual confusion’ (Blomqvist, 1997) 
implies to the various sources, forms and functions of trust, and makes it a ‘complex 
and slippery’ concept (Nooteboom, 2002). In any case, there is an agreement that is 
important for organisations in a number of ways. It enables cooperative behaviour 
(Powell, 1996), eases the management of conflicts (Das and Teng, 1998), supports 
organisational change (Sydow, 1998). Tmst is also required to reduce uncertainty, 
promote a more participative management style (Hosmer, 1995), and lower the 
formalisation in the organisation (Whitener et al, 1998) emphasising the delegation of 
authority to the members of the committee to decide about the vital issue of funds 
distribution. Furthermore, tmst as an element of governance is related to effective 
control (Bradach and Eccles, 1989), deliberation (Wanen, 1996), participation and/or 
delegation of decision authority (Hardin, 1999; Mills and Ungson, 2003), 
communication, procedural justice and organisational support (Albercht and 
Travaglione, 2003),
The present study will investigate the role of tmst in the management of the 
resource allocation process of The University. The contribution of the study will be 
the in depth understanding of the importance of tmst in the process from a 
management accounting perspective. In the meanwhile the study will develop through
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an interdisciplinary perspective of accounting, while challenging the traditional 
economics’ orientation of the discipline.
1.3 Research inquiry
The thesis of the study will address the research enquiry which is best stated in 
the question ‘how trust relates to the conditions of the resource allocation process?’. 
This question will be addressed considering the resource allocation process, as a 
managerial process embedded in the broader governing system of The University. 
The prospective outcome will be a suggestion of how trust would facilitate The 
University’s governance processes, such as the resource allocation one. The answer 
to this question will be provided while studying the conditions of social interaction 
that relate to trust within the resource allocation process. For that reason the study 
will seek to identify the perceived levels of trust between the participants, and the 
conditions of interaction in the process that are related to these levels of trust. The 
prospective outcome will be an in-depth understanding of the ways trust and 
organisational processes, such as the resource allocation process, could be constructed 
in The University organisational context.
For clarification purposes, it is also necessary to define major concepts that 
will be frequently refened in the present dissertation. First, the participants of the 
study are those individuals who accepted to participate in the study and they are all 
members of the official resource allocation committee of The University, the Star 
Chambers (section 2.5.4). In the study they are considered individually, and also as 
interacting members of two groups, the group of the Heads of the Resource Units and 
the group of the Management Group Participants. The Heads of the Resource Units 
who volunteered to participate in the study are also the Deans of the academic
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faculties of The University" .^ The ‘members of the management group’ are the 
study’s participants who are expressing their views from The University’s central 
administr ation point of view. For clarification and avoidance of misunderstanding the 
views expressed are not necessarily reflecting the official views of the existing 
Management Group of The University, and they are treated in the study as rather 
individual perceptions.
Resource Allocation Process in the study is considered the whole interaction 
between the Heads of the Resource Units and the members of the Management Group. 
In this context the study places major consideration on the official resource allocation 
committee meetings named the Stm; Chambers, as well as the existence of other 
formal or infoimal contacts that are related to the process, such as the Recourse 
Strategy Group, task groups and individual contacts. In that respect the resource 
allocation model, in the study, is the Income Driven Resource Allocation Model 
employed in The University’s resource allocation process at the time of the research. 
Its usefulness and operation of the model in the process, is conceived in both the 
official explanation given by The University’s Planning Office and as it is perceived 
by the paificipant’s of the study (see sections 2.5.4, 5.3.4, 5.3.5, 5.5.4 and 5.5.5).
hi addition Trust is a central concept in the study. However, as mentioned 
before, there are many conflicting views on the definition of ‘trust’. The Cambridge 
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary define trust as a ‘ belief or confidence in the honesty, 
goodness, skill or safety of a person, organisation or thing. Trusting / trustful 
(adjective) means always believing that other people are good or honest and will not 
harm or deceive you’ (http://dictionaiy.cambridge.org). In this study. The literature 
review section will deal with the concept of trust following the view that it 
encompasses an extrinsic and an intrinsic value (Nooteboom, 2002, see more section
The resource allocation process also involves Star Chamber meetings with tlie Non Academic 
Resource Units, who imfortunately did not accept to be considered in the present study (see section 
2.5.2).
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3.3). In the research’s empirical stages, the study will develop adopting two different 
approaches of understanding trust. First, a definition of trust is constructed from the 
literature in order to develop the Organisational Trust Inventory (section 4.7.1). 
Second, definitions of trust will be gathered from the participants’ perception of the 
meaning of the concept, as expressed during the individual semi-structured intei*views 
(section 5.3.1 and section 5.5.1).
Finally, accounting is perceived in the organisational context as a media and 
an outcome of the interaction between the study’s participants. More precisely, 
accounting in the current study is perceived as combining first a system of routines 
and procedures (accompanying the resource allocation process and the model 
employed), and second the ability to generate accountability through structures of 
communication, domination and legitimation (section 3.2.2). That perspective has 
been suggested as useful for understanding management accounting in its 
organisational context by Roberts and Scapens (1985).
1.4 Methodological considerations
The thesis developed during the course of the study engaging a variety of 
methods of evidence collection and analysis. In parallel, an interdisciplinary literature 
review undertaken to assist the in depth understanding of the phenomenon observed. 
Both the empirical and theoretical stages of the study developed during a continuous 
interpretation and reflection in the course of the study (with an appreciation of the 
Structuration theory as an essential theoretical background -  see more section 4.4 and 
4.5). The attention placed on the understanding of the process of interaction between 
the study’s participants and how trust relates with the development of the resource 
allocation process. The research developed in an 18 month period, considering one 
planning period of The University’s resources. All the senior personnel of the
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Resource Allocation Process were considered potential participants to the study, and 
the majority of them volunteered to participate in the study. The obseived interaction 
occurred between two groups of participants. One includes the participants from The 
University’s Management Group, namely the Principal, the Director of Finance, two 
Vice Principals and a senior administrator who was considered to be the ‘architect’ of 
the Income Driven Resource Allocation Model. The other Group includes all the 
Heads of the academic Resource Units (deans of faculties). The methods used was an 
organisational trust inventory that was administered to each individual at the 
beginning of the planning cycle, and individual semi-structured interviews that took 
place at the end of the period (section 4.7).
The first, chronologically, method of evidence collection method is an 
Organisational Trust Inventory (section 4.7.1). The role of this instrument in the study 
is to attain a first impression of existing levels of trust between the participants of the 
study. Originally, the Organisational Trust Inventory was published by Cummings 
and Bromiley (1996) and was used to measure interpersonal trust in an organisational 
context. The instrument used to the present study was reformed in consideration the 
study’s requirements and context. The outcome of the questionnaire was considered 
as an initial attempt to understand the levels of trust between the participants.
The second, chronologically, but major source of evidence to the study is a 
series of individual semi-structured interviews conducted with all the participants 
(section 4.7.2). The interviews provided with rich and meaningful insights to the 
understanding of the conditions of interaction between the participants and their 
perceived role of trust in the process. At the end of each interview the graphical 
representations of the questionnaires outcome shown anonymously to the participants, 
to allow them to react and comment about their own questionnaire response and the 
responses of the rest of the participants (section 5.6.3 and 5.6.4).
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The evidence gathered from the two primary methods was analysed first 
individually, then for each group of paiticipants and finally in cross case analysis 
between the two groups to identify patterns that might express them all (section 
4.7.3.).
1.5 Plan of the thesis
The thesis develops in a sequence of chapters that address different aspects of 
the research process. For that reason, the first chapter (Chapter 1) is the introduction 
to the thesis and outlines its context, main objectives, concepts and methodology.
Chapter 2 introduces the context of the British Higher Education and outlines 
the impact of the institutional reform of the sector and its relation to the universities’ 
organisational challenges. The chapter develops in thi'ee thematic stages. First, is the 
outline of the British public sector reform phases and its impact on the Higher 
Education sector (sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3). Second, is the review of the academic 
literature considering the British Universities’ responses to several aspects of the 
public sector reform such as the challenge for the universities’ governance structures; 
the non-profit character of the institutions and the impact of the notion of ‘new 
managerialism’; the impact of performance assessment technologies such as the 
Resource Assessment Exercise and Teaching Quality Assurance; and the review of 
resource allocation issues in the cases several British Universities (section 2.4). The 
third stage outlines The University’s response to the reform of the Higher Education 
sector introducing the main organisational features of The University as its mission 
and character; its governance and management stmcture; its funding main sources and 
its financial performance; and an overview of the Resource Allocation Process and 
Income Driven Resource Model which is the main attention of the present dissertation 
(section 2.5). The chapter concludes two key ideas. First that the Universities
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responded to the sector’s challenges dynamically and continuously. Second, that the 
diverse picture of responses indicates the individual character of each institution, 
which reflects the need to consider the internal socio -  political dynamics along with 
the broader cultural and historical importance of each university. Therefore, the 
choices of responses of the British Universities should be viewed as been driven from 
rather ‘inside’ than ‘outside’ socio- political dynamics.
The next chapter (chapter 3) reviews the academic literature considering the 
importance of studying accounting practises as socio-political processes within 
organisations, and the value of relations of trust in the organisational context. The 
chapter develops in three stages. First, is the review of the literature addressing the 
idea of how accounting practices should be considered as socio-political processes in 
the organisational context in which they operate (section 3.2). Main aspects of this 
review address the importance of accounting in the organisational governance, the 
usefulness of the Structuration theory in understanding the social constitution of 
accounting practices, and the view that accounting practices should be considered as 
rather dynamic processes rather than static ones. The second part of the chapter, 
reviews the academic literature of Trust and addresses its forms, faces, and objects 
(section 3.3.1). The chapter also introduces the idea of how trust could enhance the 
function of governance in general, and organisational management in particular 
(section 3.3.3). The last part of the chapter reviews the literature of organisational 
control aspect of management accounting and its relation to organisational trust 
(section 3.3.4). The chapter concludes that trust is a necessary aspect for 
organisational governance and it is important to be considered when studying 
accounting practices in the organisational context.
The next chapter (chapter 4) includes the methodological aspects of the thesis. 
The chapter evolves from theoretical considerations to the empirical stages of the 
research. The theoretical section outlines the social research paradigm debate, and
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addresses the way that organisational research can contribute to the social sciences’ 
knowledge about truth, reality and human nature (sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5). 
Following is the demonstration of the empirical choices of the research conducted, 
including the consideration of an ethical research approach, the methods of evidence 
collection and the methods of evidence analysis (section 4.6, 4.7). The chapter 
addresses the appropriateness of the methodological choices made for the thesis, 
facilitating the in depth study of the role of trust in the resource allocation process in 
the old University case.
The following chapter (chapter 5), demonstrates the analysis and discussion of 
the participants’ views about the resource allocation process and its relation to trust. 
The participants’ views are disclosed in three levels of analysis, which is first 
individually(section 5.2, 5.4), then within the group (section 5.3, 5.5), and finally in 
comparison between the two main groups (section 5.6). The synthesis of the views 
also considers both the administrative (instrumental) conditions of the interaction, 
such as the type of meetings related to the resource allocation process and the model, 
and the conditions of social conduct of the process as constructed during the 
interaction such as communication, authority and interests patterns and finally 
legitimate anticipations.
The final chapter (chapter 6) outlines the concluding observations from the 
research case (section 6.2), along with the study’s contributions to the issues 
addressed in the literature review and suggestions for further research (section 6.3). 
Ending, there is a note on the theoretical and empirical limitations of the study.
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Chapter 2- The British Higher Education Environment
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of the challenges that Higher Education has 
faced during the last decades and the ways in which Universities have responded, and
in particular The University under investigation. The main purpose of the chapter is
(to demonstrate the external environmental pressures confronted by the Higher 
Education histitutions in the last decades, and the preferred responses of these 
Universities. It is suggested that although universities faced a demanding external 
pressure, the choices of response were driven from ‘inside’ rather than ‘outside’. In 
other words the internal socio -  political structures of the paidicular institutions, 
reflecting their mission and interests, along with the demand to economise efficiently 
and effectively on resources, gave individual (different) types of response to reform.
The overview of The University’s governance, and the particular managerial decision 
of resource allocation, demonstrates the individuality of the response and the need to 
consider carefully the dynamics influencing the decision process in The University.
The reforms of the Higher Education are viewed from the old university 
perspective, due the character of The University under investigation. Angluin and 
Scapens (2000) acknowledging the ‘considerable diversity of the UK universities’, 
identified within others the ‘traditional older Scottish university’ as a distinctive 
university category (see appendix 1). This categorisation along with other similar 
categorisations found in the literature (see also Ackroyd and Acki'oyd, 1999) are 
considered useful to identify and understand the particular character and 
circumstances of The University in which the study occurs.
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2. 2 The British public sector reform
The Higher Education environment of Britain has changed dramatically since 
the late 1980’s, following the general ‘public sector reform’ imposed on public seiwice 
providers in Britain. All British universities faced the challenge to reform their 
management systems and their perspectives towards the effectiveness of their 
operation.
In general, the rhetoric of public sector reform which began to emerge in the 
last decades in the United Kingdom, attempted to reshape the provision of public 
services ideology from a bureaucratic state to ‘a flexible, accountable and devolved 
sector, capable of offering choices of uses to the public’ (Office of Public Services 
Reform, 2002). Attempts to reform the public sector ideology were twofold, with a 
focus on organisational changes of the public institutions on the one side, and 
attention on the ‘human resources’ involved on the other. The main implications of 
the new public sector system was to pursue a devolved administration in Scotland, 
Wales, Northern Ireland; to attain a costumer focus service; to conduct an operation 
with national standards of quality and accountability; and incentivise performance 
with indicators and reward systems. Similarly, the ‘human’ side of the public sector 
reform was aimed towards principles and values that public servants had to maintain. 
For that reason, the Committee on Standards in Public life (first chaired by Lord 
Nolan in 1994) produced the ‘Seven Principles of Public Life’ report suggesting that 
‘the public sector service provision should meet with principles of Selflessness, 
Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty and Leadership’ 
(Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2001). These principles were to be applied 
to the whole public sector including Education.
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2. 3 Impact on Higher Education
These ‘new public management’ developments affected the Higher Education 
sector enviromnent, in many ways. Major, government driven, changes in the Higher 
Education sector marked the route of Universities through to the ‘modernisation 
programme’ (Office of Public Seiwices Reform, 2002).
First, the devolved authority model influenced the Universities at various 
levels. In 1988, the ‘Education Reform Act’, allowed institutions to decide on local 
authority control in favour of incorporation (HMSO, www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/ 
acts.htm). Later in 1992, the ‘Further and Higher Education Act’, challenged the 
status and internal governance structure of Higher Education Institutions and 
reclassified the former polytechnics into Universities. Further, in respect to Higher 
Education fimding procedures, the 1992 Act, incorporating the devolved model of 
authority, proposed regional Higher Education Funding bodies. These bodies would 
act as institutional mediators between government and universities in the funding 
allocation process and have responsibility for institutional research, teaching quality 
assessments and the resulting allocation of funding. Until 31 March 1993 the 
Department of Education (DFE) funding bodies were the Universities Funding 
Council (UFC) for English, Scottish and Welsh universities, and the Polytechnics and 
Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) for English polytechnics and colleges of Higher 
Education. From 1 April 1993 these bodies were replaced by regionally 
differentiated councils with responsibility for funding all higher education institutions 
in England (Higher Education Funding Council for England - HEFCE), Scotland 
(Scottish Higher Education Funding Council - SHEFC), Wales (Higher Education in 
Funding Council for Wales - HEFCW). The Secretary of State (Department for 
Employment and Learning) continues to hold responsibility in Northern Ireland. The 
funding bodies work in partnership with other representative bodies (such as
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Universities UK, Universities Scotland) the Quality Assurance Agency and the Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (DfES, 2004).
England Northern
Ireland
Scotland Wales
Government Department for 
Education and 
Skills (DfES)
UK
Government
Scottish
Executive
National 
Assembly for 
Wales
HE funding 
body
Higher
Education
Funding
Council for
England
(HEFCE)
Department for Scottish 
Employment Higher 
and Learning 
(DEL)
Education
Funding
Council
(SHEFC)
Higher
Education
Funding
Council for
Wales
(HEFCW)
Table 2.1 : The Funding Bodies and the Government 
(Source; Department for Higher Education and Skills ‘Higher Education in the 
United Kingdom Guide’ -  January 2004, http://www.dfes.gov.uk)
The major flinding amounts aie distributed to the Universities through the 
Funding Bodies that allocate most of their funds by formula to teaching and research. 
In general, the allocation of funds for teaching is based on the number of students and 
the subjects that the university teaches. On the other hand, most of the funds for 
research are based on the quality and volume of research. The funding bodies have 
‘sole responsibility’ for allocating funds to Universities, but they operate at ‘arms 
length’ from the Government which provides them with guidance and priorities 
(DfES, 2004). Although the Government, via the Higher Education funding bodies 
remained the main source of funding for the Universities, other alternative income 
sources are sought to maintain the operation of the institutions such as fee-paying 
students, conferences and through providing services. The following diagram shows 
the structure of the Universities’ funding.
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Figure 2.1 : Sources of Finance for Universities and Colleges 2001/2002
Department for Education and 
Skills / Scottish Executive/ 
National Assembly for Wales/ 
Department for Employment 
 and Learning NI______
Office of Science and 
Technology
Other Government
SLC/LEA/SAAS/ 
NI fees 
£554M 4%
Funding Research
Council Grants
grants and
£5. Contracts
96M £805M
39% 6%
Postgraduate 
fees £293M 
2%
Research Non­
£572M research
4% £985M
7%
Universities and colleges 
total income £14,491M
Other research UK Overseas Residences Other
income £45 OM charities student and catering Income
£607M fees £968M 7% £2,690M
4% £875M 19%
6% t
Other fee income £1,121M 
Income from non research services 
£455M
Endowments £25 8M
Other operating Income £856M
(Source: HESA finance record 2001- 02 UK HEIs)
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The need to widen Universities’ accessibility and the competition for 
alternative sources of funding has resulted in nearly doubling the numbers of students 
as Universities in recent years. The Figure 2.2 below shows the growth of student 
numbers since the end of 1980’s (see also appendix 2b).
Higher Education Student Population
(Source; DfES - httpVAvww.dfes.gov.uk)
2000
1800
1600
1400
« 1200 +  • o
V V V V V \ '  \ '  T
year
Figure 2.2
In order to meet the customer focused service aim of the reform, an operation 
of national standards of quality and accountability to the Universities’ stakeholders 
was introduced to the sector during the 1990’s. These involved procedures designed 
to assess the quality of various aspects of University education. The main procedures 
are outlined at the following table 2.2.
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Process Undertaken by
Internal quality assurance process The University including external 
examiners, and internal validation and 
review of programs
Institutional -  level quality review Quality Assurance Agency (QAA)
Subject -  level quality review QAA (will end 2005)
Professional Accreditation Professional and statutory bodies
Research Assessment Funding Bodies using peer review (RAE)
Table 2.2: Quality assurance in Higher Education 
(Source: DfH: ‘Higher Education in the United Kingdom Guide -  January 2004,
http://www.dfes.gov.uk)
There are three major schemes of assessment, which operate independently. 
These are:
a. The Research Assessment Exercise is a UK wide assessment of research 
quality based on the number of research active staff, the quality of staff publications, 
the numbers of research students and research assistants, the level of external research 
income, and the research environment within the institution. The first RAE was held 
in 1986 when a policy of selective fimding was introduced by the government (RAE, 
2001: http://ivww.rae.ac.uk/).
b. The Transparency Review is to improve the Universities’ public 
accountability and to ensure improved information for management. Specifically, the 
Transparency Review was to establish an approach that demonstrated the full costs of 
research and other publicly funded activities in Higher Education to improve the 
accountability for the use of public funds. The requirements for the Transpaiency and 
Accountability Review were established in 1998 by the Government, which then 
conducted the first ‘Comprehensive Spending Review’. The scheme awarded £1. 
5bn of additional funding for Higher Education but with the condition of becoming 
more open about the way public funds are spent in universities and colleges (JCPSG: 
http ://www.i CPS g . ac. uk/transpar/index.htm)
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c. The Quality Assurance Agency was established in 1997 ‘to provide an 
integrated quality assurance service for UK. Higher Education’. The agency plays a 
safeguarding role to assure that every Higher Education Institution offers ‘good 
quality of education’ and that ‘appropriate standards are achieved’. It does this 
mainly through a peer review process of audits and reviews of teaching and learning 
provision. These are conducted by teams of auditors and reviewers, most of whom are 
academics but with some members drawn, where appropriate, from industry and the 
professions (QAA: http://www.qaa.ac.uk).
Finally, a very challenging development of the Universities reform was the 
establishment of ‘performance indicators’ in 1998. The main bodies which pursued 
the development of the indicators were the four funding bodies. The first set of 
performance indicators, in their current form, was published in December 1999. The 
indicators attempt to measure performance of the Universities reflecting access to 
Higher Education, non-completion rates for students, outcomes and efficiencies for 
learning and teaching in universities and colleges, employment of graduates, research 
output. They have been published amiually since 1998, with additions and 
amendments as their coverage is extended (SHEFC: http://www.shefc.ac.uk).
2. 4 The Universities’ response
This section includes the views found in literature about the changing 
environment in Higher Education and the reaction of the academic community and 
institutions to subsequent pressure. Some of the studies critically theorise the 
potential reform of the governing style of the universities, in respect to the values and 
management style of the institutions (amongst others see Ackroyd and Acki oyd, 1999; 
Knight, 2002; Parker, 2002; Paterson, 2003). Others examine the impact of the 
reform on particular cases (see Jones, 1994; Scapens et al, 1994; Jarzabkowsky,
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2002). The main points of these studies are first that the Universities’ reform is a 
continuous and dynamic process; and second that it is difficult to draw a unifonn 
picture of the impact of the changes due to the different character of the institutions 
and the particularity of their internal socio-political structures that affect these 
changes. In respect to the external political response of the Universities -  which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse- it has been suggested that the development 
of ‘small, semi-infoimal groups’ of universities, such as the Russell Group and 
Universitas 21 (in which The University under investigation participates), function as 
lobbying bodies (see appendix 3).
Bearing in mind the earlier literature (see Pheffer and Salancic, 1974; Hills and 
Mahoney, 1978), it is broadly accepted that the process and outcome of decisions 
affecting resource allocation, depends more on the conditions of the social-political 
environment of the institutions rather than an economic rational of efficiency. 
Studies of Universities in USA, suggest that political model accounts are more likely 
to provide valuable explanations of the budgetary process than the rational or 
bureaucratic model (Pfeffer and Salancic, 1974). They demonstrated that at the 
University of Illinois, the resource allocation process was a political one. They found 
a significant relation between departmental power and the proportion of the budget 
received and that the more powerful the department, the less the allocated resources 
are a function of departmental work and student demand for course offerings. Others 
found that power and social influence processes were more important in University 
budgeting in decision situations of uncertainty, scarcity and criticalness and secret 
information (Gordon and Darkenwald, 1971; Hills and Mahoney 1978; Pfeffer and 
Moore, 1980)
The following sections review the literature about British Universities and with 
particular consideration to the old ones (pre 1992), which could provide a better 
understanding of The University under investigation.
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2.4.1 University governance structure
The changes of the external university environment imposed a multisided 
pressure to the universities, which were asked to respond by refonning their 
governance structures. Several academics dealt with the examination of the attempt 
of British Universities to cope with these changes. It is commonly accepted that 
Universities have to change what they do, but traditional university structures, 
reporting mechanisms and control processes are facing difficulties in coping with 
these changes. The process of internal change is difficult because institutions are 
trying to cope simultaneously with increased workloads and reduced levels of 
resources. Furthermore it is also accepted that Universities do not have imifonn 
governance or management arrangements (Ackroyd and Ackroyd, 1999; Bennett, 
2002; Shattock, 2002; Taylor, 2003) and it is difficult to give a commonly acceptable 
picture of the entire sector.
Ackroyd and Ackroyd (1999) claim that old Universities are collegial 
organisations, with governance based on high levels of participation for the benefit of 
the groups having an interest in them. Further, they insisted that the problems of 
governance do not arise from the general lack of accountability but from the particular 
features of organisation, which sometimes prevent their existing processes of self­
regulation fi'om functioning adequately. Drawing the main characteristics of the old 
Universities (pre- 1992), they observe that Senates and Couids tend to be the major 
bodies of governance, with strong collegiate character ‘featuring collective decision 
and dispersed power’ (Ackroyd and Ackroyd, 1999). The role of Vice Chancellor is 
seen as combining that of academic leader with that of chief administrative officer, 
implementing the decisions of the council and the senate. The vice chancellors senior 
team is often made up of elected academics serving only limited terms of office. 
Stability is usually founded in a highly centralised unitary administration with
2 0
Chapter 2: The British Higher Education Environment
pemianent officials. In these circumstances administration by officials rather than 
management by senior academics is a key coordinating mechanism. Academics are 
not directly managed and academic staff often retain significant power within 
departments and faculties. Knight (2002) claims that the attempt of the government to 
reform the governance structures of the universities (both old and new) with the 1992 
Act, created flawed constitutions with maximised roles of vice -  chancellor (old 
universities) and chief-executive (new universities) and limited participation of staff 
and students. He suggests that there is a need to reform the governance arrangements 
of the particular Act. The table below shows the main governance characteristics 
between the old (pre-1992) and new (post-1992) universities identified by Ackroyd 
and Ackroyd (1999).
Old universities New universities
Characteristics Slow moving Responsive
Lacks responsiveness to Innovative
markets Opportunistic
Traditional Decisive / managerial
Collegial / democratic Devolved and
Centralised and unitary decentralised
administration administration
Key imbalances Too strong senate Too weak academic board
Lack of financial control / Impropriety, abuse of
bankruptcy power, lack of/
Too weak/ ill defined interference in due process
executive Too strong executive
Large Court Lack of wider consultative
Council too large structures
Danger of too cosy a 
relationship between Chair 
of Board and Vice 
Chancellor
Table 2.3: Characteristic problems of governance 
(source Ackroyd and Ackroyd, 1999)
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A major characteristic of the old universities governance is the centrality of the 
university’s administration, which results in increased overhead costs and inflexible 
bureaucracy. Hackman (1985) linked the concept of power to the one of centrality in 
a university management, in tenns of the relation of the unit to the university’s 
mission, he concluded that ‘core units’ (academic departments) benefit when they help 
themselves while peripheral units (non -academic departments) gain ‘when they 
contribute to the total institution’. Ashar and Shapiro (1988) identified centrality in 
terms of organisations workflow (not of mission) such as research collaborations, 
classes offered by department and number of students registered for classes in a 
department. They found that ‘centrality is a major departmental characteristic taken 
into account by decision makers’ and that ‘ central departments survive better than 
peripheral ones in times of financial crisis’.
However, the need to develop devolved authority structures is stressed by 
Bourn (1994) and Tomkins and Mawditt (1994). They suggest that universities need 
to adopt a devolved authority structure that will help to cope with large size and 
diverse activities; make the best use of ‘local’ and expert knowledge; speedier 
decision taking; encourage innovation and accountability; and gain greater cost and 
revenue consciousness. However, analysing the attempt to implement a profit centre 
based accounting structure in the case of the University of Bath, Tomkins and 
Makwditt (1994) found that it was not happily accepted by senior administrators, who 
were disinclined to devolve decision-making power to profit centres and the loss of 
central control, and that was one of the main causes of cmcial financial problems.
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2.4.2 The non -  profit character and ‘new managerialism’
Another characteristic of the old civic Universities in Britain is their non -  
profit chai'acter and it is reflected in the values that their mission incorporates. Kanter 
and Summers (1987) illustrate that the measurement of Universities’ performance is 
difficult because their goals are not around financial returns but around their mission 
or services (also Salter and Tapper, 2002; Goddard and Ooi, 1998; Gillie, 1999; Lewis 
and Pendlebury, 2002). Further, Paterson (2003) found that in British universities 
there is a widespread attachment to a civic role for Higher Education and strong 
attachment to traditional academic values. Arguing that there is an unavoidable 
historical fact that universities are socially embedded (also Jarzabkowsky, 2002), the 
policies followed have social goals in mind such as educating, maintaining and 
developing the nation’s cultures, preparing students to contribute to community and 
economic development. With particular respect to Scottish ‘dominant epistemology’, 
she observes that the traditional Scottish Universities (St Andrews, Glasgow, 
Aberdeen and Edinburgh) perceive knowledge as public good, a whole body of belief 
called ‘democratic intellectualism’ (quoting in Davie, 1961). Moreover, academics in 
Scotland were more in favour of government monitoring the expenditure of Higher 
Education than their counterparts in England, stressing that accountability framework 
for Scottish Higher Educations should be Scottish. Gross (1968), while observing 
that universities are not usually viewed as formal organisations, seeks an explanation 
to the definition of ‘goals’ that university communities identify as priorities. He 
views universities as ‘ideological organisations’ with an emphasis on education, and 
as in the case of ideological organisations, there may be a close coiTespondence 
between private and group goals. He found that most of the ‘top goals’ between 
academics for university were support of the academic activities goals rather than 
output goals (for instance financial resources).
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The attempt to ‘reform’ the ways of thinking in the university administrative 
culture, is perceived by many researchers as an implementation of the ‘new 
managerialism’ proposed to the extended British public sector (Williams, 1997; 
Parker and Gould, 1999; Gray et al, 2002; Salter and Tapper, 2002; Lapsey and 
Miller, 2004). Deem (2004) views the ‘new managerialism’ as a set of ideologies 
about organisational practices and values used to bring the benefits of the practices 
developed in the private sector and from the devolution of financial and other 
responsibilities to lower organisational levels. However, she comments that what is 
often ignored during such attempts of ‘modernisation’ is the strong value basis of 
public service work, which differs significantly from that in the for-profit sector. 
Furthermore, contemporary academic work is not just public seiwice but also there is a 
significant engagement with creative knowledge work. This engagement creates 
distinctive characteristics of work such as the direction of academic loyalty to the 
basic academic unit and subject or discipline and not the interests of the university as 
a whole; the fact that much of the academic work, especially research, is individual 
rather than collective; and finally academics are trained as critical thinkers and can 
apply this to anyone attempting to manage them. These characteristics make the 
implementation of ‘for -  profit’ managerial ideologies (for instance performance 
evaluation or incentivation) difficult. In respect to the construction of the manager -  
academic identity, Jolmson (2002) claims that when academics take on management 
roles, and when the external context for academic work and organisation changes, the 
relative value of previous knowledge and understating is reduced. Therefore, training 
and support on management practices is required. In a very critical tone, Parker M. 
(2000) views the construction of the manager-academic as a paradox, arguing that the 
‘romantic conception of the ethical purity of intellectuals is placed in extreme doubt. 
The future of work as Universities seem to reflect an increasing tension between the
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‘dominant McProfessionalism’ and the receding sense of what it might mean to be an 
intellectual’ (also Prichard and Willmott, 1997).
Strathern (2000) observes the construction of an ‘audit culture’ in Universities, 
where the ‘new managerial’ techniques are applied with the rhetoric of helping 
(monitoring) people to help (monitor) themselves, including helping people to get 
used to this new culture of ‘economic efficiency and good practice’. She 
demonstrates, adopting the ‘audit society’ argument of Power (1997), that the 
increasing checking as an enforced accountability becomes necessary in situations of 
mistrust. Similarly, Shore and Wright (2000) while considering the development of 
the ‘new managerialism’ in Universities, observe an attempted implementation of an 
‘audit culture’. They claim that this approach damages trust while it encourages the 
displacement of a system based on autonomy and trust, by one based on visibility and 
coercive accountability.
The need to consider the universities’ non-profit and educational mission is 
also discussed in eaiiier Higher Education literature for US universities. White 
(1974) investigated the effect of the goal of individuals and of consti aints of resource 
utilisation, on organisational behaviour. He maintained that different individuals will 
have different levels and kinds of interest in the same allocative decision, and will 
attempt to achieve different goals with the same resources. Furthermore, he found 
that the greater the number of allocations affected by a change, the more the 
individuals who will be interested and consequently, the more difficult it will be for 
them to agree on the change. Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) state that when 
organisational participants derive different meaning fonn the same set of details, no 
bureaucratic decision procedures will unambiguously decide the issue. They noted 
from Wildavsky (1961) the quote ‘It is not just whether or not to do more or better, 
but also who shall receive the benefits’.
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2.4.3 Responding to Teaching and Research assessment technologies
One of the core arguments in the reform of British Universities is the necessity 
to perfomi efficiently in terms of research and teaching, ihanaging effectively the 
human and financial resources available. Salter and Tapper (2002) suggested that the 
Universities internal governance, ideally, should adapt to the changing external 
environment using the principle of ‘fitness for purpose’. They claim that the t^vo key 
functions of the universities, teaching and research are reformed as ‘political games’ 
to which the universities governance need to respond adaptively. The following 
studies deal with the academic views on the implementation and appropriateness of 
the mechanisms imposed externally (such as Research Assessment Exercise, Quality 
Assessment see section 2. 3) and the impact on the internal miiversity governance.
Responding to the Research assessment technologies, Humphrey et al. (1995) 
claim that the research selectivity is arbitrary and subjective and does not directly 
ensure that ‘resources for reseaich are used to the best advantage’. They ascertain 
that instead of academic freedom of thought, sharing of ideas and the need to build a 
sound, scholarly basis for a university career, research selectivity is promoting the 
language of self interest, marketing and entrepreneurship. West et al (1998) 
investigate the relationship between university departmental climate and the research 
excellence rating. They found that the more bureaucratically governed a department 
is, then less the ownership and value are attributed to departmental objectives. The 
less relaxed and friendly the atmosphere. The less sharing of ideas exist. The less the 
career development opportunities are perceived to be fair, and less the support for 
innovation is in place. In similar tone, Elton (2000) claimed that a competitive, 
adversarial and punitive spirit are some of the unintended consequences of the 
Research Assessment Exercise, and a fundamental review of the system is required to 
avoid the consequences before they become apparent.
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Glass et al (1996 and 1997) undertook an economic analysis using a 
production model to investigate the issue of cost efficiency and expansion of the 
university sector, the targeting of reseaich funding and the desirability of universities 
to ‘produce research and teaching as joint programmes’. They found particular 
difficulties inlierent in the output measures of university efficiency and the 
consequential behavioural impact of using such measines important. Further, the 
manner in which the RAE has been used to allocate funding has introduced 
uncertainty and significant scope of gaming (for instance the indication of varying 
strategies of staff classification as ‘research active’ or ‘research inactive’ which would 
result on different levels of funding). Traditional universities have been characterised 
by overall increasing return to scale, which in Glass et al (1996) opinion, suggests that 
any further investment in universities to improve efficiency would be better targeted 
towards the top universities.
Lewis and Pendlebury (2002) explain that due to the societal role and public 
character of the Universities, it is difficult to justify an appropriate measure for Higlier 
Education cross subsidies. However, the ‘traditional ethos’ of societal benefits rather 
than financial viability, is challenged with the increasing emphasis on accountability 
and efficiency and the attitudes of senior managers are subject to change towards 
cross subsidy.
In respect to the Teaching Quality Assessment, Sharp et al (1997) found that 
between old and new University academics in Scotland, there is a generally broad 
degree of tolerance of most aspects of the Teaching Quality assessment. However, 
they observed a mixture of reactions, which may be an effect of the introduction of the 
whole notion of having external monitoring of the quality of universities’ teaching. 
For Instance Sharp et al (1997) found that the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
universities affected the perceived usefulness of Teaching Quality Reports in tenns of 
marketing and advertising. Also, differences found in relation to whether the
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respondents were involved in the teaching assessment process as assessors or 
assessed, such as the experience of the assessment visit was regarded more favourably 
by the assessors.
2.4.4 University Resource Allocation Models
In respect to the specific issue of resource allocation, Thomas (2000) 
investigated the rhetoric of rationality of the formula based systems of resource 
allocation in two UK Universities. He found that behaviour patterns associated with 
sub-unit power emerged between individuals and groups. Responses to the changes 
proposed in the Report of the Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies (published by 
the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principles in 1985, broadly known as the 
‘Jarratt Report’) differed between institutions, but there developed a ‘post Jarratt 
orthodoxy’ (quoted in Williams 2000) which involved the adoption of formulaic 
approaches to the allocation of resources and enhanced devolution of budgetary 
responsibility to a departmental or faculty level. Internal models tended to have two 
characteristics: they reflected the funding council’s methodology at an institutional 
level and they incorporated incentives for departments to increase non-govemmental 
income to compensate for declining government support. Angluin and Scapens 
(2000) found that universities with computerised planning tend to be considered as 
having more transparent planning models and resource allocation models. However, 
significant differences found amongst UK universities in the use of financial 
information for academic management and the transparency to academic subject 
group of university planning and resource allocation. Knowledge of how universities 
allocate resources appears to be largely restricted to those involved in the process. In 
any case, transparency was related to the fairness of the planning process and in 
universities without a computer based planning model or with low or non-transparent
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models, the allocation process is considered as less fair by the respondents to the 
survey.
Jarzabkowsky (2002) examined the strategic implications of resource 
allocation models in three universities (Warwick, LSE, Oxford Brooks) in respect to 
their degree of centralisation, locus of strategic direction, cross subsidy and locus of 
control. The study’s findings suggest that resource allocation models are historically 
and culturally situated within the context of each university, therefore the models in 
use were more a matter of internal fit than of best practice.
Scapens et al (1994) investigated the development of the resource allocation 
model of The University of Manchester and in particular the way overheads were 
allocated. It was found that charging academic resource centres with the amount of 
overheads proportional to number of students, academic staff and space occupied, was 
more acceptable between academics than the previous system which top-sliced 35 per 
cent of all income. However, some problems remained unsolved (such as difficulty 
to allow the surplus generating faculties to have full access to their funds) and he 
suggests that greater transparency would help to a better implementation of the model.
In the particular type of ‘top slicing’ mode, Pendlebury and Algaber (1997) 
state that although the system can be successfiil to fimd central services, the need for 
devolved budget responsibility and transparency, requires the consideration of 
alternative models. However, surveying the attitudes towards the introduction of 
other systems (such as Activity Based Costing, internal market prices, service level 
agreements) they found that universities have been ‘sensible in resisting these trends’
Groves et al (1997) investigated the appropriateness and relevance of the 
development of ‘strategic management thinking’ and managerial models in 
universities. Universities do not appear ready to conform with the corporate model of 
strategic thinking because the nature of their processes and products (teaching, 
research and support services) is very different. The institutions face more
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conflicting goals from numerous and diverse stakeholders more than private firms and 
they have more complex strategic choices. However, Groves et al (1997) suggest that 
an awareness of competitive position, competitive advantage and scope and the value 
chain of a university can be useful tools for prioritisation between research selectivity, 
teaching excellence and income generation. They also proposed that issues of 
educational products and processes need to be considered alongside cultural and 
political factors.
Bourn (1994) examines the affect of environmental change on the strategy, 
organisational process and structure of The University of Southampton. He proposed 
an evolutionary process approach to matching a university to its environment so that 
more informed strategies of resource acquisition and allocation would be applied. 
Goddard and Ooi (1998) examined the development of Activity Based Costing at The 
University of Southampton and found that there were significant problems in the 
system’s application. They suggest that political and social factors may influence the 
selection of such a system more than economic considerations.
Jones (1994) examined the possibility of introducing a uniform approach to the 
reporting and resource allocation processes of universities. His study is a 
comparative examination of The University of East Anglia, The University of 
Edinburgh and University College London, Although he recognises that the 
individual circumstances of different institutions must be considered carefully. He 
observed that the management of the universities relied heavily upon consensus and 
extensive committee structures. During the 1990s all three universities developed 
new planning models, which reflected to a degree the format of the information 
received from the university Funding Council, but the specific organisational 
characteristics of each university influenced the model’s implication and 
effectiveness. Jones (1994) claims that the allocation models provided a sense of 
objectivity, which potentially defused tensions and created a starting point for
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discussion, but at the end the strong collegial culture, which traditionally operated as a 
management by consensus, proved unwilling to accept strong centralised patterns of 
the proposed processes.
Whittington (2000) explored the effect of the funding council formula funding 
approach to The University of Cambridge and concluded that the although Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) did not require the adoption of a 
formula by the institution, the pressure of efficiency savings resulted in a 
reconsideration of the fund’s drivers within the institution. However, he believes that 
the impact of this adoption is damaging. Whittington (2000) maintains that areas of 
the university system in the lowest cost bands for teaching and research would suffer 
damage due to the ‘prices’ which do not reflect the efficient relative cost of providing 
teaching and research. Furthermore they fail to reflect market values of degrees in 
interdisciplinary subjects.
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2. 5 The University’s response
2.5.1 Mission and character of The University
The University was founded in 1451. The civic character of its operation and 
the historical role in the social reality of Scottish education determine its particular 
organisational characteristics. Mainstream to The University life is the strategic 
orientation of a public institution ‘leading to national and international position in 
teaching, in research and in links with industry and commerce’ (quoted from the 
Strategic Planning Statement 1997 - 2001). The emphasis is on the civic status of 
The University that detennines its role within the local and international community 
and is related to the social expectations concerning its educational leadership and 
achievement. It is stated - in the strategic planning statement of The University - that 
the particular status of size and diversity of large civic universities have, makes the 
achievement of a specific strategic purpose or direction difficult. Furthermore, the 
history and tradition of large civic universities ‘have at times led to a complacency, 
exacerbated in many cases by failure to develop more up - to- date management 
structure and strategies’ (quoted from GU Strategic Planning Statement 1997-2001).
The Higher Education reform demands, impact on The University. In 
response to the government guidelines of governance and operation The University 
critically reviewed its practices (see appendix 4). Characteristically, in the Strategic 
Planning Statement it is stated that:
‘Changes in the external environment in the 1980s and 1990s, 
particularly in the nature o f the relationship between Government and 
Universities, have done much to shake civic universities from this kind o f 
‘creepingparalysis 'from which The University was by no means immune.
In The University‘s case there was also the danger that its large local 
student base and its very ‘Scottishness ' as an institution would result in
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parochialism which belie its claims to be a leading international 
university' (Strategic Planning Statement 1997 -  2000).
A series of University policies developed in order to address The University’s 
response to the Higher Education changing environment. An example of this response 
that reflects the complicated character of the reform along with unique social and 
educational character of The University is the ‘conflicts of interest policy’. This 
policy developed in order to manage the possibilities of potential conflicts of interest 
between The University’s members of staff and the prospective collaborations with 
‘for -  profit’ organisations. According to this policy the members of The University 
have the obligation to avoid ethical, legal, financial or other conflicts of interest. This 
policy incorporates the Seven Principles of Public Life (Committee on Standards in 
Public Life, 2001). It is stated in the policy that ‘apparent conflicts may undermine 
trust and be as damaging as an actual conflict’ (GU conflicts of interest policy, 2001).
This concern, in addition to the fact that the British educational enviromnent 
changed drastically during the recent decades, determined the process of the 
organisational decisions taken in The University. The performance evaluation of The 
University’s Resource Units was found to be an important issue, especially under the 
consideration of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). The Resource Units of 
The University, which are resource driven centres including departments of similar 
educational disciplines, were evaluated in a process of analysis of strengths and 
weaknesses. The focus of such an evaluation was intended to estimate the 
effectiveness of each Resource Unit to increase income and reduce expenditures and 
to identify the strengths, which would lead to the achievement of The University’s 
objectives along with those of the British Government and Scottish Higher Education 
Funding Council.
The University employs a transparent approach to its operation and 
specifically to the financial and management procedures. A great amount of
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information is disclosed to the web site of The University and is visible to everybody 
within the campus. In addition a large volume of periodic publications focuses on the 
spreading of the information. Furthermore, the administration’s profile is open and 
communicable to everyone who is interested in going to more details. In part, this 
approach is determined by the regulatory requirement of the British Government that 
introduced the ‘Transparency Review’ initiative (published by the Joint Costing and 
Pricing Steering Group http ://www.icpsg.ac.uk/ti^anspar/index.htm). According to this 
the UK Government is demanding that imiversities should demonstiate that they 
provide value for money as a condition of continued research funding. It is 
committed ‘to ensuring that the Funding Councils and the Research councils work 
together to deliver better value, transparency and targeting in the use of science 
research funding’ (quoted from The University Newsletter, December 1999).
2.5.2 The University’s governance and management structure
The governing body of The University is the Court. The Court is responsible 
for the ‘strategic direction of The University, approval of major developments and the 
receipt of regular reports from officers of the Court on the day to day operations of its 
business and its subsidiary companies (quoted by the ‘statement on corporate 
governance’ in the financial statement of the year 31 July 2000). The Principal who is 
also a Vice -  Chancellor, is a member of the Court but does not chair it. The overall 
policy responsibility rests with the Management Group of the Principal. The 
Management Group consists of the Principal, the Vice Principals, the Secretary of the 
Court, the Clerk of Senate and other appropriate senior administrative officers. It acts 
as a ‘policy and Resource Committee’ and advises the Court on overall objectives and 
priorities of The University and proposed strategies and policies to achieve them 
(‘statement on corporate governance’ in the financial statement of the year 31 July
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2000). The Resource Strategy Group has been at the heart of the current planning 
process which has led to the production of the planning statement.
For organisational purposes relating to internal planning, management and 
finances The University has (at the time of the research) eleven (11) academic 
Resource Units and two (2) non-academic Resource Units. In the Strategic Planning 
of The University 1997 -  2001, it is stated that The University operates witliin ‘a 
devolved management structure where much of the responsibility for resource 
planning and management rests with the thirteen (13) Resource Units (11 academic 
plus Central administration and Information Services). Each academic Resource Unit 
has a Dean (Head of Resource Unit) and a Resource Unit Administrator, and similarly 
the non academic Resource Units have a Head of Resource Unit and a Resource Unit 
Administrator.
Table 2.4: University Organisational Hierarchies
Source: Planning Office (University’s web site)
Academic Resource Units in ‘national academic cost center order’
Clinical Medicine (CMED)
Dental School (DENT)
Veterinary Medicine (VETS)
Institute of Biomedical and Life Sciences(IBLS)
Physical Sciences (PHSC)
Engineering (ENGN)
Computing Science, Maths and Statistics (CSMS, in 2002/03 renamed as FIMS) 
Social Sciences (SOCS)
Arts and Divinity (ARTS)
Education (EDCN)
Ersatz /pseudo academic Resource Units 
Business School (GBUS)
Crichton Campus (CRIC)
Non Academic Resource Units 
Information Services (INFO)
Central Administration (CADS)_______________________ ________________
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2.5.3 The University’s funding
Most of The University’s teaching and research income is allocated by the 
Scottish Higher Education Funding Council Grant. The table 2.5 below shows the 
summary of the income and expenditure amounts of The University (see also 
appendix 5).
Table 2.5: Financial figures 2002 -  2003 (summary)
Source: (University’s web site)
Summary of income £M
Funding council Grants 116.0
Tuition fees and education contracts 38.7
Research Grants and contracts 76.9
Other income 48.0
Endowment and investment income 6.2
Total income 285.8
Summary of Expenditure £M
Staff costs 170.8
Other operating expenses 100.1
Depreciation 14.7
Interest payable and other similar charges 0.4
Total expenditure 286.0
Summary of Historic Cost surplus £M
Surplus on continuing operations 6.4
Difference between historical cost depreciation & actual charge for the period 3.3 
calculated on the revalued amount
Realisation of property revaluation gains of previous years 2,5
Historic cost surplus________________________________________________ 12. 2
More precise, the main source of The University’s income is received horn the 
government through the Scottish Higher Education Funding Council 
(http://www.shefc.ac.uk). The council’s Grant letter at the year of the research 
announced on the 20^  ^of March 2002 (SHEFC, Circular Letter HE/15/02).
In general, the Council hinds The University with the condition that The 
University satisfies particular arrangements, which are contained in the Financial 
Memorandum of the council (http://www.shefc.ac.uk/publications/
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shefc/shefc_finaiicial_memorandum.html). These conditions refer to issues of 
funding as well as requirements of Financial Statements, Reseaieh Contracts, Audits, 
Insurance, Performance Indicators and Strategic Planning. In addition, regular 
reports are required by the council from The University on student numbers, research 
activity, staff resources and others.
In the particular year, according to the Naixative Explanation of the Income 
Driven Resource Allocation Model (IDRM) as received by The University Court on 
the 26*^  of June 2002, the core-funding grant (for teaching, associated tuition fees, 
main research giant, estates and equipment) for the all the Scottish Institutions went 
up 2.7% in cash terms in comparison to the previous year. The funding figure for The 
University in comparison to the previous year increased around 6.8% (assuming 
inflation generally to be 2 % % the next academic year). This increase was due to the 
Councils new policy to support selected areas for teaching (for instance clinical based 
subjects), and the Research Assessment Exercise results announced very recently (in 
December 2001, see appendix 6). However, the comparative increase should be 
inteipreted carefully due to the change of the funding bases of the Funding Council.
2.5.4 The resource allocation process and model of The University
In respect to the planning procedure of The University, a Resource Allocation 
process and an Income Driven Resource Allocation (IDRM) model have been 
developed. The main resource allocation meetings of the senior administrators of The 
University are the Star Chambers (see appendix 7 for more on purpose, topics covered 
and historical note). The Stai* Chambers are mainly financial discussions, which take 
place during the planning process of The University. These committee meetings take 
place between the Heads of Resource Units and The University’s Principal / Director 
of Finance, accompanied by support administrators. At the time of the research the 
meetings were conducted on an individual Resource Unit basis. In respect to the
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IDRM’s operation, the Star Chamber’s consider the Cash Limited Allocations, which 
are used as a basis for the Cash Limited Budgets for each Resource Unit. The model 
does not incorporate all of the income and expenditure in The University’s budgets 
(income excluded is mainly from earmarked grants which are certain grants received 
from SHEFC for particular purposes, short courses, exceptional items and transfers to 
and fr om reserves). At the end of the planning cycle the agreed format of the IDRM is 
submitted to the Scottish Higher Education Funding Council along with The 
University’s overall budget (Finance Office, Financial Handbook, University’s web 
site)
Table 2.6: Resource Allocation Timetable
(Source: Planning Office, (University’s web site)
December - January First star chambers
January Registry checks for quality of student 
record system
February Departments, Faculties and Resource 
Units check quality of Student Record 
System data
End February Student Record System database frozen 
for definite Income Driven Resource 
Model base data
Mid- late March Scottish Higher Education Funding 
Council main grant letter published
April and May Income Driven Resource Model budget 
setting and star chamber meetings take 
place
Early -  mid June Income Driven Resource Model report 
received by Resource Strategy 
Committee, Finance Committee and 
Senate
Late June Income Driven Resource Model report 
received by Court
The Resource Allocation process cycle shown in the above table is indicative. 
In the year of the research, due to The University’s organisational changes and the 
reform of the IDRM, its final form was agreed during October 2002 (see appendix 8). 
In particular, at the yeai* of the research, a number of organisational changes happened
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in The University, ‘in the light of strategic planning in The University’ (Nanntive 
IDRM -  as in Court 26/6/02). The changes while they had a timing impact in the 
budget process, and structural impact on the IDRM, where considered carefully during 
the research process.
In respect to the operation of the IDRM model, the total income from teaching 
and research is ‘top-sliced’ in order to pay for both the Non Academic Resource Units 
and ‘services and activities’ (such as depreciation). The amount of the ‘top slice’ 
varies according to the income type (at the time of the research the top slice for Core 
income was 48.8% , earned income 33%, and other income 0%). It is interesting to 
mention that the teaching funds received by the SHEFC are distributed in the IDRM 
on a ‘t-1’ basis which the existing and expected student numbers (i.e. the existing and 
expected student loads notified to the Council in December of the cunent session and 
relate to the ‘monies’ for funded places next year according to the ‘eco principle’ 
which is ‘to echo internally the pattern of The University’s external income streams’, 
GU Finance Office Handbook). The argument for this is that with the ‘t-1’ figures 
allow the Resource Units ‘to manage the transition over the years resulting from 
changes -  particularly if adverse; and if the Resource Unit’s income is on the upturn, 
it will be a year before the benefits flow through the IDRM, so an overtrading and the 
expenditure of anticipated income prior to receipt is avoided’ (Finance Office, 
University’s web site).
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Table 2.7: Income Driven Resource Allocation Model 2002/ 03 £ 000s
Gross Attributable Income
Teaching-graiit 48.8%
Research-grant 48.8%
Inter-Resource Unit transfers 48.8%
Home/EC Fees -  Undergraduate (fiill time and part time) 48.8%
Home/EC Fees -  Postgraduate Teaching 33.0%
Home/EC Fees -  Postgraduate Research 33.0%
Home/EC Fees - Full Cost 33.0%
Overseas Fees - Undergraduate 33.0%
Overseas Fees - Postgraduate Teaching 33.0%
Overseas Fees - Postgraduate Research 33.0%
Overseas Fees - Full Cost 33.0%
Overheads on Research Councils, CSO & Charities 33.0%
Overheads on contracts & other services rendered 33.0%
Miscellaneous Income 0.0%
Central hicome 0.0%
Total Gross Attributable Income £000s
Total Topslice £000s
Total Net Attributable Income £000s
Total Strategic Allocations £000s
Fuidher topslice £000s
Resource Unit allocation received or donated £000s
Final Cash Limited Allocation £000s
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According to the Financial Handbook of The University’s Finance Office, 
after the first top-slice cut, which is applied on the gross income streams of each 
Resource Unit, the remaining income is used as a starting point for the calculation of 
each Unit’s Cash Limited Budgets (Finance Office, University’s web site). It is 
claimed that the first top-slice amounts are required for the operation of the Non 
Academic Resource Units and to cover overhead costs, which are analysed in detail 
according to the Unit’s needs and statutory requirements. After the first top-slice cut, 
the amounts retained are either distributed back to the academic Resource Units (if 
there are sufficient amounts) or are retained while increasing the top-slice percentage 
to meet a number of strategic adjustments. This is the second cut, which is also 
justified on a given expected level. If after the second top -slice cut the amounts 
remaining in the Resource Unites Cash Limited Allocation accounts is greater than the 
pre-determined level, a third redistribution occurs. The third cut is teclinically 
justified with a Rate of Manageable Change. The Rate of Manageable Change is a 
‘safety-net’ or floor provision and is the maximum percentage decrease permitted 
from the previous year’s comparable figures. This rate is set by The University’s 
Management Group after taking in account what The University can afford in relation 
to its proposed budget (Finance Office, University’s web site). To arrive at Cash 
Limited Budgets for each Resource Unit, some further adjustments may be made to 
the Resource Unit’s final Cash Limited Allocation, following the discussions at the 
Star Chamber meeting.
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2.6 Summary
This chapter demonstrated the impact of the British public sector reform in the 
Higher Education context. The core argument of the chapter was that the universities 
developed different responses to the subsequent pressures due to their internal socio­
political environment. In addition, it has been demonstrated that the development of 
the responses is continuous and dynamic, and it is reflected in the institution’s internal 
governing styles.
The public sector reform rhetoric concentrated in two main streams. First the 
change of the namely ‘institutional’ reform of the public services providers, and 
second the principles and values that people committed to perform public services. 
The reshape of the public sector institutions framework aimed to change the 
bureaucratic ideology of the sector promoting flexibility, accountability, 
administrative devolution and offering of choices to the users of the services i.e. the 
public. The implications of this ideology were the introduction of devolved 
administration, consumer focus service, conduct of codes of standards and quality, and 
measurement of performance with indicators and reward systems. The other stream of 
the reform attempted to identify the principles and values that the public servants have 
to maintain. For that reason, ‘seven principles of public life’ were introduced, which 
are ‘selflessness’, Integrity’, ‘Objectivity’, ‘Accountability’, ‘Openness’, ‘Honesty’ 
and ‘Leadership’ (section 2.2).
In the perspective of the Higher Education sector, response of the Universities 
to the British Government approach reflected on both reform streams (section 2.3). 
Universities responded by introducing ‘new’ technologies of governance and by 
accepting (or resisting to a degree) the management of academics (section 2.4). The 
main observation though, was first that the ideological refonn and its implications is a 
continuous and dynamic process, and second that the observed responses were diverse 
and therefore it is difficult to draw a uniform picture for the entire sector. The present
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study argues that the diversity of responses reflects the underlined socio- political 
plurality of the internal environment of the institutions. In this context the 
development of governing teclinologies, such as the resource allocation process, is 
influenced by the unique socio political influences within the universities rather than 
an external universal economic rational. In that respect the following chapter of the 
volume will introduce the concept of trust as an interesting dimension to the 
challenging issue of internal governance of the Higher Education Institutions, and in 
the particular case of The University.
In the section 2.5, The University and its resource allocation process as part of 
its governance and management culture was introduced.
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Chapter 3 -  Trust and Accounting
3.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with trust and accounting literature in the organisational 
context. It has been suggested that accounting practices, such as the resource 
allocation process (budgeting) should be studied considering the particular 
organisational context in which they operate (Hopwood, 1983). It is further suggested 
that tmst should be carefully considered, while the organisation is considered from a 
socio-political perspective, where interests and interactions between individuals and 
groups create a dynamic setting. Adopting the view of Roberts and Scapens (1985), 
accounting practices in an organisational context are visualised as a combination of 
accounting rules and procedures (accounting system and more specifically the 
resource allocation process and model) and structui'es of accountability that reflect 
meaning, authority and moral rights and obligations between the individuals or groups 
involved. In a similar pattern, the concept of trust is viewed as embedded within 
contexts of interaction (Nooteboom, 2002) reflecting an extrinsic value, ‘as a basis for 
achieving social or economic goals’; and intrinsic value, ‘as a broader notion of well 
being or the quality of life’. Moreover, there is consideration of the importance of 
trust and accounting in a democratic organisational governance (Wairen, 1999), and it 
is claimed that different relations between democratic governance and tmst develop, 
depending on the extrinsic and intrinsic value of both. In this context, the main theme 
being addressed is that the relationship between trust and accounting is an interplay 
that produces and reproduces stmctures of accountability and procedures of 
accounting practices, which have a very influential impact on the governance style of 
the organisation.
The following literature may support the understanding of the conditions and 
reasons that, in the Universities, there is an absence of uniform accounting practices
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and perspectives developed as has been demonstrated in chapter 2. In that respect, the 
social embeddedness of the accounting procedures in consideration and the 
interpersonal trust within the particular organisational context seem to be a major 
influential factor in the production and reproduction of both accounting and trust. It 
may be also useful to understand the importance of tmst between individuals and 
groups when dealing with the allocation of financial resources. In the meanwhile, the 
resource allocation process is perceived and an accounting system in praxis, which 
stmctures of accountability develop through the interaction in the particular 
organisational context.
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3.2 The social science of accounting
This section includes the literature of accounting in an organisational context. 
An interest in this literature is based on the view of the resource allocation process as 
the budgeting process of The University. It is stressed that the particular Resource 
Allocation process should be examined within the organisational context of The 
University, bearing in mind the social, political and behavioural factors that affect its 
operation.
The social
Organisational structures
Group pressures
Individual
needs
Iu
PhO
8
<
s
and economic environment
and control strategies
and controls
and attitudes
Figure 3.1: The social context of accounting (Hopwood, 1974)
The Figure 3.1 asserts the importance of the human influence (from the macro 
institutional level to the psychological level) on the function of the procedures and 
outcomes of accounting practices. It is stated that human behaviour is formulated 
fi-om the social environment and the individual’s psychological needs and attitudes 
(Hopwood, 1974). In return, human behaviour affects accounting (Caplan, 1966; 
Roslender, 1992; Manicas, 1993). Therefore, it is important to examine and 
understand how and why people behave in the way they do, and how this behaviour 
influences human practices and institutions (Caplan, 1966). More specifically. Trust 
is referred to as an influential element for behaviour (Good, 1988, Kiamer et al, 
1996), and it is supposed to affect the way that accounting is formed in the specific 
organisation.
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3.2.1 Accounting in the organisational and social context
In order to investigate the role and importance of accounting practices in an 
organisation, it is necessar y to examine what constitutes the organisation and how the 
practices, and in particular the one of resource allocation, are embedded and shaped in 
that context. It is claimed that the socio- political view of the organisation is 
appropriate to understanding the practices and structures developed. The importance 
of this concept has been emphasised by several social scientists interested in 
examining how accounting operates in an organisational context since the 1970s. 
Although earlier budgeting as a key focus of accounting research tended to be 
examined extensively, addressing its behavioural impact on participation and 
motivation (the work of Chris Argyris ‘the impact of Budgets of people’, 1952, 
opened the path for a long academic debate, also Schiff and Lewin, 1970), the static 
character of these investigations was criticised, and the argument of ‘examining 
accounting in the context in which it operates’ later emerged (Hopwood, 1978 and 
1983). From this perspective, analysing the organisational dynamics, that connected 
budgeting with organisational control structures and strategies, was suggested to be 
considered in order to explain and understand the use of accounting in an 
organisational as well as social context.
In general, a broad distinction between the two perspectives adopted for the 
study of organisations can be identified. One of the perspectives is influenced by the 
classical economic theory, in which the organisation is viewed as an economic entity 
which is organised in such a way that the creation of prosperity and the maximisation 
of wealth plays a major role. The organisation is viewed as the best combination of 
people, capital, land and knowledge with the objective to maximise wealth with the 
least economic sacrifice and the best economic return. This basic function assumes an 
economic rationality. It also assumes that when the firm is simplistically divided
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between the entrepreneur and the staff, that the best economic effort is the one based 
on the entrepreneur’s choice and managerial skills (Baiman, 1982 and 1990).
The other perspective, emphasises that the organisation operates for macro and 
long term prosperity of the society (Cyert and March, 1963). The rational of the 
organisation’s existence and decisions is based on a rather ‘collective mind’ reasoning 
rather than the strict self- interest motivation of human action (Weick, 1980 and 
2000).
More precisely, the organisation can be viewed from a socio- political 
perspective as a combination of the willingness of people to organise their efforts and 
expectations in such a way that a common benefit will be achieved. Therefore the 
firm can be viewed as a coalition of individuals who share the willingness of utilising 
their best effort in order to satisfy their common expectations (Cyert and March, 1963; 
Colville, 1981; Berry, 1994). The notion of common expectations does not prohibit 
the existence of different views and opinions, which are derived from different 
experiences, and knowledge of each individual (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; 
Morgan, 1998). The plurality of views within an organisation can be the source of 
contradictions and often the reason that there is dissatisfaction with the initial 
objectives of the organisation. Conflicts arise when interests collide. However the 
same conditions can give rise to positive outcomes for an organisation. In the 
organisational literature conflict is normal and can be present within groups or 
coalitions. Wliatever the reason, and whatever form is takes, its source rests in some 
perceived or real divergence of interests (Covaleski et al, 1996).
The management of diverse interests and the development of a collaborative 
climate in an organisation aie influenced by the interaction between the organisational 
members. Weick (1980) based his core definition of organisation in the importance of 
the processes of organising, stating that ‘organising consists of resolving equivocality 
in an enacted environment by means of interlocked behaviour embedded in
48
Chapter 3: Trust and Accounting
conditionally related processes.. .of enactment, selection and retention’. He maintains 
that organising among people involves choices of what to select and how to act.
During the social interaction within an organisation a governing mechanism 
is developed. These governing mechanisms involve systems and procedures of 
accountability and quantification (Porter, 1995; Fligstein, 1998) that often concentrate 
on purposes of control, performance evaluation, motivation, and planning. 
Accounting systems and procedures stand between the various groups in the 
organisation (Dirsmith, 1986; Meyer, 1986; Armstrong 1991; Bums and Scapens, 
1999). They provide a way in which the relative contributions to organisational 
activities can be evaluated and a mechanism through which resources are allocated. 
Thus accounting can be part of the process of controlling and channelling actual and 
latent organisational conflict.
In summary, it is necessary to investigate accounting in its organisational 
context. In this context the role of accounting practices expand further than the 
sti'ictly rational economic function to a broader socio-political importance. An 
interesting sociological theory that should be considered as a useful framework for 
understanding management accounting in the organisational context is the theory of
Stmcturation (Macintosh and Scapens, 1990). Next, we look closer to the way that
■S.,structuration theory provides a sensible prism of interpretation of the accounting 
practices in the organisation.
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3.2.2 Structuration theory and management accounting
The usefulness of structuration theory in understanding accounting practices in 
their organisation context is founded on its consideration of both the context in where 
accounting practices occur, and the activities of the individuals involved in these 
practices. Interaction between individuals and social context reflectively produce 
meaning, morality and ability to transform behaviour and material in a dialectic order. 
In this section the interpretation of structuration theory in management accounting 
research literature is reviewed. A reference to the original presentation of the theory 
by Anthony Giddens (1984) will take place at chapter 4 (section 4.4).
Roberts and Scapens (1985), suggest that Structuration theory is a useful 
framework to understand accounting in its organisational context. In this perspective, 
the interaction of people in the context of the accounting practice, shapes and 
maintains particular patterns of accountability within an organisation. Accounting 
systems are produced through the actions of individuals, while accountability 
structures provide meaning, legitimation, and authority to these actions. Macintosh 
and Scapens (1990) explain that in a day - to - day interactions management 
accounting provides managers with a means of understanding the activities of their 
organisation and makes them able to communicate meaningfully about these 
activities. Further, management accounting systems bear norms of organisational 
activities and provide sanction for reciprocal riglits and expectations of the individuals 
involved. Finally, management accounting systems provide authority to organise and 
coordinate the activities of the individuals involved as well as to command on the 
material resources.
Macintosh (1995) explains that individuals become accountable for their 
actions through the production of patterns of communication, morality and authority. 
However, these structures are constituted by the individual’s actions and, at the same 
time, are the medium of this constitution according to Giddens’ concept of ‘duality of
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structure’. Further, he explores the concept of ‘dialectic of control’ in a management 
accounting context and argues that management accounting practices produce both 
autonomy and dependence between individuals. He states that even the most 
subordinate agents have some resources which they can influence the actions of their 
superiors (in his example, subordinates can choose to withhold information from their 
superiors).
3.2.3 Accounting for organisational governance
The complexity of modem organisations leads them to differing governing 
mechanisms of which an aspect is the internal (management) accounting system. As 
Weick (1980) demonstrates, unitary thinking about organisations is incomplete 
because our understanding is ‘partly true, partly false, partly incomplete and partly 
irrelevant’. Therefore, there is no uniform approach to management accounting 
practices in an organisation (Otley, 1980). In addition, the systems developed are 
often conveniently not ‘rational’, in a strictly economic sense, but operating within a 
broader socio -  political prospect of effectiveness and efficiency. Also, as Argyris 
(1971 and 1973) claims, there is a genuine resistance to Management Information 
Systems because ‘if systems achieve their designer’s highest aspirations, they will 
tend to create conditions of reduction of space and free movement, psychological 
failure and double bind, leadership based more on competence than formal power and 
decreased feelings of essentiality’.
In early organisational theory and management control literature, an attempt to 
separate the financial control, managerial control and strategic planning (Anthony, 
1965) resulted in extensive criticism that argued for an integrated corporate planning 
system which combines programming and budgeting based on strategic, operational 
and financial outputs (Otley, 1994). Later, the separation thesis of Anthony (1965) 
was re-examined and the suggestion to consider the combination of the three internal
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processes with the behavioural issues occurred. Therefore, an effective financial 
control can be achieved as a result of the effective management of people and it can 
not be assessed in isolation.
Further, the socio - political effect of accounting practices is well 
acknowledged, and in particulai’ the interplay between budgeting processes and 
behaviour emerge. Ansari and Euske (1987) make a case for more of a holistic 
treatment of accounting practices and recommend that the structural and behavioural 
work should be integrated as there are interactions between information systems and 
human behaviours, which could not be overlooked. In this respect, the behavioural 
effect of budgets, as a tool of plamiing and control, is extensively emphasised and 
attention is focused on the understanding of the norms, values and role expectations 
that are sourced in the organisational cultuie (Schiff and Lewin, 1970; Merchant, 
1981; Bimberg et al, 1983;); and the power unequalities that make budgets both a 
substance and result of political bargaining (Pfeffer and Salancik 1974; Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1988).
In respect to whether qualitative or quantitative information is appropriate for 
control, Lowe (1970, 1971) considers the importance of a unified management 
accounting system, which emerges from the need for integration of a range of 
qualitative mechanisms, although no framework for such integi'ation is provided. 
Scapens and Roberts (1993) suggest that more complex controls are necessary as 
organisations evolve and that there is a necessity of underlying control systems to 
provide the information required to support financial control. It is reasoned that 
control based on financial objectives is no longer adequate, while traditional 
management control techniques, which were oriented to financial and quantitative 
measures, are inadequate for assessing the effectiveness of organisational performance 
(Cooper et al, 1981, Hanison, 1993; Beiry, 1994).
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Emmanuel et al (1990) made a distinction between financial control and 
organisational control, where they claim that accounting information plays a different 
role. They suggest that organisational effectiveness should be measured with a variety 
of measures as suiwival, growth, employee attitudes and absenteeism and labour 
turnover. Otley and Berry (1980) address the risk resulting from the dependence of 
financial control, which ensure the need for the use of accounting information in a 
broader organisational context, and the accountant’s professional development 
through the acquisition of professional skills necessary to collect and use information 
from an extended range of variables. Similaily Merchant (1985 and 1990) 
investigated the effect of the two ‘dysfunctional side effects’ of financial control 
systems named ‘manipulation of short tenn performance measures’ and the 
encouragement of ‘management myopia’. The first refers to the manipulation of 
performance indicators, involving time period change so to show a favourably altered 
performance pattern, and falsifying data report. The second reflects the short-teim 
nature of financial controls which is the case that managers ar e highly motivated by 
short term profit considerations.
Hopwood (1983 and also 1974; 1978; 1994) claims that the study of 
accounting should respect the context in which it operates and he criticises the 
conventional accounting paradigm for inflexibility, short-termism, ‘almost exclusive 
emphasis’ on financial aspects, abstraction and distancing of the control process fr om 
the practical performance of the task. He states that ‘an organisational view of 
accounting in action is emergent’. Similarly, Laughlin (1987) views the accounting 
systems in organisational contexts as more than technical phenomena and he states 
that to understand and change these technical elements the social roots must also be 
both understood and changed. Conventional accounting practices embody routines, 
which define the nature of costs and profits and provide the appearance of rational 
behaviour
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3.2.4 Management accounting change
The issue of the dynamic nature of accounting changing within the 
organisational context is considered as very important in the study of the resource 
allocation process of The University. As demonstrated in chapter 2, several aspects of 
the external funding process and in the internal resource allocation process, changed 
during the time; and although this change can be explained as an impact of the Higher 
Education reform, it is also necessary to consider the organisational context of these 
developments. It is emphasised that the changes of the accounting practices, and in 
particular of the resource allocation process, are associated with the general 
organisational changes of The University, along with the socio -  political influences 
in The University, developed during the time period under review. In the literature.
growing concern that accounting practices should not be assumed ‘stable’ and most 
importantly not ‘uniform’ while examining processes that involve interaction, routines 
and values. Although the present study adopts an approach closer to social 
constructionism of organisational practices, and of the resource allocation process as 
an accounting praxis, a review of the main views found in the literature is believed to 
be of use.
Weick and Quinn (1999) suggest that theories of organisational change can be 
categorised in four broad categories;
• Life cycle theories: that have an event of start -  up, grow, harvest 
terminate, and start up. They have an generative mechanism of an immanent 
programmer regulation
• Teleological theories: that have an event sequence of envision / set goals, 
implementation of goals, dissatisfaction, search / interact, and envision/ set 
goals. They have a generative mechanism of purposeful enactment and social 
construction.
%different perspectives and levels of theorisation of accounting change reveal a
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• Dialectical theory has an event sequence of thesis / antithesis, conflict, 
synthesis, and thesis / antithesis. It has a generative mechanism of pluralism, 
confrontation and conflict.
• Evolutionary theory has an event sequence of variation, selection, 
retention, and vaiiation, it has a generative mechanism of competitive selection 
and resource scarcity.
In respect to management accounting changes, Shields (1997) claims that 
changes in the environmental and organisational context of management accounting 
include changes in competition, operations technologies, information processing 
technologies, and organisational designs. He contends that although a static 
comparative analysis tends to be adapted while attempting to capture change (see 
Vamosi, 2000; Granlund, 2000), research considering the wider institutional dynamics 
and unpredictability of change is important in ‘understanding contemporary 
management accounting’ (see Armstrong, 1991; Hopwood and Miller, 1994; Scapens, 
1994; Bums and Scapens, 2000; Quattrone and Hopper, 2001).
Further, the understanding of when and how management accounting is 
leading, following or inhibiting organisational changes is valuable. Often
environmental chances and needs create the need for response (see Abrahamson, 1991
■
and 1996). From this perspective, change can be a formal or managed organisational
event or process which is carried out in a rational and functional way. The possible 
problems of change have a teclinical nature, but with ‘good implementation’ they can 
be solved (Kloot, 1997; Bums and Vaivio, 2001; for instance balance scorecard or 
ABC implementation literature). On the other hand management accounting can be a 
follower or inhibitor of change because employees have learned how to ‘play the 
game’ with the existing management system and therefore resist or manipulate the 
system. In this way, a rather political activity of interests and power interplay shapes 
views and alliances (see Hopwood and Miller, 1994; Bums and Scapens, 2000).
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In respect to the source of influence for change, Bums and Vaivio (2001) 
explain that management accounting changes can be driven by top -  down or bottom -  
up influences. In the top- down perspective, changes can be seen as a centrally driven 
effort, where the organisations top management plays a key role. On the other hand, 
changes can be regarded as a fundamentally local concem, top management is unable 
to identify the particular conditions that cry for reform -  local actors within larger 
decentralised stmctures are the real architects and mobilising agents of change. 
Established management accounting routines become revaluated as a result of local 
questioning (Covaleski et al, 1996; Luff, 1997).
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3. 3 Trust in social sciences
The rational choice model of the individual’s decisions has enormously 
influenced the social sciences. From such a perspective, humans are rationally 
motivated to maximise their personal gains and minimise their personal losses in 
social interactions. The reason they organise their resources and efforts collectively, 
arc to maximise the individuals’ benefit from the organisation. Major theories that 
adopted this rationalist model approach are the ‘agency theory’, ‘transaction cost 
economics’ and ‘theories of collective action in organisational analysis’ (Eisenhart, 
1989), However, recent phenomena of ‘irrational’ and non-predictable behaviours of 
individuals, and organisations, reveal the need for fundamental awareness and 
understanding of the context where the social interaction of individuals occurs, along 
with considerable attention to the observed praxis of the subjects’ everyday life 
(individuals or organisations). Main dogma of this perspective is that the individual’s 
decision to engage her / his effort and resources in a collective form is other than 
rational and calculative. Therefore, the need to understand the social context where 
the individuals organise their collective interests in a manner that includes both their 
actions along with the structural conditions of their environment (economic, historical, 
social) provides the foundations of theories considering the ‘social contextualism’ 
(Kramer, 1994).
In respect of the latter perspective, the rational model of human behaviour 
conditions that shape the conduct of individuals in organisations are no longer 
primarily instrumental but are shaped and reproduced within the interaction in a given 
context. In the present study such interaction produces and reproduces trust in the 
resource allocation process within the paiticular organisational context of The 
University. Fabricating the main argument with respect to both human behaviour 
models, the study seeks to gain understanding of the trust role in its particular context. 
Ruscio (1999) states that trust exposes the limitations of rational choice theories, their
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cramped views of political life, and their failure to draw from a political heritage that 
balanced the pursuit of self interest with social virtues. In addition, Hollis (1998) 
states that trust grows fragile when people become too rational; and trust gr ows fragile 
when people are not rational enough. Furthermore, he claims that without tmst, social 
life would be impossible and everyday is an adventure in tmsting thousands of others, 
seen and unseen, to act reliably.
A thorough examination of the literature around the issue of tmst in general 
and in the particular context of the resource allocations process in The University 
attempts to formulate the main ground where the study’s inquiry develops. In general 
the literature of tmst is considered interdisciplinary and broad (Blomqvist, 1997; 
Rousseau et al, 1998). However, Lane (1998) observes that the divergence between 
the views may be sourced on the grounds or social bases on which tmst expectations 
are based on the one hand, and on the other may arise both from the object of tmst and 
the context in which the tmst relationship is situated.
This section includes the arguments found in literature in a twofold articulation 
trying to respect both ends of the human behaviour theories spectrum, with a specific 
reference to trust. In that respect the extrinsic and intrinsic value of tmst (Nooteboom, 
2002), is the core starting point of the exploration of its meaning and usefulness in the 
interaction, and as the chapter develops, different angles are examined. This 
frmdamental distinction is based on the perceived value of tmst in the society which in 
its extrinsic form provides the basis for the achievement of social and economic goals 
in a rather functional / instrumental fashion, and in its intrinsic foim is the basis of a 
broader binding in the relationship as an inner quality, that may reflect feelings of 
loyalty, honour and self respect. The following table presents the stmcture of the trust 
literature review, with the main arguments on its source, objects, and its role in 
accounting systems and stmctures of accountability.
58
Chapter 3: Trust and Accounting
Table 3.1: Trust in social sciences
extrinsic intrinsic
Undersocialised assumption of human 
action (transaction cost economics, self 
interest, opportunism, rational decision 
model)
Oversocialised assumption of human 
action (community oriented individuals, 
critical and self reflective)
Trust as predictable expectation 
(confident expectation that the other will 
perform in particular important to trustor)
Trust as goodwill expectation (unforeseen 
contingencies will be meet in good faith 
and mutual benefit)
Mental basis: peoples trust based on 
knowledge experience analysis
Mental basis: emotions, habits, routines
No trust increases Suspicion No trust increases Vulnerability
Accounting system: formal control, 
contracting, close monitoring
Accounting system: social control, 
informal, inteipersonal relations
Accountability is enforced by contract, 
punishment, and checking (auditing)
Accountability is enhanced by trust 
Actors deliberately participate in the 
exercise of authority
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3.3.1 Defining Trust in the literature
The notion of trust is increasingly considered in the literatures of social 
sciences such as sociology, economics, and political science. However, disagreement 
between the academics who investigate trust in different disciplines uncovers a 
cautious adoption of a particular stance.
It is also interesting that the conceptual diversity of trust often attracts a mix- 
up with synonyms of the word trust. The following table (3.2) from Blomqvist, 
(1997) is indicative of the concepts used in the literature as synonyms of trust.
Concept Definition Connection to trust
competence The actor’s perceived ability 
to perform something
A passive concept describing 
an actor’s ability to perform
credibility The actor’s perceived ability to perform something s/he 
claims s/he can do on request
A passive concept referring 
to the actor’s claimed ability, 
which does not however say 
anything about the actor’s 
intentions nor his will to do 
the requested
confidence The actor expects something 
to happen with certainty, and 
does not consider the 
possibility of anything going 
wrong
Does not involve the 
conscious consideration of 
alternatives, as trust does
faith Actor’s blind belief in 
something
The actor does not have or 
does not request information 
for considering alternatives, 
as in the case of trust does
hope The actor passively looks forward to something
Due to the actor’s passivity 
he or she does not invest / 
risk anything by hoping, in 
the case of tmsting
loyalty The actor has taken a faithful stand relative to another 
actor, behaving totally 
positively towards that 
actor’s needs
A static and long term 
concept, does not seem to 
involve the possibility of 
breaking down
reliance The actor may on consideration decide to rely 
only on certain aspects or 
features of another actor or 
system
A narrower concept than 
trust in the sense that a 
trusting actor trust another in 
all respects after judging the 
character and behaviour of 
the other.
Table 3.2: Concepts commonly used as synonyms of trust (Blomqvist, 1997)
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Similarly, Luhmaiin (1998) observed that familiarity and confidence are often 
confused with trust and he found it necessary to distinguish firstly between familiarity 
and trust, stating that ‘familiaiity is an unavoidable fact of life; trust is a solution for 
specific problems of risk; secondly he distinguishes between confidence and trust. He 
claims that while confidence is required to conduct the basis of living, tmst implies 
going beyond basic activities and presupposes a situation of risk, choice and social 
engagement.
Although trust is a variably defined concept, there is some agreement that is 
important for organisations in a number of ways.
• It enables cooperative behaviour (Hardy et al, 1998; Whitener et al, 1998;
Hwang and Burgers, 1997);
• promotes adaptive organisational forms (Brenkett, 1998; Whitener et al,
1998);
• eases the management of conflicts (Das and Teng, 1998);
• decreases transaction costs (Williamson, 1975);
• enhances business performance (Sako, 1998);
• supports organisational change (Sydow, 1998),
• and curtails opportunistic behaviour (Nooteboom, 1992).
Further more, trust is required to reduce uncertainty, promote a more 
participative management style (Hosmer, 1995), and lower the formalisation in the 
organisation (Whitener et al, 1998) emphasising the delegation of authority to the 
members of the committee to decide about the vital issue of funds distribution
The following sections review the definitions of trust found in the literature, 
and the importance of trust in organisational governance. In general the various 
definitions given, attempt to answer the question ‘why people trust’, and a useful 
criterion for classification is the distinction between the definitions which reflect the
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extrinsic and / or the intrinsic value of trust (Nooteboom, 2002). The following 
section presents this broad categorisation of the definitions found in the literature.
3.3.1.1 Extrinsic value of trust -  instrumental function
The extrinsic value of trust is a point of view that focuses on the instrumental 
and functional role of trust in interactions, hi this approach, trust is defined as an 
element of a transaction between two parties and refers to the confident expectation 
based on the predictability of another party’s behaviour, that one’s interest will not be 
harmed or put at risk by the other. Trust is based in on a calculative decision to allow 
someone to act within a spectrum of reasonable and acceptable actions, eliminating 
the possibilities of opportunistic behaviour. One of the major factors that the function 
of trust is required to eliminate is the possibility of risk and complexity (Lulimann, 
1979). This type of trust develops through knowledge and experience of one’s 
intentions. People organise their efforts in order to achieve better possibilities to meet 
their own self-interests through social coercion. This approach assumes an under­
socialised human behaviour (Granovetter, 1985), which is most influenced by the 
rational decision model and economic theory (studies on this angle by Blau, 1964; 
Luhmann, 1979; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Williamson ,1993).
Lane (1998) explains that in the case of agency theory, game theory, and 
transaction cost economics, trust is based on calculations which weigh the cost and 
benefits of certain courses of action to either the trustor or trustee, hi particular, 
Williamson (1993) claims that trust reduces costs in transactions between the principal 
and the agent (that could refer to individuals, to groups, or to firms). In market 
conditions the principal negotiate and monitor create contracts to protect against 
opportunistic behaviour. In hierarchies the principal creates close controls for the 
same purpose. Contract and control function are substitutes for trust, and they are 
required because it is difficult to identify the untrustworthy agent. Therefore, if trust
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trust, in that if  one trust another because there are incentives for the other to be 
trustworthy, then the vulnerability to exploitation is removed which gives its very 
meaning.
From a sociological perspective, Blau (1964) explains that tmst promotes 
reciprocity in social exchange. The need to reciprocate for a benefit received 
(material or non-material), meets the expectation for continuous social interaction and 
group stmcture. The difference with an economic interaction is that the benefits 
involved in the social exchange have no price and therefore the generation of feelings 
of ‘personal obligation, gratitude and tmst’ need to develop.
Further, Zand (1972) divided tmst into personal behaviom' (as a decision to 
trust) and individual expectations (expected outcome). Tmst in these terms is an 
individual decision based upon optimistic expectations or confidence about the
was a given in the relationship between the principal and the agent, the costs of
contracts and controls would be eliminated. In Williamson’s (1993) view humans are 
acting with an economic rational that determines the options and formats of cost 
elimination.
The approach of game theory perceives tmst as a factor of cooperative 
behaviour in the prisoner’s dilemma game (Buskens, 1998). Tmst is based on an 
expectation of cooperative outcome. Cooperation and tmst can emerge in two 
situations, first either of the players expect repeated games and a lasting relationship, 
or when both actors interact intensively with a third person in other contexts and wish 
to preserve their reputation. As Luhmann (1979) explains, trust is a rational decision 
under risk. A rational actor tmsts only if her /his calculation suggests that the gain 
from reciprocated tmst is higher than the loss threatened by a betrayal of tmst and 
when tmst relations are supported by negative sanctions. Deutsch (1958) states that 
risk taking and tmsting behaviour are different sides of the same coin. However, i fHarvey and James (2002) believe that in the prisoners dilemma there is a paradox of
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outcome of an uncertain event, where also an element of vulnerability and lack of 
control over the action of others occurs. Zand (1972) adopts the view that individuals 
fundamentally behave autonomously and calculative. Also that groups characterised 
by strong feelings of common purpose and interest are better able to focus on group 
problems directly, whereas groups that are more self interested tend to generate 
interpersonal conflicts when problems arise.
Deutsch (1958) examined the relationship of personality to trust and suspicion, 
mid found that people who were indicated as ‘suspicious’ were more likely to have a 
low opinion of human nature, to be submissive to authority, to be punitive of deviant 
behaviour' and to be less interested in ‘feeling’. Further, he stretches this point to the 
‘pathology of trust’ which is a situation where someone acts in a trusting manner 
without regard to the characteristics of the situation in which the behaviour is to take 
place.
hi organisations studies, authors such as Tyler and Degoey (1996) identify that 
trust is linked to individual beliefs about the likelihood of receiving positive outcomes 
(also Bhattacharya et al 1998) from interactions with authorities and is also related to 
the nature of the social bond to authorities. Similarly Mayer, Davis and Schooman
(1995) state that trust is the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party, based on the expectation that the other party will perform a particulm* 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that 
other party. They also identified trust as a crucial component to more participative 
management styles mid that a need for trust arises in a risky situation.
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3.3.1.2 Intrinsic value of trust- Goodwill belief
Another way that tmst is viewed in the literature takes an oversocialised view 
of human behaviour (Granovetter, 1985). In this approach tmst is referred to as an 
expectation based upon the other party’s goodwill, that one’s interests will be 
protected (Fukuyama, 1995; Nooteboom, 2002). This approach is often analysed as a 
facilitator of long term, interdependent and stable relationships. Tmst is 
conceptualised as a belief in the other’s goodwill beliefs and values. It often takes the 
form of an irrational predisposition that one is ‘doing the right thing’ (Fukuyama, |
31995), for the general ‘well being’ or ‘quality of life’ (Nootemboom, 2002). This 
definition conceives tmst as embedded in the context where people live, creating 
shared norms and values habitually or through routines and cultural experiences.
These approaches suggest that values and norms may enter into tmst relations in very 
specific substantive areas or specific cultural contexts, i.e. tmst relations are 
embedded in particular social relations and the obligations sourced in them. Thus, 
common values and norms of obligation can develop in a long-standing relationship 
where tmst was initially created in an incremental manner but where value-consensus 
emerges from the relationship.
Hollis (1998) explains that from a moral perspective tmst becomes something 
more complex than knowing ones’ interests. Hosmer (1994, 1995) states that tmst is 
based on an assumption of an implicit moral duty. He observes tmst in the form of 
individual expectations that reflect the persistence and fulfilment of the natural (and 
existing) social order in which the individual found her-self or him-self. Tmst, in an 
interpersonal relation, is reflected in as a moral value developed from the interaction 
between the two people involved. In managerial situations, tmst generates 
commitment, and commitment builds effort to cooperate. However, he observes that 
although in economic transactions business managers often do act on the basis of tmst 
-the difficulty in identifying tmstworthy agents is so great that organisations have to
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structure themselves as if all agents could not be trusted (negotiation and control of 
contracts to protect against opportunistic behaviour).
Fukuyama (1995) insists that trust is based on shared values between actors 
that support each other and they share a ‘community of tmst’. ‘Spontaneous 
sociability’, which is associated with tmst, varies across national and cultural 
boundaries. He found that tmst exists in the ‘shared ethical habits’ of people. He 
believes that tmst is non-rational and is the expectation that arises within a community 
of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour based on commonly shared norms, 
Webb (1996) explains that tmst is a central component in the most trivial and routine 
activities of organisational life. In that sense, people’s predispositions create habits 
that reflect certain ways of conduct through everyday practice. Through these 
practices, people become used to and are more comfortable with social routines and 
situations.
Lewis and Weigert (1985) insist that tmst is social and normative rather than 
individual and calculative and requires a social relationship to exist. They also 
maintain that tmst can have both an emotional, cognitive and behavioural base. 
Cirmmings and Bromiley (1996) explain that tmst is an individual’s belief or a 
common belief among a group of individuals that another individual or group makes 
good faith efforts to behave in accordance with any commitments, both implicit or 
explicit, is honest in whatever negotiations preceding such commitments and does not 
take excessive advantage of another even when the opportunity is available. Kramer 
et al (1996) state that individuals who engage in trusting behaviour create opportunity 
and vulnerability.
Bradach and Eccles (1989) work contributes to transaction cost economics, but 
they do not assume that the risk of opportunism is always present in economic 
transactions; also they also adopt a sociologically informed notion of economic 
exchange. They view as sources of tmst the interpersonal relations and social norms,
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rather than rational computations of self interest. Trust as a social control is seen as 
both functionally equivalent to price (market) and authority (hierarchy) and as a 
complement to them. They contend that price, authority and trust can be combined in 
a variety of ways.
Whitener et al (1998) examined the antecedents of managerial tmstworthy 
behaviour. Tmst in another party, reflects an expectation or belief that the other party 
will act benevolently. Also tmst involves a willingness to be vulnerable and risk that 
the other party may not fulfill that expectation. Moreover tmst involves some level of 
dependency on the other party, so that the outcomes of one individual are influenced 
by the actions of another. They defined managerial tmstworthy behaviour as 
volitional actions and interactions performed by managers that are necessary though 
not sufficient to engender employee’s tmst in them.
Parsons (1971) views tmst as affection motivated loyalty, for the acceptance of 
solidarity in relationships. In his view, rational self- interest is rejected and the basis 
of collective order is solidarity. Solidarity is the main characteristic of a legitimate 
order of societal community whose primary function is to define obligations of loyalty 
to the societal collectivity. He emphasises the notion of generalised morality, where 
in a power relation tmst is based on the expectation that the other will meet her/his 
social obligation and exercise responsibility. In his framework, he identifies four 
conditions for tmst. First all gi'oup participants must believe that action is focusing on 
common values (e.g. education in the case of The University). Second, the common 
values identified must be ‘translated into common goals’ (e.g. teaching and research 
excellence in the case of The University). Third, each participant’s expectations must 
generally fit into the ‘general set of solidarity’ (e.g. collegiality between faculties in 
The University), and finally, participants must be reasonable in Tight of relevant 
empirical information’ (e.g. transparency and training on using financial figures).
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These conditions generate trust that becomes ‘an unexamined assumption’ and govern 
the participant’s social and moral expectations.
Zucker (1986) states that tmst is a set of social expectations shared by 
everyone involved in an economic exchange. This definition includes ‘broad’ social 
mles and legitimate social processes. It is the ‘background expectations’ or ‘common 
understanding’ taken for granted as a part of the ‘world known in common’ among the 
members of a society. However, Shapiro (1987) and Gambetta (1988) reject the 
argument that trust could be institution based. Asking the question ‘who guards the 
guardians?’(Shapiro 1987) and ‘can we tmst, tmst?’ (Gambetta, 1988), they explain 
that despite the ethical, social and legal statuses in which common expectations are 
embedded, the temptations to lie, to steal, and to misrepresent the security of 
institution based guarantees continue to exist.
3.3.1.3 Trust as a dynamic concept
Tmst in most of the literature is examined as a dynamic concept that develops 
and decreases through time or type of interaction. Given the distinction between 
extrinsic and intrinsic trust, different factors have impacted on its development or 
decline. The reasons that trust develops vary depending on the assumptions of human 
nature, ‘self interest’ or ‘community-oriented individuals’. As has already been 
mentioned tmst exists and / or increases when it is possible to expect with calculative 
precision, the outcome of the relationship, or when the social binding between 
individuals presupposes or creates conditions of tmst development (sections 3.3.1.1 
and 3.3.1.2). As tmst is a dynamic concept, the literatuie tends to associate the 
declining of the functional tmst with suspicion and fear, which is related to risk of 
opportunism and exploitation of one’s resources due to lack of information . On the 
other hand, the declining of the intrinsic value of tmst appears to leave the individual
6 8
Chapter 3: Trust and Accounting
vulnerable and insecure, unable to associate herselfr himself with the other part of the 
relationship, which in times leads to a deeper identity crisis.
Elangovan and Shapiro (1998) examine trust betrayal from an organisational 
management angle and put forwai'd a model of betrayal. They defined betrayal as a 
voluntary violation of mutually known pivotal expectations of the trustor by the 
trusted party (trustee), which has the potential to threaten the well being of the trustor. 
Betrayal is different from deviant behaviour and antisocial behaviour. They 
demonstrate that the key characteristics of betrayal are a voluntary violation of pivotal 
expectations of the tiustor, mutually awareness of expectations (not necessarily 
accepted ones), involves behaviour i.e. actual violation, potential to harm. Although 
betrayal involves a violation of personal trust it is not necessarily unethical or 
antisocial. There are also several types of betrayal that can be outlined as accidental 
betrayal, intentional, premeditated and opportunistic (which is actually the most 
frequently observed). The reasons for opportunistic betrayal can be self-interest, 
group need or prosocial interests and interpersonal role conflict. They proposed a 
model of opportunistic betrayal. Another study by Bies and Tripp (1996) investigated 
how people react when they are betrayed by others, with whom they believed they had 
a trusting relationship. They found that two types of harm result from the violation of 
trust. First, a damaged sense of civic order through the failure of others to follow 
social rules and second, a damaged identity or social reputation. Sitking and Stickel
(1996) studied the dynamics of distrust, in the case of an organisation that seeks to 
implement a ‘total quality management’ programme on a group of employees. The 
case illustrated how misperceptions between managers and between the two groups 
involved affect the trust between them.
Nooteboom (1992) investigated the impact of opportunistic behaviour to trust, 
and he stated that when opportunism is absent, one can leave contracts open and tmst 
that unforeseen contingencies will be met in good faith and to mutual benefit.
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Opportunistic partners may exploit events that are unforeseen, and hence not covered 
in the contract, or conditions of information asymmetry, in order to gain advantage at 
the expense of the partner. Hwang and Burgers (1997) developed an analytical model 
of tmst and found that tmst supports cooperation through its impact on fear and greed, 
which are commonly perceived as the main threats to cooperation. Deutsch (1958) 
associates the concept of ‘fear’ with ‘suspicion’. He observes that suspicion and tmst 
are both based on the expectation of a particular event, on the individual or social 
environment. He argues that tmst is based on an expectation of an event and 
suspicion is a preference of disconfiimation of the event’s occurrence. He perceives 
the choice to trust, as a decision of optimism in contrast to the development of 
suspicion, which is a choice of pessimistic preference. Kramer (2002) calls the 
moderate form of suspicion ‘pmdent paranoia’ which can be highly valuable to the 
distmstful individual or organisation, in falling prey to opportunistic behaviours.
Lane (1998) observes that interpersonal tmst in business relations is rarely 
offered spontaneously, but requires an extended period of experience. This time 
consuming experience is required in order to know the other person through direct 
contact or though a reliable third party. In the case of direct contact, tmst develops 
tlirough the interaction, given the assumptions on where human expectations / belief 
are based (confidence or goodwill tmst). On the other hand in the case of indirect 
contact, ‘symbolic tokens’ such as reputation, brands, quality standards establish 
channels of communication (Giddens, 1990).
Romm (2002) adopts the ‘tmsting constmctivist’ position which focuses on 
ways in which individuals, who are enquiring the systems may create cycles of tmst, 
whilst recognising that those conferring other with tmst may feel vulnerable in the 
process. She suggests that to create vulnerability tmst is developed through discursive 
accountability. Through accountability, tmst develops but when people believe that
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there are alternatives that have been left out and not acknowledged, that can become a 
source of distrust.
3.3.1.4 Objects of trust
We might consider that trust involves two sides of a relationship; where there 
is the subject who trusts and an object of trust (i.e. the subject has trust in the object). 
One approach towards trust investigation in the literature examines the difference 
between trust in people and trust in systems, or institutions (Luhmann, 1979; Lewis 
and Weigert, 1985; Giddens, 1990). The argument of this approach is based on the 
long debate within sociology of action and structure, where on one side humans are 
viewed as independent from their institutional environment entities and they are acting 
consciously and individualistically. On the other side is the approach that perceives 
individuals as embedded in their historical and institutional structures and their actions 
are continuously reflecting the systems to which they belong. Nooteboom (2002), in 
considering this issue, adopts the Giddens (1984) approach which tries to bridge the 
two sides, and maintains that the system provides an institutional basis for action, but 
is produced or changed by that action (also Sydow, 1998). Trust in the system affects 
trust in people. In the same way, behaviour and experience have effect on the trust 
that one has in a system and therefore personal and system trust are symbiotic. The 
major fundamental assumption is that trust requires a process of interaction. Lewis 
and Weigert (1985) demonstrate that trust is applicable to the relationships among 
people and exists between collective units (dyads, groups, collectivities). Therefore, 
attention is concentrated on the relationship between the subject and object of trust 
and the dynamics developed rather than in a static self-evident assumption of 
perceived trustworthiness of peoples or systems.
More precisely, subjects and objects of trust can be people or systems that 
interact with each other. However, it is difficult to define the distinction between the
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people or system trust, because as Granovetter (1985) claims, human action is both 
embedded in the structural properties of the interaction and at the same time 
dissembedded from such context, Giddens (1990) stresses the argument that social 
relations are ‘lifted out’ (dissembedding) from the local contexts of interaction (and 
often face-to-face) and are restructured ‘across indefinite spans of time-space’. He 
views this as an effect of modernity, and trust is required to balance the result of 
insecurity that the absence of face-to-face interaction creates. Therefore, the object of 
trust is not a rational and independent social actor but an abstract construct (identified 
in a ‘system of expertise’) that has a role also socially defined by the place and era 
where she / he belongs. As a result the boundaries of reference to ‘individual’ or 
‘system’ trust are difficult to define -  an effect that is observable in this study’s 
context, where the participants are knowledgeable and independent when they express 
their views but are also defined from the context of their interaction and their role in 
the process.
Context of interaction
Tmst as outcome 
(confidence expectation, 
goodwill expectation)
Subject
(people, groups, 
organisations, institutions)
Sources of tmst 
(psychological, social, 
institutional)
Object
(people, groups, 
organisations, institutions)
Figure 3.2: The dynamics of trust in an interaction as perceived in this study.
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Building on the assumption that trust is developed in an interaction, between 
subject and object, and agreeing that an action has a cause and an effect, Nooteboom
(2002) conceives the causes of the possible action of trust as displayed in the 
following table. The analysis of trust, as a dynamic action between the subject and the 
object of trust, requires the understanding of the disposition to trust and behaviour of 
trust. Cause and effect patterns of action might form a useful framework for the 
analysis.
Form of trust Object of trust Multiple causality 
(Aristotle)
Behavioural trust An actor Efficient cause
Material Means, inputs Material cause
Competence Ability skills, knowledge, to 
use technology, methods, 
language etc.
Formal cause
Intentional Aims, intentions Final cause
Dedication trust Dedication/care
Benevolence trust (or Benevolence, goodwill, lack
goodwill trust) of opportunism
Conditional Outside enablers, contracts Conditional cause
Exemplar Role models Exemplary cause
Informational trust Information All causes
Honesty tmst truthfulness
Table 3.3; Elements of behavioural trust (Nooteboom, 2002)
Trust as an outcome of the interaction between subjects and objects is foimed 
by the context of the particular interaction. As objects of tmst can be individuals, 
organisations or particular established ‘abstiact systems’ (Giddens, 1990), trust 
represents the security that a relationship is not going to fail, while the direct face to
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face contact between individuals is replaced with structural properties (symbolic 
tokens) such as expertise knowledge and money. Trust in this context, is an outcome 
of the interaction with the object and it is maintained with continuous reference to the 
particular engagement.
Trust as a source of tlie interaction between subjects and object, is also 
examined in the literature. Various authors, who examined the complexity of concept 
of trust, attempted to distinguish between different kinds of sources of trust which in 
Nooteboom’s (2002) terms offer a ‘kaleidoscopic set of insights in trust’. Zucker 
(1986) distinguishes between process based, characteristic based and institutional 
based trust. Process based trust, is developed when a record of past operations or 
expected exchanges occurred such as a gift exchange or reputation and is identified in 
the individual’s psychology. Characteristic based trust is developed when viewed as 
an element of network of collaborations, produced between groups and individuals 
with similarities and common cultural system. And institutional based trust is 
generated in a wider network of relationships and is derived by traditions, professions, 
and associations. Similarly, Tyler and Kramer (1996) approach the literature of trust 
production in different levels of ‘dynamics’. The macrolevel (similar to institutional 
level of Zucker 1986), the mesolevel that includes network collaborations as kinship, 
membership in professional communities, historical experiences and group 
memberships, and mutual dependencies. Finally, the microlevel is considered with 
the individuals psychological model of trust. Sako (1998) distinguishes between 
contractual trust (based on moral honest and promise keeping), competence trust 
(based on professional conduct, technical and managerial standards) and goodwill 
trust (based on consensus on the principle of fairness). Lewicki and Bunker (1996) 
distinguish between knowledge based, identification based and calculus-based trust.
Briefly, tmst is an interdisciplinary as well as complex and dynamic concept. 
It has been demonstrated that tmst could be understood as bearing an extrinsic and an
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intrinsic value. Either value dimensions reflect a presumed set of assumptions about 
the nature of social relationships and the driving dynamics of human action. 
Respectively, trust’s extrinsic value is expressed as a confident expectation that the 
other party will act in a predictable manner. On the other hand, trust can be 
understood as a goodwill belief that others are intrinsically motivated to maintain and 
built a social relationsliip. In any case, trust should be viewed as a dynamic and fragile 
value. Further the present study maintains that trust should be understood as being 
embedded in the context of interaction between two parties. However, the literature 
reviewed indicates that one should cautiously interpret the social construction of 
objects and subjects of trust. The following section will introduce the Stmcturation 
Theory perspective as a useful framework to understand the ways that trust is 
produced and reproduced in an interactional context.
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3.3.2 The constitution of organisational trust
Sydow (1998) suggests that Stmcturation Theory could be a useful framework 
to understand the constitution of organisational tmst. Tmst in this perspective is 
viewed as a medium and outcome of both intentional actions and a product of an 
interplay of stmctures of communication, authority and legitimation.
structure
modality
signification domination legitimation
6 ______ &________ &
trust as a rule of ] trust as an tmst as an
signification: the authoritative independent
world is resource: trust or normative mle
interpreted ; tmst relations as a
trustingly, e.g. resource referred
based upon a to in further
corresponding interactions and
propensity to CO- operative
trust ventures
interpretative allocative and norms positively
schemes authoritative influencing the
positively | resources evolution of tmst: i
influencing the stimulating the openness
evolution of trust constitution of honesty
-images of people tmst or tolerance
- images of facilitating tmst
organisation (e.g. information
1 patents)^
V ............... V...............
communication power (--> sanction
Figure 3.3: The constitution of tmst (Sydow, 1998).
Rules and resources of social interaction generate meaning, enable the exercise 
of authority and produce moral obligations and anticipation. In that sense individuals 
communicate with mles that help them to interpret the social world as a tmsting 
context of action. Also, tmst enables the involvement of individuals in the 
interaction, while it expands the possibilities of control over material resources or 
other individuals. Finally, tmst could be seen as a mle of legitimation to which 
individuals refer as an acceptable moral behaviour.
Also in this perspective the continuous interactional relationship between the 
subject and the object of tmst (which can be a person and / or system) produces and 
reproduces tmst with reference to the particular context where the interaction occurs
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(i.e. experiences, characteristics or institutions). Systems and peoples coexist and 
dynamically shape and construct the context of their interaction. Bachmann (2001) 
discusses the relationship between trust and power as an ‘embedded decision’ in trans- 
organisational relations. He insists that social actors build their decisions on good 
reasons rather than on calculation of idiosyncratic preferences. Their decisions are 
‘constitutively drawn from structural contexts and institutional arrangements in which 
their expectations and patterns of interaction are embedded’.
Source of trust
Object of trust Experiences Characteristics institutions
Person Positive experience with persons in 
exchange relations
Personal 
characteristics 
features relevant for 
trust
Regulations 
concerning 
interpersonal 
exchange relations
System
Positive experience 
with social systems 
in exchange relations
Social system 
properties relevant 
for trust
Regulations 
concerning inter- 
organisational 
exchange relations
Table 3,4: Conditions of the constitution of personal and system trust (Sydow, 1998)
Sydow’s (1998) view on the constitution of organisational trust using 
Structuration Theory as a useful framework of interpretation is a considerable 
suggestion for the present study. In particular, the suggestion that the production and 
reproduction of trust in an interactional context could be viewed both as a medium and 
outcome of the continuous interplay of structural modalities of communication, 
domination and legitimation is considered useful in the present study. However, a 
further and more detailed reference on Structuration’s main concepts will be presented 
in section 4.4. Following, a review of the literature in respect to the creation of 
organisational governance and the importance of trust in such a perspective, will 
support the understanding of the role of trust in the governance of organisational 
processes.
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3. 3. 3 Trust and governance
This section reviews the main arguments found in the literature about the role 
of trust in the operation of effective governance. The review is built on the 
assumption that democratic governance is the contemporary answer to the 
organisation’s challenges. According to Rose (1999), governance refers to the process 
and outcome of interactions and interdependences of a range of politically awai*e 
individuals or groups. He views politics as increasingly involving exchanges and 
relationships amongst organisation without a clear sovereign authority. He argues that 
trust is required, in these terms, to support the actual operation of the exchanges 
through which governance occurs. Similarly, Hardin (1999) explains that trust is 
important in democratic governance because to trust someone, with respect to some 
matter entails delegating that matter to them to some extent. Therefore, trust is an 
issue because by delegation, the delegator empowers someone else to look after the 
well-being, or to cause them harm or to fail in some task in return. He states that trust 
in that case should be considered as a requirement in a reciprocal relation. Further, 
Uslaner (2002) clarifies that good government does not generate trust, but trust in 
others helps make governments work better.
Considering that democracy has an intrinsic as well as instrumental value 
(Warren 1999) an association of each kind of trust can be drawn (following the 
distinction of extrinsic and intrinsic value). Seligman (1997) explain that trust is a 
modem phenomenon and not generalisable to all forms of social organisation. It is 
articulated to a particular idea of the ‘self and is a solution or type of specific 
interactional problems. The following table refers to the tmst role in the main 
concepts of liberal and deliberative democracy (also found in the literature as 
‘expansive’, ‘participative’, ‘discursive’). Although the political theorists’ debate on 
what constitutes each type of democracy is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
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some points are interesting to develop an understanding of the role of trust in 
organisational democratic governance.
Table 3.5: Trust and Democratic governance
Standard liberal democracy / extrinsic 
trust
Deliberative democracy / intrinsic trust
Democracy: instrumental value for
protecting or realising the interests of 
individuals or groups
Individuals are formed by hierarchical or 
anomic relations -  (hierarchies, markets)
Self: pre-politically constituted, - defined 
by individualistic interests.
Change of social relations: from
bureaucratic hierarchies
Trust and power: substitutes -  each 
functions as instrument of securing 
individuals interests
Democracy: increasing scope and
domain. Increased participation in and 
control over collective decision making
Individuals are formed by their 
experiences.
Self: constituted by social relations and 
practices that provide occasions for 
mutual interest.
Change: individual experience and higher 
level representative institutions.
Trust and power: complements-
presuppose each other to fair, equal, open 
representation of interests.
Communication: meaning -  and
infoimation sharing has not constitutive 
feature, it is only instrumental.
Communication: discursively constituted 
-  speech increases one’s sense of identity 
and autonomy
Legitimation: moral commitments are 
sourced in the expectations of the roles 
functionality in the system.
Legitimation: Moral commitments
derived by the engagement of the parties 
in the embedded identity of ‘we’
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On the one hand, the liberal approach to democracy is based on the assumption 
that individuals are formed by hierarchical functions or markets, and their interests are 
independently sourced in their individual desires and needs. These individuals wish to 
participate in the decision making processes, to the extent that they are assured that 
the systems of expertise are working properly to represent their interests and needs. 
Democracy in this sense is viewed as an instrumental function of assurance that the 
rules and routines regulating the decision processes are well justified. Emphasis is 
given to information disclosure and sharing is viewed as an instrumental function of 
communication between the parties involved. Tmst, particularly in abstract systems 
and routines, functions as an alternative to power and substitutes the possibilities of 
risk of failme of the systems of governance (Luchman, 1979; Warren, 1996; 
Korczynski, 2000). According to Hardin (1999), tmst is placed in institutions only 
when the ‘basic idea’ of the institution is known and accepted. It presupposes 
identification of interests and is a reciprocal expectation.
On the other hand, the deliberative approach to democracy is based on the 
assumption that individuals’ identities, needs, and interests are transformed by their 
experiences in the political interaction with others. Increased willingness to 
participate in and conti'ol over the collective decision making process, motivates them 
to engage in collective actions reflecting mutual interest. Democracy which generates 
values that are intrinsic to political interaction ar e closely related to self development 
(Warren, 1999). In this type of democracy, the decision making process is inclusive 
for those who are affected by the outcome. Romm (2002) suggests that tmst earning 
goes hand in hand with an orientation toward discursive accountability. Tmst is 
viewed as a pattern of authority emphasising inclusiveness, equality and fairness (both 
distributive and procedural) (Warren 1992; Warren, 1996 a,b; Hunold 2001)
Warren (1999) suggests that democracy depends more on interpersonal tmst 
than on tmst in political institutions and elites. However, not all kinds of interpersonal
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trust are good for democracy. He suggests that the attention should be focused on the 
‘social capital’ concept. Coleman (1990) was the first to define ‘social capital’ as the 
social norms and expectations that enable individuals to act collectively. Tmst and 
other foims of social capital are particularly interesting because they are moral 
resources, which operate in a fundamentally different maimer than physical capital 
(Powell, 1996). Uslaner (1999) claims that tmst which is generalised to strangers and 
not in specific group of people only, is in favour for democracy. By that means, 
interpersonal trust that is built in people, who do not have any characteristic type of 
family, culture, religion, ideology, is more likely to be favourable for democratic 
institutions.
3.3.3.1 Organisational governance and trust -  Extrinsic value
In the literature, the instrumental value of trust and democracy in governance 
relates the notions of authority exercise and control. From this perspective, studies of 
organisational governance and management, view trust and power as a substitute to 
each other. Some studies, while adopting the economic theory perspective, investigate 
the role of tmst as an alternative mechanism of market control or control in an unequal 
relationship of the principal and the agent in the agency problem. Ranging from 
viewing tmst as the most general of three classes of control mechanism -  price, 
authority and tmst (Bradach and Eccless, 1989) to viewing tmst as essential factor that 
permits all forms of risk taking in any social system. The main function of tmst, is the 
assurance that the risk of opportunism within the agency relationship in an absence of 
a contract in the relationship (Luhmann, 1979). Another instmmental view of tmst 
and power as substitutes to each other include the very influential writings of 
Luhmann (1979 and 1988) and Blau (1964). They address the association of tmst and 
power as alternatives to each other in situations of social exchange and control. In
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lateral alliances and social relations are increasingly replacing liierarchies. In such 
relationships, individuals need to develop negotiating skills in an evolutionary 
manner. Spreitzer and Mishra (1999) suggest that tmst may help managers to be more 
willing to involve lower hierarchy employees in decision making. They view tmst as 
an alternative to traditional control mechanisms. Finally Whitener et al (1998) 
maintained that openness of communication is an important determinant of 
organisational tmst.
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particular, Blau (1964) develops the ‘social exchange theory’. As suggested, in 
general terms tmst can be developed through increasing the quantity and or quality of 
communication exchanges over time
Adopting the substitute relationship view, Mills and Ungson (2003) 
demonstrate that the need for empowerment in a decentralised form of decision­
making authority to employees, arises from high uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Empowerment for them, is an effective way to facilitate stable exchanges and to 
sustain relational agreements. They propose the development of mechanisms of 
organisational constitutions and tmsting relationships, as alternative control 
mechanisms in response to the limited effectiveness of traditional controls such as 
monitoring, certification, and contracts. Sheppard and Tuchinsky (1996) observe that
3.3,2.2 Organisational governance and trust - intrinsic value
Tmst, as an intrinsic value of governance, is increasingly considered in the 
literature. Although the stmctural characteristics of organisational governance are not 
ignored, studies that adopt this approach give emphasis to the development of trust as 
a value instilled into the employees of the organisation. Nooteboom (2002) views the 
engagement of individuals to the affairs of their organisation as a ‘relational 
contracting’ (Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). He views
I
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relational contracting as a broader form of governance, where reliance may be based 
on several sources as norms and values, advantage, bonding and routinisation. He 
explains that management by relational contracting (involving trust) with incentives 
from self interest, has the advantage that is cheaper than contracts, is more flexible, 
and is in the player’s own interest to be seen to comply with agreements.
Hunlop (2001) proposes a deliberative model of bureaucratic accountability 
and explains that deliberation is not merely ‘talk’ but meets with norms of freedom 
and equality, publicity and inclusiveness in discussion and decision making. In order 
to enhance these norms and strengthen the democratic governance in administration, 
attention should be place on the following issues:
the inclusion of everyone affected by a decision of substantial political 
equality, including equal opportunities to participate in deliberation
- equality in methods of decision making and in setting agenda 
free and open exchange of information and reason
- reasons sufficient to acquire an understanding of both the issue in question 
and the opinion of others (Hunlop 2001)
Grey and Garsten (2001) observed a transformation of the notion of 
‘bureaucracy’ in the late 20^  ^ century decades, to a ‘post-bureaucracy’. The new 
organisational culture of ‘post-bureaucracy’ is reflected to the reduction of foimal 
levels of hierarchy, where emphasis is given on flexibility rather than rule following, 
and the creation of a more preamble boundaries between inside and outside the 
organisation (increased use of sub-contracting, temporary working and consultants 
rather than permanent and / or in-house expertise). Control in this new organisational 
reality is produced with trust which is constructed for and by people in organisations. 
Trust delivers a degree of non rationalised predictability, which is based on a sense of 
community and is deeper than the enforced standardisation thiough organisational 
rules.
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Investigating the role of trust in the organisational designs, Meyerson et al 
(1996) observe that organisations are moving away from formal hierarchical structures 
to more flexible and temporary groupings, where trust is sourced not on traditional 
structures (such as the ones Zucker proposed) but on a new form of conduct. They 
call it ‘swift trust’ and it involves a series of hedges in which people behave in a 
trusting manner. Similarly, Creed and Miles (1996) believe that broad patterns of 
values and norms embedded in governance, shape a general baseline of trust as a 
shared set of expectations and predispositions. In organisations, the predisposition to 
trust or distrust is embedded in managers’ philosophies and has been displayed 
through time, in different organisational structures and mechanisms that their 
philosophies prescribe and / or accommodate. Powell (1996) studied network forms 
of governance that are based on trust, such as business groups and strategic alliances, 
and found that although cooperation entails moving to a vulnerable position, such a 
risky move requires creating governance structures that allow constant monitoring and 
consultation. The key point is that monitoring is both easier (more natural) and more 
effective when done by peers than by superiors. Trust must be deliberate or even 
studied. The relationship of power contains within itself both the seed of 
transformation and the risk of severe failure.
In respect to decision making processes, Whitener et al (1998) state that 
organisations with a high degree of centralisation and foimalisation, and a primary 
focus on efficiency will constrain or impede the development of tmstworthy 
behaviour, such as a delegated and open communication. However, low control 
organisations - with greater decentralisation and lower foimalisation, and a focus on 
effectiveness, should make managers more likely to delegate decisions and 
communicate openly. McGregor (1967) stated that managers are more likely to 
involve their employees in decision making if they are able to tmst that employees 
care about the interests of the entire organisation. Mayer et al (1995) claim that senior
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manager’s trust reflects the belief that the employees are reliable in their actions and 
are honest about their intentions. They also stress that trust facilitates the use of self 
directed work teams and delegation of decision making by supervisors that require 
employee involvement. Minkes (1997) illustrated that in decentralised organisations 
trust is an understanding of one’s discretion and is reflected in the support on can 
expect from the superior.
Investigating information sharing in the decision making process and the 
importance of trust, Butler (1999) conducted a research with 324 managers to 
determine if there was a relationship between trust and information quantity shared 
with effectiveness and efficiency of a negotiation. He found that information sharing, 
following from initial trust expectations and information sharing, did not frilly mediate 
the relationship between expectations and a climate of trust. Also, negotiation 
effectiveness was associated with the quantity of information shared, but not with 
trust, and procedural inefficiency (time to discover the solution). Hardy et al (1996) 
made the case that in an inter-organisational relationship, trust grows out of a 
communication process in which to share information, means to provide the necessary 
foundation for non-opportunistic behaviour. Considering the outcome of the 
organisational decision making outcome, Brockner et al (1997) claim that the 
establishment of trust, is a potent force in overcoming the adverse reactions that 
employees may exhibit in response to decisions yielding unfavourable outcomes.
Particularly when examine resource allocation, trust is found to be important in 
promoting collaboration and fairness. Mishra (1996) examined the reasons why 
organisations respond differently during crisis and in particular in allocation resources 
under the pressures of crisis. He found that trust is especially important in the context 
of crisis and the scarcity of resources, because it fosters collaboration over the 
allocation of resources within firms. He states that collaboration over the allocation of 
resources within organisations is difficult to sustain in the absence of trust.
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Tyler and Degoey (1996) investigated trust in organisational authorities and 
found people focus on The motive inference’ of trustworthiness when they interact 
with authorities, hi other words, they found that people prefer to develop incomplete 
but satisfactory answers, giving value to information about benevolent intentions, 
rather than engage in complex cognitive processing of events
3.3.3.3 Organisational sector and trust
The relation between the sector of the organisation (for profit, governmental, 
non - governmental), and the development of trust as a necessary condition for 
organisational governance could be an interesting issue to consider. However, the 
tendency of trust theorists not to distinguish organisational trust between sectors, and 
the limited empirical literature on such a relationship, calls for a cautious adoption of 
a particular’ framework of reference and a profound need to expand the theoretical 
agenda of trust. Nevertheless, the following review intends to introduce the role of 
organisational trust in management of the non - for profit organisation while seeking 
literature insights for this particular organisational context, as required for the 
understating of trust development in The University.
The attempt to develop a conceptual framework of tmst in public sector 
management has been a recent but promising development. Albrecht and Travaglione
(2003) proposed a model that identifies ‘key’ antecedents and consequences of tmst in 
public sector senior management. They conducted a survey with employees of two 
organisations (325 responded from the first organisation which was involved with 
publicly funded library seiwices, arts and theatres and 425 responded from the second 
organisation which was responsible for the administration of land tittles). Antecedents 
of trust in the model were procedural fairness, organisational support, security and 
communication. The proposed consequences of tmst were affective commitment, 
continuance commitment, change cynicism and turnover intention. The findings of
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the survey established a relationship were trust mediated between the proposed 
antecedents and the expected consequences. Moreover, the findings supported the 
fact that trust in public sector senior management can be measured and employees are 
able to distinguish trust from other alternative organisational factors such as 
procedural fairness and commitment. Overall, though, the level of trust was not high 
and Albrecht and Travaglione (2003) suggested that there may be significant 
opportunities to improve public sector efficiency and effectiveness by improving 
levels of trust between employees and senior management in public sector. They also 
found that open climate of communication, fairness and equity in organisational 
policies and procedures, perceived organisational support and satisfaction with job 
and career security were significant determinants of trust. Further, the findings 
suggested that trust in senior management influences the extent to which employees 
are cynical towards change, they feel emotionally committed to their organisation and 
they intent to remain in the organisation. In that respect the proposed role of trust is to 
be considered as a critical factor in determining employees attitudes to change, which 
is a very a important role considering the continuing change of the public sector 
environment. With a similar type of research. Perry and Mankin (2004) surveyed the 
employee trust in management in a public organisation, a laige municipal fire 
department, and in a private sector one, a private manufacturing company. However, 
the study’s intention was not to compare between the two sectors but rather to model 
antecedents of employee’s trust in different levels of management. The model 
included characteristics of the trustee (namely gender, ethnicity, years worked under 
the manager), characteristics of the organisation (layoffs, managerial turnover) and 
characteristics of the manager (technical expertise and credibility). The study’s 
findings were that different levels of trust observed for different levels of 
management.
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In general, while considering governance as a process and outcome of 
interactions and interdependencies (Rose, 1999), the organisational context of such 
processes should be considered when studying tmst. The role of trust in such a 
perspective could be an important insight of managing a range of organisational 
challenges, while maintaining patterns of deliberate communication, influential 
participation and engagement in mutual moral commitments. The following sections 
will review the existing literature of tmst in relation to accounting procedures as an 
aspect of organisational control and accountability.
3.3.4 Trust and accounting systems / structures of accountability
Although research on tmst in accounting literature is not well developed, there 
are some views that tend to perceive tmst as calculative expectation that can be a 
solution to the agency monitoring problem or as behaviour favourable to the reduction 
of transaction costs. In studies that are associated with the implementation of 
management control mechanisms, there is disagreement whether accounting functions 
as a substitute or complement to tmst in organisations. In general lines, the views that 
argue for the substitute relationship suggest that tmst and accounting are inversely 
related, therefore more trust results in less use of formal control mechanisms and vice 
versa (Sitkin and Stickel, 1996; Power, 1997; Sztompka, 1999; Shore and Wright, 
2000). In that respect more accounting damages tmst. On the other hand the 
complementary relationship suggests that tmst and fornial control are additively 
related and an increase in the level of either tmst or formal control results in a higher 
level of control, and therefore enhances trust (Das and Teng, 1998; Poppo and Zenger, 
2002). Seal and Vincent-Jones (1997) reason that the replacement of tmst with a 
formal monitoring process is abstract and essentialist and they suggest that it is 
necessary to specify the empirical conditions under which formal accounting and 
accounting processes are supportive or compatible with the development of tmsting
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relationships. Dekker (2004) suggests that the possible explanation of the two 
different conceptions is that firstly, the relationship may not be linear, secondly, the 
changes of trust may be a moderating effect of problems of the control system, and 
that different types of trust (goodwill or competence) may differentiate between 
different purposes of control. Seal, Berry and Cullen (2004) distinguish the 
theoretical origin of the arguments and they explain that from a managerialist 
perspective, the importance of trust in business relationship is seen as a desirable and 
feasible strategy irrespective of the institutional environment. On the other hand, they 
explain that it is the institutionalist perspective, which is focusing on the production of 
trust and its relationship to power in interfirm relations (such as Gambetta, 1988; 
Zucker 1986). The third approach is the neo-functional perspective, which 
dichotomises trust and control as alternatives to each other (such as Lulimami, 1979).
The following table is drawn to create a framework of association between the 
concept of trust, (as it has been explained in previous sections), and its relation to the 
implementation of accounting as a control system in the organisation along with 
accounting’s presumed function of accountability. The left landside of column of the 
table demonstrates the conceptual association of the extrinsic / instrumental value of 
trust with the function of accounting as substitutes to each other. The next column of 
the table, links the intrinsic value of trust with the accounting function as 
complements to each other. At this stage it is necessary to indicate the concepts of 
‘accounting system’ and ‘system of accountability’. The definition of management 
accounting as a combination of accounting system and system of accountability 
proposed by Roberts and Scapens (1985, see section 3.2.2). The choice of the 
particular way of analysis is explained in the Methodology chapter (section 4.4).
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Table 3.6: Trust and accounting systems / systems of accountability
Substitute Complement
Undersocialised assumption of human 
action (transaction cost economics, self 
interest, opportunism, rational decision 
model)
Oversocialised assumption of human 
action (community oriented individuals, 
critical and self reflective)
Trust as predictable expectation 
(confident expectation that the other will 
perform in particular important to trustor)
Trust as goodwill expectation (unforeseen 
contingencies will be meet in good faith 
and mutual benefit)
No trust increases Suspicion No trust increases Vulnerability
Accounting system: formal control, 
contracting, close monitoring
Accounting system: social control, 
informal, interpersonal relations
Accountability is enforced by contract, 
punishment, and checking (auditing)
Accountability is enhanced by trust
Actors deliberately participate in the 
exercise of authority
3.3.4.1 Accounting and trust as substitutes
The role of accounting procedures as a formal control and monitoring 
mechanism as a substitute to trust emphasises the elimination of risk effects, caused 
by the lack of trust between mainly self-interest individuals. Whitley (1999) 
examined the relation between management control procedures and systems, and the 
organisational and societal context where they operate, at the extent that controls is 
exercised through formal rules and procedures, the degree of control exercised and the 
scope of information used in the system. He observes that in societies with low trust 
in formal institutions it is likely to find close control over behavioui'. Also, Neu 
(1991) follows that when high levels of trust exist, there is no need for a contract, and 
the introduction of foimal mechanisms may displace human linkages and therefore 
break down trust.
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Accoxintability
 y  Proxy for trust based upon duty ........
.............  to account by agent to principal.................................... ..........
Distrust Lack o f distrust
Assumption that the agent will Range of suspicion Reliance on the predictability of
pursue self interest with guile the agent’s behaviour
Figure 3.4: Traditional view of accountability (Swift, 2001)
The pattern of accountability from this angle is developed as a disciplinary 
structure that forces the involved parties to behave in a trustworthy manner. Swift
(2001) explains that in the agency perspective, accountability acts as a proxy for 
ensuring behavioural predictability through control mechanisms, and stakeholder 
dialogue is largely unnecessary in such a framework. Power (1997) illustrated that 
accountability mechanisms, such as auditing, are demanded under circumstances 
where resources are entrusted but where trust is lacking and must be restored by the 
audited activity. Financial auditors are social control specialists, who oversee the 
processing of information flow to principals in the foim of accounting and disclosure 
requirements. He further admits a ‘growing feeling that organisations aie theoretically 
undersocialised as strings of transactions and contracts’ and that ‘the rise of 
contracting, expresses a loss of faith in the binding power of obligations’. Similarly, 
Sztompka (1999) claims that accomitability means the enforcement of trustworthiness. 
It is the presence of agencies monitoring, and sanctioning the conduct of the trustee, or 
at least potentially available for such monitoring and sanctioning if the break of trust 
occurs. He believes that accountability enhances trustworthiness because it changes 
the trustee’s calculation of interests, it adds an extra incentive to be trustworthy,
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namely to avoid censure and punishment. The sheer presence of the agencies of 
accountability is not enougli to make the trustee accountable. Those agencies must be 
able to act effectively with respect to the trustee. The conditions that make agencies 
of aecountability effective are the characteristics of the trustee (non -  anonymity, 
dependence, possession of resources) and some structural factors as special 
organisational arrangements (legally enforceable contract). In respect to the growing 
attempt to introduce managerialist schemes to the universities. Shore and Wright 
(2000) attempted implementation of audit model of accountability. They 
demonstrated that this approach damages trust, while it encourages the displacement 
of a system based on autonomy and trust by one based on visibility and coercive 
accountability.
3.3.4.2 Accounting and trust as complements
Empirical studies suggest that trust and formal contracting are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1998). Poppo and Zenger (2002) suggest 
that formal contracts and relational governance function operate as complements, 
while well-specified rules of contiacts may promote cooperative, long term, trusting 
relationships. That is the effect of ‘well-crafted rules’ that narrow ‘the domain and 
severity of risk to which the exchange is exposed and thereby encourage cooperation 
and trust’. Also they suggest that relational governance may heighten the probability 
that trust and cooperation will safeguard against hazards, which are not predicted by 
the eontract, with a bilateral commitment to ‘keep -  on - with -  it’ despite unexpected 
complications and conflicts.
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Accountability
 T Based upon interdependent .........
.................. relationships between ..................
organisations & stakeholders
Lack o f trust___________________________________________________ Trust
Ignorance of whether the other Range of vulnerability Confidence in goodwill of the
is trustworthy or not otiier’s intent and behaviour
Figure 3.5: Contemporary form of accountability (Swift 2001)
Swift (2001) explains that trust based interdependent relationships, 
underpimied by mutual risk and reciprocal confidence that neither will walk away, are 
promoted as an alternative to relationship monitored and policed by social controls. 
Although this kind of relationship does not contain the element of mechanistic 
controls, it involves increased vulnerability and the necessity to develop social 
controls to ensure that another’s behaviour is not available. Boisjoly (1993) perceives 
as ‘true’ accountability the action, implicit or explicit, of deliberate involvement to 
correct and hold responsible the managers who are acting irresponsibly. Wanen 
(1996) maintains that a deliberate pattern of accountability in relations to participants 
and authority for decisions made in a society, can be generated only by extending the 
possibilities of democratic challenge by empowering individuals to demand 
justification and rebuild relations of trust.
93
Chapter 3: Trust and Accounting
33.4.3 The dynamics of the relationship between trust and accounting
Tomkins (2001) observes that the link between trust and control depends on 
the stages of the relationship between the two parties. She defines trust as the 
adoption of a belief by one party in a relationship that the other party will not act 
against her / his interests, where this belief is held without undue doubt or suspicion 
and in the absence of detailed information about the actions of that other party. She 
states that trust is grounded in learning from experience, and is dependent on 
information that is needed in order to gain trust. She suggests that tmst can be an 
active control in early stages of a contractual relationship, but must be replaced with 
unobtmsive monitoring to avoid the risk of tmst violation. Johansson and 
Baldvinsdottir (2003) while adopting the Tomkins’ (2001) definition of tmst, 
examined the effect of performance evaluation system between the evaluator and the 
evaluated and the accountant who is provided with the accounting figures. They 
conducted a longitudinal case study in a manufacturing company. In respect to the 
tension observed in the performance evaluation setting, they stressed that it was itself 
an indication of tmst problems. They also demonstrated that accounting figures can 
provide a basis for creating or violating tmst providing the actions of the others. 
Similarly, in respeet to the obseived accounting change, they foimd contracting 
attitudes by the people responsible for the accounting system with one focusing on 
tmst and the other neglecting it. In any case they propose that tmsting the accountants 
as well as tmsting the accounting figures is necessary for performance evaluation
Other studies propose tmst based control models and they claim that in a 
dynamic change environment new forms of control and governance emerge between 
or within organisations where trust appears to be a fundamental necessity (Ring and 
Van De Ven, 1992; Gietzmann, 1996; Van der Meer-Koistra and Vosselamn, 2002, 
Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). Characteristically, Van der Meer-Koistra and 
Vosselman (2002) investigated how contractual interfirm relationships can be
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controlled using a trust approach based on a transaction cost model. They claim that 
from a management control point and depending on the interfirm transactional 
relationship characteristics, three management control patterns can be found. The 
market based pattern, the bureaucracy based pattern and the trust based pattern. In 
particular to the trust based pattern (table below), they emphasise that it is important 
that the parties establish an open commitment to each other and that principles of 
fairness dominate the relationship.
Trust based management control pattern
Contact phase Trust, stemming from friendship, former contractual relationships or
reputation
Contract phase International contracting, framework contracts, contractual tiust, loose
links between payment and activities and output
Execution phase Personal consultation and coordination, development of competence trust
and goodwill trust, process oriented and culture based control mechanisms
Transaction High asset specificity, low repetition, activities or output cannot be
characteristics measured well, long term contract
Transaction Future contingencies are unknown, high market risks, social
environment embeddedness, institutional factors influence the relation
characteristics
Party Competence reputation, experience in networks, experience with
characteristics contracting parties, risk sharing attitude, no asymmetry in bargaining
______________ power.____________________________________________________
Table 3.7: Management control of interfirm transactional relationships- the 
trust based pattern (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000)
In conclusion, trust as an aspect embedded in the organisational context, in 
which it develops, it has been considered increasingly in the recent research literature 
of control and accountability. Although there is no agreement on the nature and 
extent of the relation of tmst with accounting, recent theorisation and empirical 
research incline to focus either on substitute or complementary relationships. More 
comprehensive views ai'gue, though, that such associations are abstract and essentialist 
(Seal et al, 1997) and that it is necessary to consider whether the relation is lineai' or 
the extent that different types of tmst may differentiate between purposes of control 
(Dekker, 2004). In general, the importance of tmst in organisational procedures, such 
as accounting, is an emerging theme in accounting related studies.
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3. 4 Summary
In this chapter the literature of accounting and trust in the organisational 
context is reviewed. In respect to the accounting perspective, the main argument 
addressed was that accounting practices should be studied in the organisational 
context in which they operate (Hopwood, 1983). In particular, section 3.2 of the 
chapter reviewed the literature addressing the need to study accounting in a socio­
political perspective in the context of specific organisational settings. Two major 
thoughts derived from that review, first was that organisations are socially constructed 
entities, and second that the organisational practices are embedded in that context and 
are shaped through political interaction continuously and dynamically. The rationality 
of organisational decisions should be viewed by other perspectives than strictly 
economic. Accounting systems and procedures are useful to governing the diverse 
interests, views and opinions, experiences, knowledge within the organisation. As 
Warren (1999) ascertains the management of diverse possibilities make the situation 
political, and therefore accounting has an important role to play in that context.
The next part of the chapter reviewed the trust literature. In attempting to 
demonstrate an inclusive (interdisciplinary) review of the literatuie concerned with 
trust, the chapter developed introducing the literature arguments on issues related to 
the concept such as its objects, faces, and fimctions. In particular, respecting the 
concern that trust is a complex concept, the chapter developed through the Nooteboom
(2002) distinction of extiinsic and intrinsic perspective of understanding the concept 
(section 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.1.2). Tmst is also viewed as being embedded and shaped 
within a continuous and dynamic interactional context, and in that perspective the 
relation between the subject and object of tmst should be considered carefully (section 
3.3.2.4). The importance of the role of trust in democratic governance is examined in 
general (section 3.3.2), and in the particular perspective of organisational governance
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(section 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.2). It is suggested that trust is an underlined crucial value 
for governance.
The final section of the chapter, investigates the causal relationship between 
trust and accounting in the context of organisational governance and control. In that 
sense, trust and accounting are substituting each other or complete each other (section 
3.3.3). The chapter closed with the view that the relationship between trust and 
accounting should be viewed more as an interplay than linear causality between the 
two.
In relation to the overall theme of the present dissertation the review of the 
literature enlightens the importance of studying accounting processes and trust 
relationships within the context in where they occur. Both accounting and trust are 
considered to be complex and dynamic social phenomena, that have attracted an 
interdisciplinary theoretical and empirical academic attention. In that respect, the 
theory of Structuration, has been suggested to be an informative framework of 
understanding the construction of accounting procedures and relationships of trust 
within organisations. The following chapter describes the methodological 
considerations that the study commenced.
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Chapter 4 -  Research Methodology
4. 1 Introduction
This chapter considers the theoretical and empirical stages of the research 
undertaken to explore the role of tmst in the resource allocation process of The 
University. The chapter explains how the research inquiry developed in a reflective 
manner, while theoretical assumptions and empirical justifications were generated 
during the course of the study (see section 4.5). In that respect the study adopted a 
flexible approach to the research paradigm implementation (section 4.2), while it 
absorbed a variety of evidence collection methods which allowed an interpretive 
approach of analysing the evidence gathered (section 4.7). The outcome of the 
research process was intended to provide an in-depth study of The University resource 
allocation process case.
More precisely, the theoretical approach of the research rests on the attempt to
generate a framework of understanding the role of tmst in accounting practices, such 
as the resource allocation process. Tmst, within the resource allocation context, is
"2 :
perceived as a reality relevant to the study’s participants who are considered to be 
aware and capable actors to be involved in and to shape the conditions of interaction 
in the particular situation. In respect to the social sciences research paradigm debate, 
as it is explained in section 4.3, the study adopts other than the positivist perspective. 
The concept of tmst and the use of resource allocation process are considered as 
perceptions of the participants of the study. The reference to Stmcturation theory 
(Giddens, 1984) in this stage is used as the essential theoretical backgiound in the 
study. In particular the concept of tmst according to Sydow (1998) can be viewed as a 
media and outcome of an interaction between knowledgeable actors, while it is 
affected by stmctures of signification, domination and legitimation. Similarly, the 
concept of resource allocation (as accounting practice) derives from the influential 
argument of Roberts and Scapens (1985) that accounting practices can be understood
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in the twofold ailiculation of accounting systems and systems of accountability. 
Accounting systems, in that perspective, are rules and procedures of accounting in 
practice such as the resource allocation process and the resource allocation model of 
The University. Systems of accountability involve structmes of domination, 
communication and legitimation.
The explanation of the evidence collection stages of the reseai’ch process is 
developed in the later sections of the chapter. Briefly, the major methods of 
investigation are described including the chronological sequences of contacts with the 
participants, research ethics, methods of analysis and demonstration.
4. 2 The research paradigm debate
The need to acknowledge and assess the fine line between the philosophy of 
science and the undertaken research in the organisational context of social practices 
has created a well-established debate during the last decades. The underlined attempt 
is to defend the ongoing and often paradoxical research approaches adopted from 
organisational researchers, who contribute to the deeper and broader understanding of 
organisations, under the wide spectrum of social sciences. This need is stretched 
further when an interdisciplinary approach is adopted to investigate a particular 
phenomenon, employing a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods.
Burrell and Morgan (1979) proposed a matrix based on two bipolar 
continuums. One continuum shows the alternative approaches to social science 
(ranging from ‘subjective’ to ‘objective’) and the other contains different assumptions 
about the nature of society (ranging from ‘sociology of regulation’ to the ‘sociology of 
radical change’). More specifically, the social science continuum includes 
assumptions on ontology, human nature, nature of society, epistemology and 
methodology.
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The sociology of radical change
Radical Humanist Paradigm
Anti-organisation theory
Radical structuralist Paradigm
Radical organisation theory
Interpretive Paradigm
Hermeneutics, ethno- 
methodology and 
phenomenological symbolic 
interactionism
Functionalist Paradigm
Behaviourism, 
Determinism and abstracted 
empiricism
Objective
The sociology of regulation 
Figure 4.1: Paradigms and related schools of organisational analysis (Morgan,
1980)
Morgan and Smircich (1980) following on the analysis of Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) suggest that the dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative methods in the 
social sciences is a rough and an oversimplified one. In addition the thorough 
adoption of the underlined epistemological and ontological assumptions concerned 
with the constitution of knowledge, reality and human nature, reveals a cautious 
interpretation of the organisational phenomena under consideration. More precise 
social researchers, implicitly or explicitly, approach their scientific disciplines via 
assumptions ‘about the very essence of the phenomena under study’ (ontology), ‘the 
grounds of knowledge’ (epistemology), ‘the relationships between human beings’ 
(human nature), and ‘the way in which one attempts to investigate and obtain 
“knowledge” about the “real world” ’ (methodology) (Hassard, 1991). These 
assumptions fall into the wider categorisation of paradigms where the researcher 
settles. However, the transition from one perspective to another must be seen as a 
gradual one and it is often the case that the researchers of any given position may 
attempt to incorporate insights from others (Fossey et al, 2002). Therefore the direct 
fit of a particular organisational research project to a given paradigm might be
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unattainable, while the assumptions may well be adopted from a variety of paradigms 
in-between the extreme objective and subjective ones.
Subjective Objective
Nominalism ---------Ontology------------ Realism
Anti-positivism ------ Epistemology--------- Positivism
Voluntarism ----- Human natuie--------- Determinism
Idiographic ------ Methodology--------- Nomothetic
Figure 4.2: The subjective -  objective dimensions of the social sciences 
assumptions (Burrell and Morgan, 1979)
Although the detailed reference to the representation of each paradigm is 
considered beyond the scope of this analysis, closer attention to the particular 
assumptions of the extreme subjective and objective approaches might be considered 
valuable. More precisely, the extreme subjectivist view suggests that the everyday 
reality is socially constructed and it does not exist as an external concrete form. 
Social science is a product of subjective experience. Humans are viewed as 
intentional beings, shaping the world within the realm of their own immediate 
experience. This extreme position claims that there may be nothing outside oneself: 
one’s mind is one’s world (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Researchers in these 
paradigms, seek to deconstruct the phenomenological processes through which shared 
realities are created, sustained and changed. Quantitative techniques may have an 
important but only partial role to play in the miderstanding of the phenomena under 
investigation. Qualitative research stands for an approach rather than a particular set
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of techniques and appropriateness- like that of quantitative research- is contingent on 
the nature of the phenomena to be studied. The researcher can no longer remain as 
external obseiver, measuring what one can see, but they move to investigate from 
within the subject of study and employ techniques appropriate to this task (Morgan 
and Smircich, 1980; Fossey et al, 2002).
On the other hand, the extreme objective paradigms tend to rest on the 
premises that the society has a real, concrete existence and a systematic character. 
Social science is believed to be objective and value free, and that gives rise to 
positivism. Human beings are a product of the external forces in the environment to 
which they are exposed and their behaviour is a predictable and determined response 
to the external stimuli. Researchers in this approach tend to manipulate ‘data’ through 
sophisticated quantitative approaches attempting to ‘freeze the social world into 
structured immobility’ (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Large-scale suiveys and 
detailed laboratory experiments are likely to be favoured in this approach.
Other attempts to provide framework of assumptions of the social sciences 
were also produced, challenging the contribution to the issue. Particularly, Deetz 
(1996, also Alvesson and Deetz, 2000) demonstrated that although the Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) framework provided ‘a kind of asylum’ to a variety of different kinds 
of research, it had been used to reify research approaches and lead to quick and poorly 
formed categorisations. In addition Deetz (1996) explains that although many 
questions admit numerical answers, when codification, counting and statistical 
reduction are separated from the full process of determining problems and influencing 
communities; when only one slice of the research is claimed as science, then research 
loses relevance and critical parts of the process are not investigated. He suggests to 
locate research differences in discursive moves and social procedures rather than 
procedures and individuals, gives a more contemporary look at alternative research 
programmes in organisation science.
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Relation to dominant social discourse 
Dissensus
Origin of Dialogic studies, Critical studies,
concepts and
problems Local / deconstructionist | reformist  Elite / a
post-modern, late modem.
emergent Interpretive studies, Normative studies,
Pre-modem, modem.
traditional progressive
Consensus
Figure 4.3 : Contracting dimensions from the metatheory of representational 
practices (Deetz, 1996)
His approach focuses on two dimensions of the contrast between research 
approaches. The first dimension focuses on the origin of concepts and problem 
statements, as part of the constitutive process of research and can be contrasting 
between local / emergent and elite/ a priori ones. The local/emergent approach to 
research attends to the feelings, intuitions and multiple forms of rationality of the 
researcher and the researched. Instead of using a single logic of objectification or 
purified rationality, it is based on interactions in the research process. It is expressed 
by researchers who engage in forms of participatory research. The knowledge form is 
more often one of insight rather than truth, aiming to aid the deeper understanding of 
particular settings. On the other end, the elite /a priori dimension of research tends to 
be heavily theory driven with careful attention to definitions prior to the research 
process. The researcher hopes to produce rational knowledge not constrained by 
tradition or particular belief systems of the researcher or researched.
The second dimension focuses on the relation of research practices to the 
dominant social discourses and the wider community, which can be contrasting 
between consensus and dissensus discourses. These two dimensions represented unity 
or difference with a given discourse and it is similar to the Burrell and Morgan’s 
‘change’ and ‘regulation’ distinction. Therefore, the consensus part draws attention to 
the way research seeks order in social systems. Conflict and fragmentation are usually
103
Chapter 4: Research Methodology
treated as system problems and attention is given to how social systems deal with 
them, attempting to maintain social order. On the other hand the dissensus part draws 
attention to research programmes, which consider struggle, conflict, and tensions to be 
the natural state.
4.3 Research in management accounting and trust -  the organisational 
context
The study of trust and also of accounting in the organisational context have 
been attained through the engagement of many human science disciplines (such as 
sociology, economics, politics, psychology) and at different levels, ranging from 
institutional and philosophical theorisations to everyday organisational practices 
(Chua, 1986; Rousseau era/, 1998).
More accurately, the importance of the consideration of the social sciences 
philosophical debate, found an oveiwhelming appreciation among accounting 
researchers, who attempt to contribute to the understating of accounting in the 
organisational context in which it operates (Hopwood 1978, 1983; Llewellyn, 1993). 
Sathe (1978) addressed the relevance of the modem organisation theory for 
managerial accounting, arguing that there is a connection between the two, while 
management accounting is concerned with the design and implementation of 
processes in organisations such as budgeting systems, responsibility accounting and 
more. Building on this linkage. Hopper and Powell (1985) admit that attempts, such 
as the Burnell and Morgan (1979) framework, provide a useful bridge and map in the 
research of the social and organisational aspects of accounting, acknowledging that 
certain fundamental theoretical and philosophical assumptions underlie any piece of 
research. They claim that individual values, philosophical assumptions, theoretical 
backing and research methods should all be related to each other and the aims of 
research. They emphasise the importance of the understanding of the principal
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assumptions with particular respect to the multi-disciplinary nature of management 
accounting, and its practically oriented character (also, Johnson 1995). On the other 
hand, Scapens (1994) suggests that management accounting researchers should ‘never 
mind the gap’ between theoiy and practice, tiying to address the link between 
accounting and mainstream economics, rather they should focus more closely on the 
study of management accounting per se. He views accounting practices as 
institutionalised routines which enable organisations to reproduce and legitimise 
behaviour and to achieve organisational cohesion.
On providing critique of the Burrell and Morgan approach, Chua (1986) 
explains that several problems are raised, based on the use of mutually exclusive 
dichotomies (determinism v, voluntarism), the latent relativism of truth and reason 
which the framework encourages, and the dubious nature of the differences between 
the radical structuralist and humanist paradigms. Similarly, Wilhnott (1993) suggests 
that the sharp division of ‘subjectivist’ and ‘objectivist’ forms of analysis should be 
challenged, with the understanding that there is a continuity as well as asymmetry in 
the process of theory development. Roberts and Scapens (1985), find constraining the 
model’s insistence to provide exclusive paradigm limits where dialogue across 
paradigms is precluded. They suggest ‘Structuration Theory’ offers a possible 
synthesis of the different schools of contemporary social theory. Laughlin (1995) 
admits that although the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework is too simplistic, it is a 
useful starting point to search the key characteristics under which various social 
sciences and accounting, in particular can be located. However, an alternative matrix 
of approaches to empirical research in accounting is provided and a ‘middle range 
thinking’ approach is considered also valuable (Laughlin, 1995). In that respect, 
Weick (1989) admits that ‘middle range theories’ are a necessity if the process of the 
research is to be kept manageable, and representations (such as metaphors) are 
inevitable, given the complexity of the subject matter.
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4. 4 Structuration theory
It has been suggested in chapter 3 that accounting practices, such as the 
resource allocation process (section 3.2.2), and organisational trust (section 3.3.2) 
could be viewed under the prism of Structuration theory. In this section a review of 
the particular theory would reveal the main concepts of the theory and its contribution 
to the understanding of social interaction in the organisational context.
In 1984 the sociologist Anthony Giddens published a manuscript proposing a 
theory for the society named the ‘structuration theory’. In his theory, the two poles of 
subjective and objective understanding of society are bridged with a continuous 
production and reproduction of conditions of social interaction across time and space. 
Social action and social environment (also applied to organisational context), are 
produced and reproduced in a dialectic order and are constructed in relation to each 
other. This continuous interplay is named ‘structuration’ and can be identified in the 
conditions of an interaction between social actors.
The social environment (context) that affects and is affected by the social 
interaction is constituted by social structures of signification, domination and 
legitimation. Each structure is not ‘external’ to individuals and it does not 
predetermine her / his actions, although it can be ‘constraining and enabling’ 
(Giddens, 1984:25). Individuals have a choice of a range of actions within a given 
social framework. Structures are identified as organised rules and resources which are 
produced from the interaction between knowledgeable individuals. Rules refer to 
norms used in the constitution of meaning between individuals and enable (or 
constrain) communication between them during their interaction. Rules also can be 
the perceived notions of acceptable moral behaviour, which constitute the perceived 
moral obligations and moral anticipations of the individuals involved in the 
interaction. There are both formal and informal codes of conduct. The resources, 
allocative and authoritative, constitute the structure of domination. Allocative
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resources refer to the capability to exercise command over material sources, while 
authoritative resources form the ability of an individual (or a group) to exercise power 
over another individual (or gioup). Rules and resources of conduct are both medium 
and outcome of the interaction and this double role is what Giddens names ‘duality of 
structure’ (Giddens, 1984).
structure
(Modality)
signification
J .
<» domination
Interpretative
scheme
V
facility
">• legitimation
norm
Interaction communication <•> power sanction
Figure 4.4: The duality of structure (Giddens, 1984)
The interaction between individuals is driven by their discursive consciousness 
and ‘they always know what they are doing’ (Giddens, 1984). However, individuals 
are not able to predict or predetermine the consequences of the activities in which they 
engage. Their actions are always embedded in the context where they occur. 
Characteristically, Giddens (1984) states that human history is created by intentional 
activities in an unintended project. In his view, human action is sourced on three 
different levels of consciousness, which generate the reflexive monitoring of action, 
the rationalisation of action and the motivation of action. Reflexive monitoring is the 
purposive or intentional character of human action and it should be considered in the 
continuous process of action. Rationalisation of action is the capability of humans to 
‘keep in touch’ with the grounds of what they do and if asked by others they can 
supply reasons for their activities. Both the reflexive monitoring and rationalisation of 
action are embedded in the context of the interaction and aie expressed as modes of 
action in that particular context. Motivation of action, however, refers to the potential 
of action rather than the mode that this action occm*s.
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Reflexive monitoring of action -► Unintended consequences of
action
Rationalisation of action
Motivation of action <------------------------------------------- — —  ----------
Figure 4.5: The model of action (Giddens, 1984)
The continuous interplay of action and structure on a regular basis develops 
institutionalised patterns of inter-depended social practices. These patterns are the 
‘systems’ which, although tend to have an organised and regular character, do not 
exist in isolation or externally of the social practices that produce them. However, 
their difference with the structures of mles and resources is that systems ai*e embedded 
in particular time and space. In a sense, systems are produced and reproduced during 
the interaction of knowledgeable social actors which draws upon rules and resources 
of communication, authority and moral anticipations on a regular and organised 
manner within a particular set of social practices. Control within such systems is 
organised as both dependence and autonomy between social actors. The ‘dialectic of 
control’ explains the situation where a less powerful individual has the ability to 
manage resources in such a way as to gain contiol over the most powerful part of the 
relationship.
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4. 5 Methodological assumptions of the study
Bearing in mind the social and organisational context of accounting and the 
interdisciplinary understanding of trust and of accounting, the need to consider a 
multifaceted research approach emerged. Romm (1998) suggests that 
‘interdisciplinarity’ as a practice, can be understood as a reflexive orientation that 
enables researchers to entertain possibilities for taking on board ideas / interpretations, 
exceeding the boundary of some ‘source discipline’.
More accurately, the research approach resulted from a reflective manner
during the course of the study. Covaleski and Dirsmith (1990) claim that what is
needed in field research is self-consciousness and reflexivity on the part of the
researcher, who should reflect her/his own detachment from both the original thesis
and antithesis, and the possible role of synthesis in channelling and directing research
attention and creating or altering that which is observed (also Denzin and Lincoln,
1984; Weick, 2002). In addition to this. Hopper and Powell (1985) suggest that
researchers into management sciences should consider their own values and beliefs
.concerning the nature of society and social sciences. Therefore, the self-reflective 
mode gave bones to the potential ideas, wonderings, assumptions, decisions and 
practicalities faced through the research process. Adopting the ‘going to the Wizard 
of Oz’ attitude, the project developed through the interaction between the main 
persons involved in the research (my supervisor and I), the reflections gained from the 
academic community (academics who provided constructive advice and criticism 
during the study) and the participants of the study. However, considerable attention 
has been placed on the need to attain a reasonable ‘distance’ for independence and 
reflection in the study.
More precisely the research developed as a gradual process of experience and
.understanding, seeking the depth and insights in the ongoing exploration of the 
research subject. Although the learning exercise evolved from the expanded literature
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review to the actual field research, the required understanding is gained through a 
continuous interpretation and reflection during the course of the study. The broad 
knowledge of the literature was aiming to provide background to the research topic 
rather than to form and adopt a particular stance. In other words, the literature review 
inspired the project but in no way provided a pre-fomied theorisation or derived to 
testable presuppositions. Supporting this approach to knowledge, Alvesson and 
Skoldberg (2000) state that reflective research has two basic characteristics, careful 
interpretation and reflection, which gives a constant assessment of the relationship 
between ‘knowledge’ and ‘the ways of doing knowledge’.
Adopting the reflective perspective, the importance of the interpretations made 
in order to realise the phenomenon under study was centred in the perceptions of the 
study’s participants. Each of them gave a view which is treated in the study as insight 
to the world where the participants feel, think, believe, act, and produce the meaning 
of their existence in the particular organisational context. This ontological approach 
of ‘Seeing the world through the eyes of others’ is widely defended as an option of 
relativism, where reality is constructed socially and changes through social 
interactions occurring through time and space. Due to the relativism of the particular 
reality of the participants, a distant or ‘external’ observation would be dangerously 
abstract.
The methodology followed to uncover and address the nature of the research 
subject, involved different methods of evidence collection and interpretation. The 
need for in-depth investigation was satisfied by the all-time access to The University’s 
day-to-day organisational life and its Intranet, where various documentation was 
reached, while the broader cultural experience of The University’s main self -  
explanation of an old research led institution was considerably important. This access 
facilitated the understanding of the concerns of the senior personnel of The University 
for funding resources in a changing environment and the trust between them as an
;;v
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underlined attitude. The use of a quantitative attitude scale measurement -  
organisational trust inventory (see section 4.7.1) - was hinctioning more as a 
‘snapshot’ of the particular attitude rather than as a self-sufficient method for 
conceptualisation. As Morgan and Smircich (1980) state, narrow empirical snapshots 
of isolated phenomena at fixed points of time do not do complete justice to the nature 
of the subject, so the need for qualitative semi-structured interviews emerged (see 
section 4.7.2.1). Both methods were used in the research context and the information 
gained was subject to the understanding of the phenomenon in order to derive 
propositions relating to how the situation could or should be interpreted. Attention 
should also be placed on the methods of data analysis which are not simply neutral 
tecliniques because they carry the epistemological, ontological, and theoretical 
assumptions of the researchers who developed them (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000; 
Mauthner and Doucet, 2003). Therefore the outcome of each of the methods of data 
collection and analysis would be considered in the overall research context.
4. 6 Research Ethics
The research project gained an Ethical Approval fi*om the Social Science 
Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Law and Financial studies of the University of 
Glasgow. The Ethical Approval requirement was in compliance with University of 
Glasgow policy on all non clinical research involving human participants, material or 
data. The need for formal Ethics Approval considered appropriate in respect to the 
participants involvement to the project. Further, the committee commented that the 
project ‘does not appear to involve vulnerable subjects’.
The issue of ethical organisational research is extensively discussed in the 
literature (Gill and Johnson 1997; Brewrton and Millward, 2001). Guillemin and 
Gillam (2004) define as ‘ethics in practice’, the day -  to -  day ethical issues that arise
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in undertaking research, issues that are not addressed in an ethical research protocol. 
They explain that the ethically important moments when conducting qualitative 
research methods (for instance interviews) arise due to participant’s indication of 
discomfort with their answer or reveal vulnerability. They suggest that researchers 
should be aware of all potential influences and be able to step back and take a critical 
look at her/ his role in the research process.
It was therefore a serious consideration of conducting an ethical research 
approach, that resulted in the adoption of several actions assuring sensitivity to 
possible risks and hazards in respect to the research participants’ involvement. First 
of all, the participants were invited to be involved in the research project with a letter 
explaining the purpose, the nature, and the prospective contribution of the research 
outcome (appendices 9 and 10). It was clearly explained that the research was a 
contribution to a PhD completion. Further, a description of what is expected from the 
participants to do, in compliance to the specific methods employed was explained on 
the covering letter, for the questionnaire, and before the recording for the interview. 
In addition, the participants were asked permission in order to record the interview 
beforehand. A particular consideration of a possible effect of the tape recorder on the 
‘authenticity’ or ‘naturalness’ of the expressed views was taken into account when 
analysing the transcripts (Speer and Hutchby, 2003). hi both stages, the questionnaire 
and interview, anonymity was promised. Moreover, the questions of the questionnaire 
and the ones during the interview were carefully applied trying to avoid exposing the 
participants to psychological distiess and inconvenience.
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4.7 Research Methods
A case study approach was considered as the most appropriate, with respect to 
the richness and depth of the evidence required. Eisenliardt (1989) defines the case 
study, as a research strategy, which focuses on understanding the dynamics present 
within single settings. Humphrey and Scapens (1996) explain that case studies have 
an important role to play in researching the day-to-day functioning of accounting in 
contemporary organisations, although ‘no theory is true, no case study is objective and 
no findings are universally justified’.
Brewerton and Millard (2001) explain that the advantages of the case study are 
that it enables a more in-depth examination of a particular situation than other 
research designs; the information it yields can be rich and enlightening and may 
provide new leads or raise questions that otherwise might never have been asked; the 
people involved usually comprise a fairly well -  circumscribed and captive group, 
making it possible for the researcher to describe events in detail. In that respect Otley 
and Berry (1994) insist that greater clarity is needed in the ‘write -  up’ of the case so 
that maximum benefit is gained. They suggest that this clarity should be applied both 
at the initial theoretical positions, and to the interpretation of the empirical evidence, 
which should be in a way that indicates the theoretical modification that the empirical 
observations have generated.
The criteria which define a valid case study according to Brewerton and 
Millard (2001), are its significance in the public or theoretical interest; it’s 
completeness as a sense of understanding the ‘whole’ case; the consideration of 
alternative perspectives by drawing on the work of other researchers; the provision of 
sufficient evidence to enable the reader to make her/liis own judgements and finally 
the sensitivity and respect shown for the disclosures recounted in the research report 
and for the role of participants in the research process.
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In constructing case studies, a combination of a variety of methods is often 
undertaken. The use of multiple methods, named triangulation (Jick, 1979), is often 
chosen to provide greater validity and reliability to the research project. It is also 
described as convergent validation and it shares the notion of complementary 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies rather than competing approaches (Gill and 
Johnson, 1997). However, Thurmond (2001) argues that the use of triangulation 
strategies does not strengthen a ‘flawed’ study. Researchers should use triangulation 
if it can contribute to understanding the phenomenon.
The present case was studied employing two major methods of evidence 
collection. In chronological order, the first method was an attitude scale measurement 
and the second semi-structured interviews. However, other type of infomiation was 
also gathered during the study from The University’s intranet and the Faculties 
committee’s agendas and minutes that contributed to the in depth investigation of the 
case (see appendix 10). The table (4.1) demonstrates the diary of the questionnaire 
administration and conduct of the semi structured interviews.
In respect to the research undertaken, an emphasis was given to the analysis of 
the evidence gathered, which was focusing to ‘make sense’ of the case. The current 
method e followed three steps of analysis
1. Identify individual patterns: the evidence collected using multiple sources 
of data was first analysed individually to increase validity.
2. cross case analysis: to identify the main themes which emerged in the
gl'OUp.
3. Comparative analysis between cross-case patterns of the two major groups 
of participants.
Yin (2003) maintains that pattern matching analysis technique strengthens the 
internal validity of the case study. The intention of this technique is to seek and 
compare the patterns and see if there is ‘a master pattern that expresses them all’.
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Miles and Huberman (1994) also developed a cross case analysis demonstration 
building matrices of variables. Eisenhardt (1989) explains that searching for cross 
case patterns eliminates the tendencies to derive false conclusions as a result of 
information processing biases, forcing the investigators to go beyond initial 
impressions tlirough the use of structured and diverse lenses on the data.
Resource Units Name
OTI response date 
(Post date 
7/2/2002)
Interview
R U l Head of Resource 
U nitl
11/2/2002 20/8/2003
RU2 Head of Resource 
Unit 2
12/2/2002 6/8/2003
RU3 Head of Resource 
Unit 3
8/3/2002 1/10/2003
RU4 Head of Resource 
Unit 4
8/3/2002 14/8/2003
RU5 Head of Resource 
Units
4/4/2002 18/9/2003
RU6 Head of Resource 
Unit 6
7/5/2002 27/8/2003
RU7 Head of Resource 
Unit 7
23/9/2002 12/9/2003
RU8 Head of Resource 
U nits
29/10/2002 21/8/2003
RUIO Head of Resource 
Unit 10
- 9/9/2003
RU ll Head of Resource 
Unit 11
- 2/10/2003
Management Group
MGl Management 
Group participant 
MGl
25/4/2002 5/8/2003
MG2 Management 
Group participant 
MG2
24/10/2002 19/8/2003
MG3 Management 
Group participant 
MG3
7/3/2002 8/9/2003
MG4 Management 
Group participant 
MG3
5/9/2003
MG5 Management 
Group participant 
MG3
8/1/2004
'able 4.1 : Questionnaire and interviews diary
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4.7.1 Measuring trust
In order to design an instrument that would measure and provide useful 
information about the levels of interpersonal trust between the participants of the 
study, a conceptualisation of trust was found necessary. The research instrument 
developed was a reformed version of the ‘Organisational Trust Inventory’, which was 
first designed by Cummings and Bromiley (1996) as an instrument of measuring the 
degree of trust between units of an organisation or between organisations. Cummings 
and Bromiley (1996) developed a reliable and valid OTI, analysing each dimension of 
trust across the three components of belief identified by Creeds, Fradigar and Petty 
(1994),
Component of Belief
Affective State Cognition Intended
Behaviour
Keeps
Dimension of Commitments 
trust
Negotiated
Honestly
Avoids Taking
Excessive
Advantage
Figure 4.6: Definitional Matrix of Trust as a Belief by Cummings and 
Bromiley (1996)
Similar measures developed by Butler (1991) were used to analyse 10 
dimensions of trust during 84 interviews of managers. In earlier studies the 
measurement of trust was performed using sociometric scales (Rotter 1967; Cynthia 
and Swap 1982; Rempel; Holmes and Zanna 1985).
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The reformation and development of the instmment in order to fit the specific 
organisational context of The University and to provide a useflil insight to the research 
subject, occurred in different levels (see appendix 11). First, the re-conceptualisation 
of trust involving six correlated dimensions (named competence, opemiess, concern, 
reliability, loyalty and fairness) instead of three (named keeping commitments, honest 
negotiations, not take advantage) that the original instrument had, was considered 
necessary. More specifically, trust as a concept is discussed extensively in the current 
organisation and management literature (see chapter 3). However, there is a variation 
of definitions in the relevant literature. In order to meet the designing needs of the 
particular method, trust is defined whilst bearing in mind the current literature and the 
specific organisational setting. Therefore, trust is defined as the willingness to be 
vulnerable based on belief / expectation that the other is competent, open, concerned, 
reliable (Mishra, 1996), loyal and fair (Butler 1991, Swift 2001, Webb 1995).
The core characteristic of this definition is that Trust is an attitude (belief) that 
a person adopts towards others, based on the predictable expectation that the other is 
competent, open and reliable and also in the goodwill belief that the other is 
concerned, loyal and fair. This definition involves both ontological dimensions of 
Trust, as referred in the literature (section 3.3). Furthermore the concept involves the 
notion of willingness to be vulnerable, that reflect the notion of freedom of choice in 
terms of belief and expectation. Thus trust is not examined when conditions of 
enforcement and contractual cases are involved.
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Component of Belief
Affective state Cognition
Intended
Behaviour
Competence 
Openness 
Dimension of Reliability 
Trust Concern
Loyalty 
Fairness
Figure 4.7: The definitional matrix of trust as reformed for tlie study
More analytically, the concept includes the use of dimensions as broadly have 
been identified in the literature. The mentioned dimensions of Trust are competence, 
openness, concern, reliability, loyalty and fairness. In the relevant literature, these 
dimensions reflect an extension of socio - psychological perception on a given set of 
reactions and /or outcomes. More precisely, competence rests on the belief that 
managers will make conect decisions (Tyler and Kramer, 1996). McAllister (1995) 
reports that past measures of trust in organisational setting suggest that competence 
and responsibility are central elements of the concept. Additionally the dimension of 
openness is used to reflect the belief that someone will give straightforward accounts 
of events (Tyler and Kramer, 1996). Very often opemiess is related to the meaning of 
honesty. Moreover, the belief that someone is concerned about the welfare 
(McAllister, 1995) of the other partners of the interaction facilitates the notion of trust. 
Furthennore the degiee to which people’s statements and their actions are consistent is 
reflected in expectations of reliability (Tyler and Kramer, 1996; McAllister, 1995; 
Giddens, 1990). Loyalty also is referred to the literature as an indicator of trust
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(Rousseau et al 1998, Butler 1991, Webb 1995). The notion is related to a degree of 
responsibility and reciprocity and can be generated by a number of forces among these 
nonns. Finally, the dimension of fairness can be identified in trust. In the literature, a 
distinction is made between procedural form of social justice and distributive form of 
justice (Butler, 1991; Brocker and Siegel, 1995; Sheppard and Tuchinsky, 1995; 
Swift, 2001).
Trust as an attitude/belief involves affection, cognition and intention. 
Oppenheim (2001) explains that attitudes are reinforced by beliefs (the cognitive 
component) and often attract strong feelings (the emotional component) which may 
lead to particular behaviour intents (the action tendency component). In addition, he 
explains that attitudes, as many other determinants of behaviour, are abstractions - 
though very real to the person who holds them. They do not exist in isolation within 
the individual. They generally have links with components of other attitudes and with 
the deeper levels of value systems within the person, hi addition, they are acquired or 
modified by absorbing or reacting to the attitudes of others.
However, researchers such as Crites et al (1994) insist on stating some 
profound drawbacks in attitude literature. Firstly, the relationship between attitudes 
and behaviour is vague (Liska, 1974; Crespi, 1971; Gross and Niman, 1975; Tittle and 
Hill, 1967), although recent research supports that attitudinal response can be 
classified broadly into affective, cognitive and behavioural categories (Me Broom and 
Reed, 1992) . Secondly, researchers have failed to take into account the effect that 
structural characteristics of the measures, (such as wording, response format), can 
have on individual responses. Thirdly, researchers often fail to assess the reliability 
and / or validity of their scales. Generally, reliability refers to the purity and 
consistency of a measure, to repeatability, to the probability of obtaining the same 
results again if the measure were to be duplicated (Oppenheim, 2001). The reliability 
of the scale can be assessed by the conelation coefficient. Sets of questions are more
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reliable than single opinion items, they give more consistent results, mainly because 
vagaries of question wording will probably apply only to particular items, and thus 
any bias may cancel out, whereas the underlying attitude will be common to all the 
items in a set or scale (Sarantakos, 1998; Oppenheim, 2001; Shumman and Presser, 
1996). Reliability of scaled measures - includes both the characteristics of the 
instrument and the conditions under which it is administered. It is expressed in the 
form of a correlation coefficient and in the social and behavioural sciences; it is rare to 
find reliabilities much above 0.90. The square of a correlation expresses the 
percentage of shared true variance (thus a reliability coefficient of 0.90 means that the 
two measures have 0.81 or 81% in common- they overlap or share a common variance 
by just over four fifths) (Oppenheim, 2001)
Validity tells us whether the question, item or score measures what it is 
supposed to measure (Oppenheim, 2001; Sarantakos, 1998) the difficulty in assessing 
the validity of attitude questions is the lack of criteria Oppenheim (2001) Social 
desirability is referred to as the tendency to reply ‘agree’ to items that the respondents 
believe reflect socially desirable attitudes, in order to show themselves in a better light 
(Oppenlieim, 2001; Liska, 1974). There are two ways of checking the validity of an 
instrument: empirical validation and theoretical validation. In the empirical the 
validity of a measurement is checked against empirical evidence - the findings 
produced tluough the measure are supported by empirical evidence. In the theoretical 
the validity is ascertained through theoretical or conceptual constiucts - the findings 
are supported by theoretical principles.
Finally, the degree of reliability (consistency) sets limits on the measure of 
inconsistencies to some degree. On the other hand, if we find that a measure has 
excellent validity, then it must be also reliable. (Oppenheim, 2001)
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4.7.1.1 Pilot Study
Having the Organisational Trust Inventory of Cumming and Bromiley (1996) 
as a yardstick, the design of Trust scale measurement developed.
Firstly, a number of written statements reflecting each dimension of trust in 
accordance with the structural stages of an attitude were formed. The total number of 
statements developed were 120, reflecting each dimension of Trust and Belief. Each 
category had three positives and three negatives in meaning statements. The main 
concern was to develop couples in order to be able to check the validity of each single 
statement.
The concern for the statement’s wording and structure was to express as 
clearly as possible the state of affection, cognition and intention of the respondent. 
For that reason the words ‘feel’, ‘think’, ‘In my opinion’, ‘I’m planning to’, ‘I’m 
going to’ etc are employed to emphasise each component of belief as refened in 
Creeds, Fabrigar and Petty (1994). Additionally equal negative statements were 
formed as ‘I feel they don’t’, ‘I don’t think’, and ‘I’m not going to’.
Second, all the statements did not include the word ‘trust’. Rather, the words 
used to set each statement were similar or the same as those used in the literature 
where the Trust dimensions were defined. For instance, Tyler and Kramer (1996) 
define competence as the belief that managers will make correct decisions, so the 
statement reflecting this dimension in its affection state is ‘I feel that Y will make a 
correct decision’.
Third, all statements were to be kept as simple as possible i.e. having only one 
verb to reflect the response mode and avoiding conditional statements. Finally, all 
statements needed to be phrased at the group level and the letter ‘Y’ used to identify 
the other Unit i.e. ‘we think that Y’ ’ rather that ‘I think that Y’.
The next step was to identify and highlight the statements that were clearer in 
meaning and structure. Forty-five (45) statements remained to constmct the final
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form of the Organisational Tmst Inventory. The statements were listed in a random 
order so as not to bias the responses. The list was scaled in seven levels from Strongly 
Disagree to Strongly Agree.
The Organisational Trust Inventory was divided in two parts. The first part 
was seeking to identify the level of tmst that the respondents have towards their 
counterparts. All the statements at tliis part had the form of ‘WE think for Y’. At the 
second part of the instmment, the respondents were asked to evaluate how they 
believe their counterparts think of them in terms of Tmst. So all the statements at this 
part had the form of ‘Y think that We’.
At the front page of the Organisational Tmst inventory was an explanation of 
how each response should be notified at the scale, and how to interpret the ‘ Y’ which 
is referred in the statements. More over, an identification of the responded was 
required in order to analyse the potential response. However, on the accompanying 
covering letter, a promise of confidentiality and anonymity was expressed.
The first foim of the Organisational Tmst Inventory was administered to the 
staff of the Accounting and Finance department of The University of Glasgow. The 
reason for choosing this specific population to test the instmment was the similarity of 
the educational, organisational and social background with the perspective 
respondents. The total number of questionnaires administered was 12 (twelve). 
Eleven (11) were given to academic staff and one (1) to an administration secretary. 
There were eight (8) responses.
According to these responses and bearing in mind the recommendations given 
as a feedback, the Organisational Tmst Inventory took its final form. Some of the 
statements were replaced and some were rephrased in temis of clearance both in 
language and purpose. Further more, an additional selection was made in order to 
reduce the number of the items.
122
Chapter 4: Research Methodology
The final form of the Instrument had thirty six (36) statements in each part. 
Also, changes were made on the front page of the instrument, according to the 
recommendations given as feedback from the instruments test.
At the end, the complete and pre-tested Organisational Trust Inventory was 
posted to the members of the Star Chambers at 7'*’ of February of 2002.
4.7.1.2 The organisational trust inventory -  design and administration
The Heads of Resource Units and the selected members of the Central 
Management Group, were asked to respond on the formulated Trust inventory 
instrument.
The Heads of Resource Units were asked to express their degree of agreement 
in a attitude scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being ‘strongly Disagree’ and 7 ‘Strongly Agree’ 
(see appendix 12) . Bearing in mind the initial difficulties that the respondents would 
face because of the nature of the responses required, a different questionnaire was 
designed for the members of the management group (see appendix 13). More 
precisely, the respondents from the central Management Group were asked to evaluate 
in the scale of 1 to 7, all thirty six (36) statements for each of the two parts of the 
questionnaire for all the thirteen (13) Resource Units, fri simple words, each of the 
participants of the central Management group would have to reply to thirteen (13) 
questionnaires. Concerned about the volume and consumption of the participants 
time, the redesign of the instrument was considered necessary. The new questionnaire 
varied in relation to the one administered to the Heads of the Resource Units only in 
its form, all statements and scale of evaluation remained the same.
The procedure followed, in order to approach the members of the Star 
Chamber meetings, is shown chronologically in the following table 4.1.
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When What Who
14/11/2001 Email arranging meeting to Dean of Law and Financial 
Studies
16/11/2001 Dean’s email ‘doctoral student and 
star chamber’- asking involvement 
to research
to MGl, MG2, MG3, MG4, 
RU2, RU3, RU6, RU9, RUIO, 
R U ll
22/11/2001 email thanking for first response to MGl, MG3, MG4, RU2, 
RU6, RUIO
17/12/2001 Forwarding Dean’s email to other 
prospective participants
to RUl, RU4, RU5, RU7, RU8, 
RUl 3
4-5/3/2002 phone call reminding the OTI
3/4/2002 2^  ^phone call reminding the OTI - 
email
to MG4, RU6, RU7, RU9, RU8, 
RU11,RU12,RU13
18 /9/2002 Post reminding letter and a copy of 
the OTI
to MG4, RU9, RUIO, R U ll, 
RU12
Table 4.2: The contacts diary
First a meeting was airanged with the Dean of Law and Financial Studies in 
order to obtain access and support in The University’s Star Chamber committees. His 
advice was considered very helpful and the desirable access achieved with his email 
contact to the rest of the Star Chamber members asking for permission to distribute 
the questionnaire. Following the clnonology and interest expressed of the responses 
to the Dean’s email, a first message was formulated to give thanks for the positive 
response and agreement to participate in the project was sent on the 22/11/2001. It is 
necessary to mention that the particular Dean did not participate to the following 
stages of the research due to the termination of his office service. The new Dean of 
the Law and Financial Studies appointed at December 2001 accepted and participated 
in the following stages of the research and was treated equally with the rest of the 
participants. On December 2001, the access permission email was forwarded to the 
members of the Star Chamber who were accidentally not included in the first contact 
list provided by the Dean.
On The 7th of February 2002, the Organisational Trust Inventory, including 
both parts and a cover letter explaining the interest of the research and giving
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guidance on the way that the response could be provided, was posted by mail to all the 
Heads of Resource Units and the major members of the Central Management Group 
(see appendix 12 and 13)
Considering the response chronology a second contact action took place on 
March 2002 and April 2002. This contact included a phone call to the secretaries of 
the Star Chamber members in March reminding them of the questionnaire existence 
and in April, an additional email sent to both the members and their secretaries for the 
same reason.
Finally, a further required contact took place in September 2002 including a 
reminder letter and a copy of the original cover letter with the questionnaire attached, 
sent to those who didn’t respond by that time. In total eight (8) Heads of Resource 
Units responded to the questiomiaire and three (3) members of the management group 
response rate 11 out of 18 (61 %).
4.7.1. 3 The organisational trust inventory -  analysis
The received responses of the OTI were tabulated in the Microsoft Excel. 
Following the pattern of the questionnaire’s matrixes (see appendix 11), statistical 
correlations for each pair of questions were calculated. In that way it was possible to 
detect whether the participants responded with the same strength for similar 
statements (see appendix 14). Further the correlated weighted average of all the 
responses was considered as the indicative level of agreement with the statements, 
which was further interpreted as the participants overall level of trust. The analysis 
also considered the weighted averages of similar groupings of statements such as the 
different dimensions of trust and belief, as explained in section 4.7.1. The next stage 
was to draw the responses into a column chart, wliich was useful to graphically
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present the outcome of the questionnaire to the participants in a later stage of the 
research project (see section 5.6.4).
Bearing in mind that the initial purpose of the questioimaire was to capture an 
indicative picture of the trust level between the participants, its results interpreted as a 
‘snapshot’ for the study’s inquiry. Subsequently, a series of individual semi- 
stmctmod interviews with all the potential participants (those who responded to the 
questionnaire and those who did not respond to the questionnaire), were conducted to 
explore the role of trust in the resource allocation process of The University.
4.7.2 Semi-structured interviews
The major method of evidence collection for the study involved qualitative 
individual semi-structured interviews with all the potential participants of the study. 
Kvale (1996) explains that qualitative research interviews attempt to understand the 
world from the subject’s points of view. In that respect, interviews are conversations 
where the outcome is a co-production of the interviewer and the subject. However, 
qualitative interviews are more focused, deeper and more detailed than normal 
discussions (also Rubin and Rubin, 1995).
Semi structure interviews have a sequence of themes to be covered as well as 
suggested questions. Rubin and Rubin (1995) explain that interviews aie flexible, 
iterative and continuous in design. However there is opeimess to changes of sequence 
and forms of questions in order to follow up the answers given, and the stories told by 
the subjects (Silverman, 2001). Advance preparation is essential to the interaction and 
outcome of an interview. Also interview questions should contribute thematically to 
knowledge production and dynamically to promoting a good interview interaction 
(Kvale, 1996)
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Finally, Kvale (1996) outlines a number of criteria that would justify the 
quality of a qualitative interview. First is the extent of spontaneous, rich, specific and 
relevant answer from the interviewee. Also, the shorter the interviewer’s questions 
and the longer the subjects answers, the better. Next is the degree to which the 
interviewer follows up and clarifies the meanings of the relevant aspects of the 
answers. In many respects, the ideal interview is to a large extent interpreted 
throughout the interview. Another quality criteria is the extent to which the 
interviewer attempts to verify her / his interpretations of the subject’s answers in the 
course of the inteiwiew. Finally, it is important to maintain a level of quality where the 
interview is ‘self- communicating’, it is a story contained in itself that hardly requires 
much extra descriptions. These criteria were considered seriously during the 
interview sessions with the study’s participants as it is explained in the next section.
4.7.2.1 The interview process
The need to obtain rich and deep insights that would provide a better 
understanding of the role of trust in the study, and that would also challenge or 
validate the observations gained from the organisational trust inventory, led to the 
decision to meet the study’s participants for a discussion on the matter. The 
interviews were considered a more appropriate method, where the participants could 
be given the chance to comment on the resource allocation process, the relationship 
between them and the importance of trust in their own understanding. All the initial 
participants were contacted to arrange an interview on the subject, although some of 
them where reluctant to reply to the questionnaire (RUll, RUIO, MG4). Therefore 
for some of the interviewees there was no initial questiomiaire response, but their 
interviews were considered very valuable and interesting for the research topic. Also, 
the participant MG5, attended only an interview, because his participation in the study 
was decided after a constructive suggestion at the PhD progress presentation at the
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Department of Accounting and Finance research committee (biannual progress 
presentations required by the PhD programme). The interviews took place in the 
interviewee’s offices (except the MG5 who is retired and the interview took place at 
his home), and all of them were private, quiet and comfortable, giving the respondents 
time to talk about the issues they found relating to the initial questions. However, two 
of the interviewees (RU6, RUIO) had a time restriction, due to their busy timetable, 
and the conversation had to be more focused and guided than average. The interviews 
were all tape recorded after the participant’s approval and fully transcribed by the 
researcher in order to be analysed in detail afterwards.
The sequence of the interview was chosen to be more of a ‘focused 
interaction’ (Denzin, 1970) rather than following a given protocol. The primary 
objective was to maintain spontaneity (Oppenheim, 2001) and the reduced role of the 
interviewer to avoid leading the responses. It was also considered important not to 
provide any ‘interview questions’ or questionnaire outcome information to the 
participants beforehand, in order to obtain authentic attitude reactions during the 
interview. However, in order to avoid potential misconceptions due to the 
researcher’s use of English as a second language and the very sensitive nature of the 
word ‘trust’, three key theme open ended questions were provided on a question sheet 
to the participants at the beginning of the inteiview. This question sheet in most of the 
interviews tended to function as ‘a kick off to the conversation and the inteiwiewees 
followed their own discussion pattern (see appendix 15). hi any case, a ‘hidden 
agenda’ (Oppenheim, 2001) of questions was carried by the researcher who 
sometimes had to question on an issue not mentioned but relatively important for the 
study (see appendix 16).
Approaching the end of the interview, the interviewees were allowed to see 
and comment on the organisational trust inventory graphs which showed the responses 
of all the participants anonymously. The purpose of this reveal was to observe a
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reaction for their own rating, the levels of trust in The University and to ask them to 
provide any possible explanations of the gi*aphs. More detailed references on this 
stage of the interviews can be found at the analysis chapter.
4.7.3 Evidence analysis methods
After conducting the interviews, a short note of the interview ‘atmosphere’ 
was kept in order to facilitate the interview analysis. This note included observations 
related to, for instance, the level of cautiousness and hesitation of the interviewees, the 
perceived gradual openness and directness of their references during the interview, the 
way they were when sharing their personal thoughts, and the perceived confidence 
they seemed to have in their own position. Although this information was absolutely 
dependent on the researcher’s impression and state of mind, a strict self-discipline 
required ensuring the fair treatment of each piece of ‘atmosphere’ information, and 
respect of each single interviewee’s personality and position.
The interviews were transcribed by word processor. Transcribing the 
interviews proved useftil to direct attention to particular points. In addition, through 
repeated reading of the transcripts, themes emerged and attempt to organise them in a 
sensible order, resulted in categorisations between them. The initial intention was to 
make an overall sense of the data rather to reduce it to manipulative codes. A useful 
assistance to this exercise was found from the Nvivo software for qualitative research. 
Although this software has highly sophisticated functions, its usefulness to the project 
was more as an advanced word processor than a stand- alone data analysis and 
explanation facility. More specifically, the interview transcripts were reformatted into 
rich text format and were downloaded to the programme. Then a line by line 
highlighting with the programme’s ‘coding stripes’ pooled the themes and references 
into ‘nodes’ (see appendix 17 for node list). Then the node reports were printed out
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and used to write the interview analysis in chapter 5. In almost all the parts of the 
chapter, a number of nodes were referred in the analysis together and in combination, 
carefully interpreted in the interview context.
Writing up the analysis of the interviews three approaches were employed. 
First seeking for a pattern of thought in every individual intei*view, second a cross 
case analysis with the attempt to find common thoughts that were expressed by all the 
interviewees in the same group. The individual patterns, with the use of the ‘after the 
interview’ notes were used to write the interview summaries (section 5.2 and section
5.4). The cross case analysis of each separate group organised around the themes 
emerged from the interviews bearing in mind the initial aim of the research (section
5.3 and section 5.5). The final stage involved a comparative analysis and synthesis of 
all the participants’ views (section 5.7).
4.7.4 Participant’s views on trust and agreement notional position matrix
In chapter 5 the notional position of the participants’ views in matrixes of trust 
and agreement display the patterns identified fi*om the interview and questionnaire 
analysis. The initial intention of this presentation is to give an overall picture of the 
attitude of the participants as it was expressed by them. For this reason, three 
different matrixes are found to be useful in communicating, as fairly as possible, the 
trends and positions as conceived in the discussion with the participants (see sections 
5.3, 5.5 and 5.7). The first matrix attempts to show the picture in the way it is 
believed to be expressed by the Management Group participants (section 5.3); the 
second matrix attempts to show the picture as it is believed to be given by the Heads 
of the Resource Units (section 5.5); and the last one is based on the researcher’s 
perception as formulated at the finishing of the analysis exercise (section 5.7). The 
assumption underlined in this matrix exercise is that there is no ‘right’, ‘real’ or
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objective viewpoint, which is useful to acknowledge when deriving impressions from 
subjective interpretations, therefore three different matrixes were considered 
necessary. The differentiation between trust and agreement is based on the 
assumption that it is possible to trust a person even if there is not a complete 
agreement either on the way the process of the relationship operates or what the 
prospective outcomes of the relationship are. This relation is examined in the 
‘common interests and trust’ discussion, where objectives are perceived to be the 
individual targets of the faculties and stiategy or vision is the sense of common 
mission that the participants perceive in the relationship (section 5.3.6.4 and section
5.5.6.4).
agreement
more less
trust
less
Figure 4.8: tmst and agreement notional position matrix
However, the drawing of notional position matrixes does not intend to claim a 
static representation of the views expressed by the participants, that ar e believed to be 
dynamic and changing over time and interaction. In addition the position of each 
individual’s view in the matrixes does not intent to demonstrate measurement of level 
of tmst and / or agreement. Further, the participants’ views are considered 
individually and the groups are treated as non homogenous due to the individual
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participant’s experiences, personality, opinions and other characteristics. In spite of 
this, the broad distinction between two major groups involving paiticipants from The 
University’s central management and participants who are Head of Resource Unit is 
demonstrated in the matrixes, even though differences in trust and agreement within 
the groups are respected considerably. It is also necessary to acknowledge the 
difficulty to notionally position each participant in the matrixes due to the complexity 
of the issues discussed. Nevertheless, the matrixes of the notional position of the 
participants were designed to display a notional picture of the perceived trust and 
agreement between them and as such are considered useful.
4. 8 Summary
This chapter dealt with the methodological considerations of the study. 
Following an interpretive point of view, it has been demonstrated that the case study 
approach was an appropriate way to investigate the research inquiry. Both the 
theoretical and empirical considerations of the study were developed and adjusted 
during the course of the study, employing a reflective and multiple methods 
perspective. In particular, theoretically the study adopted a non positivist perspective, 
in respect to the social sciences paradigm debate. Additionally, the consideration of 
Structuration Theory of Anthony Giddens (1984) has been addressed as an influential 
background theory in the study. The empirical part of the chapter included the 
description of the Organisational Trust Inventory development and implementation, 
and the semi structured interviews with the study’s participants, along with issues of 
ethics and evidence analysis.
In more detail, the first sections of the chapter (4.2, 4.3 and 4.4) included the 
theoretical considerations that organisational research projects should take into 
account. Opening with the argument that management accounting practices (such as 
the resource allocation process) should be studied in their organisational context; the
132
Chapter 4: Research Methodology
social research paradigm debate highlights the theoretical assumptions underlined in 
this approach. Further, the suggestion that Structuration theory could be a useful 
framework to understand the phenomenon under investigation, led to the brief review 
of the theory’s main concepts. This particular framework considered appropriate 
while the study’s core assumptions were respected. In particular, the study adopted an 
interpretive and reflective approach to knowledge; while the phenomenon of trust is 
best realised as a perception of the study’s participants within a specified resource 
allocation practice. In that view, the participants are independent, individual and 
knowledgeable while their interaction and references are embedded in the particular 
context.
The empirical arrangements of the study are described at the subsequent 
sections of the chapter (4.5, 4.6 and 4.7). In time sequence, the development of the 
Organisational Trust Inventory occurred first, to gather a ‘snapshot’ indication of the 
levels of trust between the study’s participants. After that, a series of semi- structured 
individual interviews with all the participants of the study were intending to collect in- 
depth insights for the project’s specific inquiry and general context. The matrix of the 
evidence gathered from both methods is displayed in the notional position matrix for 
demonstration purposes. The analysis and discussion of the observations gathered 
from the research methods is reported in the next chapter (chapter 5).
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Chapter 5 - Analysis and discussion
5.1 Introduction
This chapter includes the analysis of the interviews and the organisational trust 
inventory. Although the sequence of the research evolved with the inventory 
administration first and the interviews later in time, the analysis follows the pattern of 
the inteiwiew protocol (see appendix 15). As it is explained in the methodology 
chapter (section 4.7.2.2), the interview protocol involved first the discussion about the 
participants’ trust and its relation to the resource allocation process; and at the end of 
the interview the questionnaire graphs were shown to the participants to provide with 
their comments on their own response and the anonymous responses of others (see 
appendix 16). Therefore, in the present chapter the analysis of the inteiwiews is 
demonstrated first and the analysis of the inventory follows. The primary focus of the 
research was to attain the paiticipants’ views on issues related to the participant’s trust 
and its relation to the resource allocation in The University. Another issue that was 
considered important to address, is that because the study intends to acquire an ‘in 
depth’ understanding derived from the richness of the qualitative evidence, the 
quantitative part of it, although important, is not disclosed extensively in the following 
analysis but it is sited in the appendix of this dissertation (see appendix 16).
The first part of the chapter includes views expressed by members of the 
Management Group, who participated in the study (section 5.2). The analysis moves 
from their individual opinion patterns (presented in this dissertation as narrative 
summary of the main themes of the each pattern), to the themes emerged during the 
interviews within the group (section 5.3). The second part includes views expressed 
by the Heads of the Recourse Units. The analysis is also moving fiom the individual 
views (as a narrative summary of the main themes raised by each individual, section
5.4), to the opinions expressed by most of the participants (section 5.5). The section 
5.6, of the chapter includes the outcome of the Organisational Trust Inventory (OTI).
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The responses to the OTI are disclosed and relate to the comments and views given in 
the interviews. Although in chronological order the questionnaire was applied 
sometime before the interviews, its usefulness is considered within the specific 
context of the individual views of the participants. The third part of the chapter 
(section 5.7) summarises in a comparative mamier, between the two main groups of 
participants, the main themes emerged from the inteiTiews about the role of trust in 
the resource allocation process.
At the end of the chapter a concluding section (5.8) summarises and highlights 
the major themes emerged from the study’s analysis.
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5.2 Individual views -  Management Group Participants
5.2.1 Participant MGl
MGl believes that tiust is developed in a relationship when the other person 
thinks that s/he has been listened to. Paying considerable attention to the other 
party’s expressed views has been of major importance for trust in a relationship. 
Intentional ignorance of someone’s voice and an assumption that the outcomes are 
predetermined undermines tmst. The preferable situation, where trust is built in a 
relationship, is opemiess. Lack of opemiess between individuals devalues the 
relationship and causes a loss of confidence in the decisions taken between them. In 
that respect when the financial resources to be allocated are restricted, more openness 
and trust is required to perceive the resource allocation decision as a fair one.
MGl explains that the way the resource allocation process operates, is similar 
to the way all management processes operate in The University. There is a 
Management Group at all levels of The University hierarchy and these Management 
Groups decide every issue in The University. The link between the faculty’s 
Management Group and The University’s Management Group is the Vice Principal, 
who transfers the messages from the centre to the faculties, and vice versa, and 
dialogue operates in The University through that process.
The tliree major Star Chamber meetings focus on the communication of 
important issues and there can be more intermediate meetings if there are issues to be 
explored. The role of the Star Chambers, in MGl opinion, is to look at the detailed 
budget of each Resource Unit so a wider and more participative meeting (with more 
than one Resource Units) would be inefficient in this context. MGl views the 
allocation process as an inclusive dialogue, based on the assumption that the other 
person is able to consider the ‘big picture’ of The University’s position. MGl thinks 
that when the approach to management is an open and inclusive dialogue, this may 
prevent the system from unexpected coimption and crisis. MGl also believes that
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opemiess is preferable in the academic environment because one has to deal with an 
intellectual community where "there are customs, sort o f Socratic dialogue, and that 
they expect to go on the managerial scenes as they do with their own academic 
discipline scenes'^ MGl also expects that if there is any issue of imbalance in views 
and anticipations, the Deans will find a way to express that disagreement and they will
not keep silent.
MGl thinks that the IDRM tends to be more "user friendly  in terms of 
accessibility, time required to work with it, easiness, and transparency. MGl also 
thinks that the Deans will voluntarily seek information from the IDRM spreadsheet 
and if there is a case, they will compare their financial position with other successful 
Resource Units of The University so that they will learn from other’s situation. The 
IDRM facilitates the Deans with financial information but the strategic direction of
The University is not dependent on how the model works.
MGl feels responsible to manage The University and finds herself/himself 
accountable to the Funding Council (SHEFC), where the financial pressure comes 
from. In respect to organisational climate s/he thinks that there is not a major 
dissatisfaction with how The University is managed because the Deans do not 
complain, although they have the mechanisms and the time to express their concerns. 
MGl believes that the main reason that s/he is not receiving major complaints is
because the Deans trust her/him.
In respect to the questionnaire, the analysis shows that s/he has a relatively
high level of trust of the Heads of the Resource Units and s/he believes that they tiust
her/him less than s/he trusts them. S/he also appears more concerned about tiust in
her/his relationship with RU2, RU4, RU5, RUIO, and RU13. For these Heads of
Resource Units s/he mdicated an overall less trust in comparison to the rest of them.
From the analysis of her/his response, we gather that s/he trusts RU2 less than they
5 Phrases highlighted in italics indicate original interview quotes. Also for issues of conftdendality both
gender pronouns are used when referring to persons who participated in the study.
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trust her/him and this is also the case with RU13, Similarly, s/he believes that RU4, 
RU5, and RUIO tmst her/him less that s/he trusts them. The values that are stronger 
in constmcting her/his tmst level to the Heads of the Resource Units are openness, 
loyalty, and reliability. Similarly, s/he believes that the Deans’ tmst is based on their 
belief that s/he is open, loyal, and fair.
5.2.2 Participant MG2
The management participant MG2 relates tmst to the issue of time, hr this 
respect the more time one interacts in a relationship with others, the more possibilities 
exist for tmst to grow or decline. MG2 also believes that when a power difference 
exists in a relationship, the senior partner conceives an assumed level of trust higher 
than the other person does. However, s/he thinks that trust develops in a relationship 
when two individuals are working together. In any case, the time element of the 
relationship is highly crucial to develop trust, which is based on the belief that the 
other person fairly represents a situation and has no intention of "dressing up’ a 
situation. MG2 also thinks that the tmsted partner should tell things as they are and 
to provide the other person infonnation which is a fair representation of the financial 
situation. MG2 believes that the information received in the relationship should be 
accurate and sufficient in order to built trust. MG2 states that it is important to ensure 
that the financial system of The University is "as accurate as possible '.
MG2 views the IDRM as a highly transparent model, however s/he expresses 
concerns about the system’s complexity that leads to a limited understanding in the 
resource allocation process. MG2 expresses her/his intention to try to make the 
model "as simple as possible' so to be understandable, as well as transparent. MG2 
admits that the model is improving thi'ough time. In relation to the information 
received by the Deans on what to discuss in the Star Chamber, s/he said that " ideally' 
they have the IDRM before any committee meeting, although s/he admits that there
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were times where the spreadsheet was not available on time. S/he states that there 
has never been an intention to hide any infonnation and s/he believes that the whole 
management system is "an open book’, hr any case, s/he thinks that information 
distortion may hann the confidence in this information and not the trust between the 
individuals who are dealing with the budget setting in The University, because trust is 
"a human thing ’.
S/he believes that there is a sufficient level of trust between the Deans and the 
management members who are in the Star Chamber process because there is an 
established working relationship where regular meetings occur, as well as personal 
appreciation of the PrincipaTs efforts and skills. S/he views the Star Chambers as a 
communication process of the hopes and aspirations of both sides. S/he states that 
there is efficient level of dialogue in the higher level of The University’s management, 
although there is not such a communication in the lower levels i.e. below the Deans. 
S/he also thinks that the management has been always supportive to the Deans and 
there has never been any conflict because there is a very high level of trust. S/he 
expects from the Deans, a receptive attitude and willingness to compromise as well as 
a good interpersonal relationship to maintain trust.
In tenais of management expectations from The University, s/he thinks that the 
Deans should be managerially capable, because universities are becoming as "business 
like' therefore there has to be a "professionalisation o f the management academic’. 
Although s/he thinks that trust is based on the individual’s nature, s/he believes that 
professional qualifications and status, may enforce the confidence of the expertise 
level of an individual.
S/he thinks that the Deans may see her/him as their number one enemy, 
because her/his role is a ‘sort o f corporate police ’ role. S/he describes the authority 
setting as an ‘us and them' traditional situation, where s/he has a stewardship role and 
s/he has to ensure that the money is properly spent and properly accounted for.
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In respect to the organisational trust inventory, her/his response shows quite a 
high level of tmst, although there was difficulty in compromising with the instrument. 
In the inteiwiew, s/he explained that her/his hesitation to answer the questionnaire was 
primarily influenced by the time required for its completion.
5. 2. 3 Participant MG3
S/he views trust in a hierarchy of three levels, where the importance moves 
from material evidence to human characteristics. Her/his base of tmst is related to the 
confidence in the numerical facts given in the budgeting process. S/he appreciates 
the importance of an effective and efficient information system, that delivers accurate 
and reliable information. The next level of tmst, is linked to the level of expertise of 
the people involved to give meaning to the facts derived. S/he thinks that it is cmcial 
to tmst the interpretive skills of the infonnation users. The following level of tmst, 
refers to the belief that the other person has good intentions to communicate honestly 
and straightforward. S/he says that political or financial reasons may distort the 
information importance between people. hi general, s/he thinks that it might be 
questioned that most of the Deans tmst most of the Management Group most of the 
time; by comparison whether most of the Management Group trusts most of the 
Deans, most of the time.
S/he views the financial shortage of resources for The University as an 
influential factor in The University’s budgeting process. S/he also thinks that The 
University cannot afford financial errors, although a strategic priority can be the 
support and development of a not financially successful unit. Therefore, there is no 
straightforward answer to financially important issues and her/his view is that political 
viewpoints should also need to be considered. hi any case, s/he believes that 
financial figiues and statistics should be accurate in order to be convinced of the
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appropriateness of any decision. Once the trust level of the figures is established, the 
disagreement between the negotiation participants will not be on what the economic 
objectives of The University are, but on the way that these objectives will be achieved 
and how the Management Group should take a collective decision. S/he views her/his 
role as a mediator between the Management Group and the Deans. However, in case 
of any major disagreement s/he believes that there are sufficient roots of 
communication and dialogue to resolve this disagreement. S/he believes that there is 
not a ‘conspiracy o f silence ’ within the current Management Group, but there will be a 
change of the people in the group and then everything may alter to a very different 
situation.
In tenus of transparency of information and processes, s/he thinks that there is 
no intentional limit on communication in The University and any lack of transparency 
is unintentional. However, s/he believes that there is a constructive change in that 
communication links. In terms of the Star Chamber, s/he thinks that there is a gradual 
opening process, where at the early meeting information is not very transparent to the 
participants and when the second and third meetings occurs, the level of information 
increases. S/he believes that transparency increases the levels of trust to obtain fair 
discussions in the Star Chamber. Her/his view is that the importance of transparency 
relates to the time the Management Group decides to disclose the necessary 
infonnation to the Deans. S/he also believes that the Deans trust the Management 
Group gradually, in relation to the timing of the resource allocation process. In other 
words, s/he thinks that at the first meeting the Deans do not have a particular high 
level of trust.
In respect to the organisational trust inventory, her/his responses reflect the 
skepticism s/he expressed at the interview, phrased as ‘7 think most o f the Deans trust 
the Management Group most o f the time (...), little skeptical about some o f The 
University’s truth that most o f us trust most o f the Deans most o f the time’. More
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precisely, her/his response shows a generally high degree of trust. However, the 
analysis reveals that s/he thinks that the Heads of the Resource Units trust the 
Management Group more than her/his perceived trust to them. It is also possible to 
observe that s/he is more concerned for some Units than others. In more detail, s/he 
thinks that RU2, RU5, RU12, and RU13 are the less tmsted. In addition, s/he feels 
that these particular Units have less tmst for the Management Group in return. 
Furthermore, s/he tmsts the Deans when s/he feels that they are loyal, open, and 
competent. In addition, s/he thinks that the Dean’s tmst to the Management Group is 
based on loyalty, reliability, and openness.
5.2.4 Participant MG4
Trust for MG4 exists in a relationship between individuals, who are willing to 
give infonnation to each other or they are willing to discuss infonnation that is of a 
sensitive nature. S/he also believes that in a trust relationship, a dialogue is an 
essential condition for communication. Moreover, s/he thinks that when trust exists 
then someone can expect reasonable behaviour and not using infomiation to one’s 
advantage.
S/he views the Star Chambers as a dialogue where tmst is important at all 
stages but much more at the first meeting, where various issues are discussed and the 
budget is in an indicative fonn. The importance of the first meeting is based on 
communicating the faculty’s perspective to the centre of The University, who also 
provides financial indications of what the financial situation of The University might 
be, although the figures discussed are not firm due to the expectation of the Funding 
Council’s announcement (i.e. first Star Chambers held at January -  February each 
year and the Scottish Higher Education Funding council Grant letter announced at late 
March [see also appendix 7], at the year of the research the Grant letter announced on 
the 21®^ of March 2002) . S/he believes that in any case, the infoimation disclosed is
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provided with the best intention to discuss it further and derive some consensus at 
later stages of the process. S/he believes that the process is more for fair 
communication, rather than confrontation between the centre and the Deans. For this 
reason s/he also thinlcs that Star Chambers can involve more than one Dean, based on 
territorial groupings. S/he believes that territorial based Star Chambers would 
facilitate tmst and collegiality between the Deans and the centre.
S/he expresses her/his views on the way Deans are chosen by The University 
Court (by the time of the research the Deans were appointed rather than elected, see 
more on the issue in section 5.3.6.4), where s/he states that the Deans should be 
individuals with strong academic and managerial sensibility.
S/he finally believes that tmst in The University is built on individual 
relationship and is not affected by the process and the systems employed. However, 
s/he sees a very strong affect of the individuals on the systems, operating in The 
University and s/he characteristically states that when the Principal changes the whole 
system changes.
5.2.5 Participant MG5
The Management participant MG5, demonstrates that tmst is developed in an 
interaction between individuals and it is affected by the personalities and the personal 
qualities of them, rather than directly by the given power stmcture or the particular 
resource model of The University. However, s/he argues that the particular 
management style that foimed the resource allocation process and the way the IDRM 
model was operating was "very much a creation o f the product o f the personalities 
involved; how the individual Principal in particular wished to operate and run up The 
University
S/he argues that although there were funding pressures in Higher Education 
and many Universities have chosen a spreadsheet resource allocation model, the
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particular IDRM was the unique response to the situation, with the particular 
preferences of the Principal at that time. S/he claims that in other similar universities 
with a similar model, the process happens to be "relatively stable and relatively well 
accepted ' with a degree of integi*ation of budgeting and planning. In contrast to the 
IDRM which operated in a way of shifting money from one Resource Unit to others, 
creating the potential for disagreement between the Principal ‘who was controlling the 
model’ and the Deans who "had to accept the consequences o f the model’. S/he 
believes that the model ‘would have worked i f  people wanted it to work’. S/he argues 
that the model had the ‘appearance o f rationality, but it is a series o f subjective 
judgments ’ where "there is nothing specifically academic (...) it is all about money(...) 
nothing about coherence, academic excellence, excellence in research ’. Further, s/he 
argues that the model became too complicated to understand and nobody, including 
herself/himself, could know exactly what was going on in the model. S/he describes 
it as ‘a big computer program for flight aircraft, where you don’t Imow whether it 
would bug somewhere in the middle and after few million miles o f travel... the aircraft 
mysteriously ends into the sea ’.
In respect to the Star Chambers, s/he claims that they were ‘explorative 
discussions ’ of how to cut costs, which had never been fonnalised and not enough 
consideration of longer term planning so The University would not go ‘through waves 
o f crisis' as it was actually happening. In addition, the time of the announcement of 
the Funding letter, resulted in the Heads of the Resource Units not having ‘enough 
time to assimilate the messages, which were contained in this extremely complicated 
model’. However, s/he believes that particular Deans managed to "learn how to play 
the game ’ and they were more organised in meeting this challenge, while pursuing 
their own agendas in the Star Chamber meetings.
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5.3 Views of the Management Group Participants
This section will deal with the views expressed from all the participants of the 
Management Group, in order to investigate whether there is a shared pattern that 
expresses them all. The investigation develops while focusing the analysis on 
specific comments / matters that the interviewees were asked or on which they choose 
to express an opinion.
For the piupose of illustration, the views expressed by the participants are 
plotted in the matrix of trust and agreement below, which are ‘notional positions’ of 
the Management Group participants. As is explained in detail in the methodology 
chapter (section 4.7.4), the initial intention behind the matrix drawing is to 
communicate the impressions gained in the course of the study and not to be perceived 
as ‘right’, ‘judgmental’, or ‘fixed’. The impressions gained are illustrated 
individually in the first part of the analysis and in combination in the second part of 
the analysis. The matrix below attempts to demonstrate the views of the Management 
Group as fairly as possible, hi other words, the matrix shows the perceived trust and 
agreement in The University as it is believed to be expressed ‘thiough the eyes of the 
Management Group participants’.
agreement
lessmore
trust
less
M61, MÔ2, MÔ3, M64
RU 1, RU3 ,R U4  
RU6,  RU7,  RU8 ,R U9 ,  R U l l
M^5
RU 2, RU 5,  RUIO,  R U l 2 ,  R U l 3
Figure 5.1 : Management Group participants, trust and 
agreement notional position matrix
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The matrix shows the relation of each individual opinion to the opinions of the 
rest of the members of the gioup and to what MGs believe is the opinion of the Heads 
of the Resource Units. In more detail, the Management Group participants expressed 
a quite strong belief that there is a climate of trust and agreement in The University. 
To justify the level of this trust and agreement comments referring to what they 
thought was the picture some time ago were considered carefully. However, 
gathering closer to their views it seems that MGl and MG2 hold a view similar to 
each other but a in a sense different from the views of MG3 and MG4. The most 
different view, is the one expressed by MG5, who tends to be more critical of the 
Management Group participants and more sympathetic to the Heads of the Resource 
Units.
In relation to the Heads of the Resource Units, the participants of the 
Management Group tend to express a contrasting viewpoint, and although MG2, 
MG3, MG4, and MG5 view their role as assisting the relationship with the Heads of 
the Resource Units, they choose to speak from the ‘centre’s point of view’. 
According to some specific comments during the inteiwiew and considering their 
explanation to the questionnaire responses the participants of the Management Group, 
distinguish between relationships with some of the Heads of the Resource Units (see 
section 5.6.3). It is interesting to notice that they choose to differentiate from the 
Head’s of the Resoiuce Units group only when there is a reason to perceive someone 
less trusted than the average, and they did not indicate anyone who could be perceived 
‘more trusted’ than the average.
The justification of trust and agreement is based on comments made in respect 
to structiual issues, analysed subsequently in more detail (see section 5.3.6, section
5.6.2 and section 5.6.3). Outlining some of the major issues that were discussed as 
relevant to tmst, the extent of agi'eement (or disagreement) can be drawn. These 
issues are related first to the system of resoui'ce allocation involving the process and
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the model where the outcome of the process is based, and second to the structural 
issues as authority, communication, moral anticipations that influence the interaction 
between the participants. A more detailed analysis of the issues discussed in the 
interviews follows.
5.3.1 Trust in general
The participants of the Management Group discuss the resource allocation 
process, perceiving trust as a condition that should exist in all interactions, including 
the particular context and The University’s management in general. They tend to 
give a broader view of how trust may develop in their relationship with the Heads of 
the Resource Units, with the resource allocation process as a part of the wider 
management approach. However, they also refer to their particular understanding of 
trust and its possible implications with an intention to clarify the notion.
More precisely, trust as the paiticipants from the Management Group believe 
exists between individuals (MGl, MG2, MG5) who think that the other person is a 
reasonable one (MGl, MG4), takes into account all the different needs (MGl) and 
does not seek to take advantage (MG2, MG4) giving a fair representation of 
requirements (MG2) and feels that s/he has been listened to (MGl). Although, tmst 
is a "human thing’ (MG2) and a function of personalities (MG5) or might be based on 
an instant impression (MG2), it is also affected from structural conditions such as 
availability and accuracy of information in the process (MGl, MG2, MG3, MG4) and 
the senior position in the interaction (MGl, MG2). Very interestingly, the 
comprehensive exploration of the notion of tmst by MG3 claims there are tluee levels. 
The first is related to the system that produces "material evidence ’ and the other two 
to the individuals involved in the process. The tmst of individuals is based first on 
their competence to interpret the evidence correctly, and second on the intentions of
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emphasise the need to trust the two major individuals of the Management Group who 
direct the resource allocation process (MG4),
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the person to give a true and straight account independent of political or financial 
reasons.
Trust is built when the senior partner in the relationship is not ‘overtly 
dominant’ (MGl) and does not treat the situation as a typical 'master and servant’ 
relation (MG2). Openness (MGl, MG2), dialogue (MGl, MG4), communication 
(MG2) and a good reason (MGl), are aclmowledged extensively as the crucial 
elements in the interaction in order to build or retain trust. In addition, a very good 
interpersonal relationship, knowing each other, experience of working together 
(MG2), ability to feel and be part of the whole context of The University (MGl, MG3, 
MG4) with the willingness to compromise (MG2) supports the development of trust. 
They also explain that it is possible for trust to change through time (MGl, MG2, 
MG3). On the other hand misunderstanding, tendency to keep information and 
prejudice about the situation and outcomes (MGl), suspicion (MG3), surprise, 
mistakes and inaccurate infonnation (MG2) are likely to affect ones trust 
unconstructively.
5.3.2 Trust in The University now
The views of the participants of the Management Group, in respect to the 
estimated level of tmst in The University in general and in the resource allocation 
process in particular, vary in a degree of confidence. MGl and MG2 seem to be 
more confident to state that ‘the level o f trust has always been high I ’ (MG2) and this 
is primarily a response in their aim and effort to ‘maintain trust as far as one can ’
(MGl). However, MG3 and MG4 appear to be ‘little sceptical’ (MG3) and
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5.3.3 Accountability and trust
It is widely acknowledged by the participants of the Management Group that 
relevant and necessary information within the resource allocation process is ‘not
but, ‘equally i f  you wait until everything is completely signed(...) no spare capacity in 
the system then that’s too late
The other dimension of this reservation to ‘let the Deans know’ relates to the 
extent that particular ‘adjustments’ of the IDRM were justified and rationalised in the 
process. MGl explains that ‘sometimes you have to produce rationalisations, which 
are...mmm ...partially closed’ in order to accommodate the needs of every Resource 
Unit in The University, rationalisations that are based on ‘strategies in my head o f 
what and how I  am doing’. MG3 believes that tmst is very important during the final 
stages of the process when the cash limited budget is finally set. MG5 explicitly
hidden ’ (MG2) and in general, they adopt an approach of openness in the process.
However, in their explanation of the intentional willingness to ‘let the Deans Imow’ 
about elements of the resource allocation process, and the way the final decisions 
incorporated to the model, it is possible to gather a degree of resei-vation.
In particular, the extent to which specific infomiation relevant to the resource 
allocation decision is acknowledged to the Heads of the Resource Units is very much 
related to the attempt to control and influence this information before the Deans get 
involved in the process. MGl characteristically explains ‘I ’m sorry I  can’t tell you the 
outcome o f that at the moment, because there are other political consequences and 
this is ‘political’ with a small ‘p ’, but as soon as things are bit tidier (...) I  will bring 
into the open’. However, as MG3 is concerned that although the management 
participants ‘have agreed not to do it right at the very beginning ’, because ‘i f  you 
keep people informed all the way through and then you are just going to spend a huge 
amount o f time on the information set (...) so it is much easier not to tell the next 
group o f people down what the plan is, until the plan is reasonably well developed ’,
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explains that there are potential disagreements between the Principal, who is 
controlling the model, and the Deans who have to accept the consequences of the 
model’s subjective judgments, with the Principal being "the last guy at the top o f the 
tree who is willing to stand by these subjective judgments saying ‘this is the way I  
want to do it' this is the model...this is the way (...) to run The University.... end o f 
story ...I will not contemplate things” .
In general, the very open attitude to the resource allocation process and in The 
University’s management overall, is believed to be a potential for trust, but some 
angles of the process can be challenged as consciously less open, and explanation 
might be found in the authority inequality is the process, the modes of communication 
and particular stand on the presumed reciprocity of rights and obligations in the 
particular context.
5.3.4 The resource aUocatiou process and trust
The major resource allocation setting, according to the Management Group 
participants, is the Star Chamber meeting. They tend to refer to the meeting as an 
attempt to communicate "hopes and aspirations ’ (MGl, MG2) in an inclusive way. It 
is claimed that there is a gi'eater flexibility for more or different style of meetings. As 
MG4 explains, ‘the whole thing is a dynamic...it has been changing over the years 
and it is not the same Star Chamber process as it was four years ago ’.
More specifically, the Star Chambers are thiee meetings, where the first one is 
a ‘positioning one’ (MGl) where there are ‘explorative discussions' (MG5) about the 
"parameters they see from the faculty perspective ’ and The University ‘would give 
indications o f how things might be financially' (MG4). The second meetings are 
"looking at the indicative budget ’ (MG4) which is based on the Grant letter amiounced 
by the Funding Body at the end of March. These second meetings have "little stress ’ 
due to attention on the list of individuals (MG5) and other cost cutting efforts, which
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need to be discussed in "detail’ (MGl). The last Star Chamber is the stage where the 
outcomes of the process are administered.
The two major disagreements in respect to the Star' Chamber organisation are 
the extent which are formalised, and the perspective of conducting them in territorial 
rather than individual basis. Firstly, as MG2 argues, the Star Chambers are 
considered fotmal meetings with minutes and when the Head of the Resource Units 
"come to the Star Chamber they have the IDRM’, but on the other hand MG5 explains 
that ‘the Star Chambers were never formalised...the agenda was never really 
formalised...players became more used to thinking that the format o f the meeting 
itself was becoming more apparent’. Secondly, as MGl thinks that letting many 
Heads of the Resource Units attend the Star Chambers together "is very inefficient’ 
and s/he argues that although there was an attempt to organise territorial meetings, a 
number of Deans did not wish to participate because, in her/his opinion, ‘they only 
needed to be present i f  the process was not open and fair '. However, MG3 thinks 
that ‘it would be very useful’ and MG4 argues that it ‘would bring more o f a collegial 
approach’. In terms of the influence of the Star Chamber on the trust in The 
University, MG2 argues that there is no effect on interpersonal trust but possibly 
influences the confidence in the system, and MG3 believes that trust in the 
Management Group develops gradually during the process. MG4 believes that at the 
second and third meetings trust between the participants is very important.
Other contacts regarding resource allocation issues, involve the resource 
strategy committee where the ‘outcomes o f the Star Chambers are shared’ (MGl) and 
the task force meetings that are organised ‘in an informal setting with no minutes and 
without anybody else there...that break in much more relaxed’ (MG2). In addition it 
is also possible to have a "little side discussion’ (MGl) or a Head of Resource Unit 
can ‘write to (the Principal) privately’ (MGl).
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5.3.5 The Resource Allocation Model
The allocation of resources through the IDRM is perceived as a necessary 
approach for most of the participants of the Management Group. The only individual 
who questions the appropriateness of the particular model of The University is MG5. 
The rest of the participants tend to accept the model and they argue that although it is 
quite complicated, it changes through time to be more a ‘userfriendly’ (MGl, MG2) 
mode, and it is available to everyone who is concerned. Moreover, MG2 argues that 
the model is supplied to the Heads of the Resource Units before the Star Chamber 
meetings; MG3 explains that some of the aspects of the resource allocation process 
are not incorporated in the model and that make it less transparent. MG5 claims that 
the model is a ‘largely arbitrary model’ which has ‘the appearance o f rationality but 
it is a series o f subjective judgments ’. MG5 is concerned with the level of top slice, 
the limited incentives that could be generated from the model, and the behavioural and 
political consequences of the model’s outcome.
5.3.6 University management and trust
5.3.6.1 Overall
The responses of MGs to the questions related to trust and power revealed an 
assumed level of trust of the senior partner in a relationship. They also believe that 
although the authority structiue is quite centralised, an efficient level of dialogue 
exists to facilitate The University’s needs. One of the major difficulties that The 
University’s management has to deal with is the shortage of funding resources. 
However the general agreement is that the allocation of funds should not be decided 
considering the economic efficiency of a particular Resoiuce Unit only, but according 
to the strategic teaching and research objectives of The University. They also agree
152
Chapter 5: Analysis and Discussion
that dissatisfaction over a decision taken from the Management Group, is an 
indication of disagreement with The University’s overall mission and interests.
In terms of the resource allocation process, they agree that the current system 
suffers fr'om complexity but there is an intention to change this condition tlnough 
time. In any case, they agree that there is no reason that the cunent allocation model 
should influence the trust level that the Deans have, because trust is primarily a 
personalised feeling towaids individuals. Therefore, the allocation model has nothing 
to do with the trustworthiness of the people involved. Similarly, they view the Star 
Chambers as a structured process, where tmst is not a major necessity because there is 
no room for effective interaction between the participants. However they mention 
that there is much more importance in the interaction between the major budget 
setting participants in the Resource Strategy Committee, and the task groups or even 
in a direct personal contact between them. Tmst develops in these other meetings, 
although there is not any decision taking delegation.
5.3.6.2 Hierarchical structure and trust
The importance of the role, positioned in the hierarchical stmcture of The 
University is mentioned in all the Management Group conversations. It is believed 
that one’s position in The University deteiinines the role’s specified obligations and 
rights. Although there is an agi’eement that the individual’s personality and 
experience is heavily important, there is a general view that one’s position in the 
hierai'chy specifies defined expectations. A major part of these expectations is based 
on a given level of tmst, which the senior one has the responsibility to maintain.
More precisely, MGl believes that it is the responsibility of the senior partner 
in a management relationship, to create a tmst development circumstances such 
inclusive involvement and open commimication in the process. S/he believes also 
that if the senior partner is "overtly dominant’ and decides without consultation or
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ignoring the opinions of the lower level individuals then that 'undermine(s) trust ’ in 
the relationship. This type of dominant behaviour also eliminates the confidence of 
the decision’s outcome. Moreover, s/he states that it is the senior partner’s 
responsibility to ensme that the other partner feels that have been treated fairly. S/he 
believes that when there is an "us and them ' climate in the relationship, then the other 
tends to be defensive. The outcome of this type of relationship is not going to be as 
productive as desired. S/he also argues that ‘there are many private sector systems 
and some public sector systems, where it is very hierarchical and there is a great deal 
o f trust.,, you can have hierarchical systems with high levels o f trust (...) because 
there is a very high degree o f openness ’
MG2 believes that one’s position in the hierarchical structure of The 
University holds a presumed level of trust. S/he states that ‘you start a senior 
management situation from an assumed level o f trust ’. However, s/he thinlcs that 
trust may change when working together rather than from ‘just a straight master 
servant typical situation'. S/he also believes that a given position, is not a faceless 
role-playing post, but depends on the individual’s personality. S/he recalls when s/he 
was employed in another University; there was not a high level of tmst towards the 
person who was holding the leading position of management. However, when s/he is 
asked whether s/he thinks that others tmst her/him, s/he states that s/he assumes that 
they do tmst her/him to do her/his job as best as s/he can. In addition, if there is a 
reason that the Deans may dislike her/him, it is because her/his position is a sort of 
‘corporate police ’ role, meaning that her/his role is to ensure order and good use of 
resources in The University.
However, MG3, MG4 and MG5 give more emphasis to the personality of the 
individuals involved, rather that the position they hold in The University’s 
management. MG3 believes that it is everybody’s responsibility to ensure a fair and 
effective relationship between the Dean and the Management Group. However, MG3
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assumes the greatest effort should be done from the central management perspective, 
and that can be achieved when working together over a period of weeks and months. 
S/he also gives value to the tmst relationship between the Deans and s/he expresses 
the view that when they are confident of each other, then their relationship is going to 
be constructive with the Management Group as well, hr any case, s/he perceives the 
Deans as major actors in The University’s management.
S.3.6.3 Decision authority and trust
The Management Group participants tend to agree that The University’s 
management system is highly centralised, but they believe that there is a degree of 
dialogue that ensures an equal representation of all their views to the centre. 
Although they believe that the centre is quite approachable and there are established 
roots of appeal if one disagrees with a given perspective, they do not see this openness 
as a delegation of authority but as a convincing mechanism that may facilitate tmst in 
a decision. They also agree that in the hierarchical stmcture of The University the 
Principal and the Management Group are the legitimate decision making group 
whereas the Deans are the next authority level, who although they are the major 
budget holders, have no direct participation in Management Group. The Deans are 
not perceived as equal participants in the resource allocation process and their role is 
more to receive and implement the decision, rather to discuss and negotiate their 
faculties’ recourse situation.
The resource allocation process is designed in a centralised way as well. 
However, there are major developments that facilitate more participative patterns and 
it is believed that they also facilitate a degree of tmst between the Management Group 
and the Deans and also within the Dean’s group. These other resource meetings 
involve The Resource Strategy committee and various task gioups where issues like
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strategic direction, the IDRM restructure and the organisational structure change of 
The University are discussed. Although these contacts are less formal than the Star 
Chambers and the Management Group participants believe that they help to establish a 
encouraging working climate and increase the level of trust in The University, they do 
not have a specific decision power, and their outcomes are perceived as 
recommendations to the Deans.
The importance of participation in the resource allocation discussions is placed 
on the development of a ‘collegial’ feeling between the Deans, rather than an intended 
decentralisation of the decision-making responsibilities. There is a general 
appreciation of the Dean’s effort to ask for territorial based resource-plamiing 
meetings, in replacement of the individual Star Chamber ones. In that perspective, 
the Deans of faculties with similar educational orientation (i.e. sciences based, 
medical based, arts and social sciences etc), would have the opportunity to gather in 
the same resource allocation meeting. However, an initial unsuccessful attempt was 
perceived as unwillingness to ‘know about others’, rather than a miscommunication of 
the purpose underlined to these territorial meetings. It is believed that tmst will be 
developed and maintained more easily when the territorial meetings operate more 
effectively.
More specifically, MGl states that 'the way the resource process operates is 
the way the management process operates, and overall is a general strategy about 
where we want to take The University’. S/he explains that there is a Management 
Group in each of the faculties and that Management Group controls the resources. A 
member of the Central Management Group, the Vice Principal, supervises the views 
of that Management Group. The Vice-Principal’s role, in MGl opinion, is focusing 
on communicating views and reminding the Faculty groups of The University’s 
general strategy. S/he thinks that conducting the Star Chambers with more than one 
Dean would be very 'inefficient ’ because the focus of the Star Chamber is to have a
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detailed look at the individual faculty’s resources. Therefore, the Resources Strategy 
Group meeting is required just after the first Star Chamber, to explain and discuss the 
changes of the IDRM model. S/he explains with an example referring to the 
proposed territorial basis meeting with the Deans of the medical related schools, that 
the meeting never actually took place because the Deans did not wish to participate, 
although they were invited to attend. In her/his view the Deans had possibly realised 
that they did not need to be present at this type of meeting because ‘they only needed 
to be present i f  the process was not open and fair
MG3 explains that the decisions, no matter how difficult, have always been 
made centrally in The University and the major difficulty is to communicate clearly 
the reasons for a particular decision to the parties concerned. S/he thinks that the 
Management Group has to decide collectively. S/he admits that there are still a 
limited number of people who have been involved in the discussions and s/lie believes 
that this is a major matter within The University. S/he believes that there is a 
tremendous need for tmst when participation is so limited and s/he thinks that the 
situation has changed through the last few years. S/he feels that the vice-Principal’s 
role is ‘to make sure that everything is a fair game ’ although, in her/his opinion, the 
Vice-Principals role is to support the central Management Group decisions even if 
they disagree.
On the same motif but on a different level of conduct, MG2 and MG4 argue 
that although tmst is an individual matter, a more participative management style may 
facilitate a collegial approach to the allocation of resources. MG2 believes that 
participation of more than one Dean in the same Star Chamber meeting is not a 
necessary condition for tmst, because trust is developed more easily in the individual 
meetings that take place for the different managerial issues raised. S/he refers to the 
various task groups, where inteipersonal interaction formulates the working climate. 
S/he believes that business is ‘all about interpersonal relationships and willingness to
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compromise Trust is developed in such an interpersonal contact, rather than in the
.fonnal Star Chamber meeting. Similarly, MG4 places more attention on the
S.3.6.4 Interests and trust
The drawing of common interests is increasingly important in The University, 
according to the Management Group members. Tmst is a key factor between the 
gi’oups of diverse interests, in order to achieve a reasonable consensus on the
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individuality of the Deans and views the Deans as a very disparate group of people 
where some may prefer more involvement in the management issues of The 
University and others prefer ‘to divide up the money in a fairly formulaic way’.
However, s/he thinks that temtorial meetings could be more effective than individual 
ones. S/he also says that there should not be a major focus on the different authority 
level between the Deans and the Management Group in tenus of trust. S/he believes 
it is a fairly equal distribution of power in the senior management level of The 
University and that includes the Deans also. S/he states openly, 7 do not necessarily 
buy the concept o f power here ’. However, s/he admits that the Deans do not have a -
direct impact in The University’s decisions; because the way the Management Group 
is organised is ‘entirely up to the Principal’ and therefore the Deans have to tmst 
her/him.
In contrast, MG5 argues that there is a great inequality of authority that 
stresses the relationship between the Principal and the Deans. S/he believes that in 
the resource allocation process, the two major Management Group individuals 
controlled the budget and although there was some participation of the Deans, there 
was not an actual ‘scope to manoeuvre’. S/he explains that this is related to the 
particular ‘hands on ’ management style of the involved personalities. However s/he 
believes that the original intention of the Principal was to try and increasingly devolve 
the power downwards to the Deans although "the opposite actually happened’.
%
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objectives that drive The University’s strategy. It is of major importance to consider 
the financial constraints of The University, as a whole, rather than individual faculty 
needs for resources. The Management Group participants agree that the ability to 
view The University’s ‘big picture’ is a cmcial skill, which is required in the resource 
allocation process. The MGs also believe that the tmst level between the parties 
involved, is related to this ability and influences the perceived fairness in the process 
and its outcomes. In order to ensure that the individuals have this ‘managerial skill’, 
a refomi of the elective process of the Deans took place under the current 
management. The previous process gave emphasis to the elective choice of the 
candidates in their own faculties, even if the individuals were profoundly opposed to 
the central management’s perspectives. After the reform, this elective process was 
replaced with an appointment of a capable individual by The University Court, who 
has the last ‘word’ in the process. The ideal capable individual for the position of the 
Dean, is the person who combines both academic distinction and managerial 
awareness, because the role has both a budget holding responsibility and academic 
leadership requirements. It is also believed that the appointed Deans are reasonably 
experienced at managing The University’s budget due to their previous position as 
Head of Department.
The Management Group participants also tend to agree that an academic, 
rather than a trained professional manager should be employed in the Dean’s position, 
because of The University’s importance as a leading research University. In general, 
they agree that if there is a level of disagreement in the resource allocation process, it 
is much more related to the way the process operates, rather than the reasons that 
support the decision made as an outcome of the process. The MGs acknowledge that 
major issues of possible disagreement with the Deans, are the top-slice level of the 
IDRM, its timeliness and the choice of strategic cross-subsidisation of specific 
Resource Units. The Management Group participants believe that when the Deans
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are able to view The University as a ‘big picture’ rather than their faculty’s particular 
needs only, they would trust the Central management’s processes and outcomes more. 
In any case, they think that there are sufficient roots of appeal, ranging from direct 
personal contact with the Principal, to the mobilisation of indirect mechanisms of 
resistance, as the formation of working groups for any kind of inquiry.
More precisely, MGl explains, with an example, that when a particular Dean 
asked for resources, that would ensure more students’ allowance, the central 
management evaluating the proposition decided that could have hannful impact to 
some other faculties. They finally convinced the Dean that her/his demand was not 
feasible ‘making them (the Deans) see their needs in the whole context o f The 
University’. S/he states that their approach is ‘not to set aside the aspirations and 
needs ’ and on the other hand to manage the situation in a way that will ‘not just shift 
the problem from there to there Her/his attention is focused on putting the Deans in 
a position that they ‘didn’t distrust us because we didn’t meet their wishes '. MG4 
thinks that although the Deans may not agree with a financial decision, they are 
required to trust that the decision taken is in The University’s interests. MG4 
particularly believes that the Deans need to have trust of the Principal and the Director 
of Finance, because many important decisions, such as freezing the reseiwes so that 
balances caimot be carried forward from one year to the next, are taken by them. 
Similarly, MG2 thinks that trusting the major participant’s commitment to The 
University’s interests, is a feeling that develops tluough interaction and interpersonal 
relationship. MG3 believes that trust is essential to avoid suspicion and conflict in 
the resource allocation process because there are few aspects of the overall resource 
allocation, which are not in the IDRM. S/he also thinks that the Deans trust most of 
the Management Group most of the time, and s/he challenges the statement with 
scepticism wondering whether ‘most o f us trust the Deans most o f the time ’.
160
Chapter 5: Analysis and Discussion
5.3.6.S Financial resources and trust
In terms of financial resources, the discussion with the participants of the 
Management Group revealed a great awareness of the limited financial resources 
provided to The University. They express a general sensitivity to the issue and they 
expect the Deans to be economically efficient. Financial sensibility is a major factor 
that influences them when they deal with a specific Resoui'ce Unit, however the 
financial position of the faculties is not the major condition that influences their trust. 
In addition, they state that when funds are very limited, trust is an urgent requirement 
in the funds allocation process. They also state that the rational of resources 
distribution in The University, is to maintain and develop the research and teaching 
units of The University, which are in a disadvantaged situation due to limited ability 
to attract funding from research councils, or they are new disciplines that are not very 
popular to the student population and other reasons. They are also aware that the
particular financial situation of a specific faculty, may influence the Dean’s level of
.tmst to the system employed, but they give more weight to the Dean’s experience and 
personality.
In more detail, MGl believes that when resources are tight, trust between those who 
decide resources allocation is very important. It may prevent a climate of suspicion 
and continuous questioning of the factors that drive the decision, and of the 
relationship between other participants. To aid trust, one has to be open and when 
resources are tight, then one must be more open. S/he explains that if the Principal is 
not open with the Deans, then the Deans would not tmst the Principal. Further, the 
Deans would not trust each other either, because they would not know about each 
Dean’s relationship with the Principal. S/he thinks that the senior managers of The 
University are accountable to the funding council (SHEFC) for the resources 
allocated, and s/he would expect the Deans to be responsible for the resources they 
receive. S/he also sees the allocation decision, to be influenced from the ‘agreed
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strategic direction’ and not to aid specific needs of individual faculties. This 
strategic direction is partly communicated thi'ough the outcomes of the IDRM and the 
Resources Allocation Process, but the model does not necessarily reflect the long-temi 
strategic objectives of The University. S/he explains that if there is a need to 
subsidise a specific faculty, the model will incorporate this decision anyway. 
Therefore, s/he believes that this decision would be appreciated if only tmst exists 
between the resource allocation participants. MG2 adds to this perception with the 
exercise of a ‘stewardship ’ power that will prevent The University falling bankmpt 
and convinces the Deans to manage their finances with care and in agi'eement with 
The University’s strategy.
The other very strong opinion on resource’s management, comes from MG3 
who states ‘we can’t afford financial errors’. Nevertheless, s/he admits that The 
University’s resource allocation process is not black and white; therefore, the 
financially successful areas would not necessarily be financed in accordance to the 
income they generate. S/he argues that the main rational, is to finance areas that are 
developing and those which are new with no reputation in the student population. 
S/he argues that every Dean has to understand that the faculties should run within the 
budget because ‘we can’t afford to run consistently at a loss '. S/he believes that tmst 
between the resource allocation participants is important to accept the decisions taken 
and s/he relates the trust developing levels to the time the budget is disclosed. S/he 
also thinks that trust should be high, not only between those who express a direct view 
in the allocation process but also with those who are supporting administratively the 
process. Similarly, MG4 agrees that the budget constraints are quite strong and 
influential in the resource allocation decision and expects both sides of the table to 
make the best effort to come to an agi*eed consensus.
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S.3.6.6 Communication and trust
The importance of information communication is perceived by the participants 
of the Management Group, as a major issue that needs to be considered when 
discussing tmst. The attention of the conversations is focused on the information 
communication during the resource allocation process, and to the availability of this 
infoimation through the IDRM; as well as the understanding of the interests and the 
decision puiposes in the process.
They tend to believe that their approach to the process is opemiess in any foim
of dialogue that builds both on the quality of information and on frequency of
contacts. Although they agree that, there were times that the resource allocation
negotiations had to be conducted with insufficient knowledge about the angles of the
planning process, they explain that there is a time restriction on some of the important
aspects of the required information such as the announcement of the funding letter
from the government body. However, they claim that their intention is to work on the
resources allocation with an open and transparent manner. They also tend to agree
.that although the Star Chambers are the major three resource allocation meetings, 
there is an attempt to conduct more and less fonnal meetings when necessary. They 
believe that the more open and reliable this conduct is the more trust exists between 
the participants.
Their argument of openness for improvement, and transparency for tmst, 
includes the fonnat and availability of the IDRM. They claim that it tends to be more 
'user friendly’ both in terms of accessibility and simplicity. However, they believe 
that it is still a complicated spreadsheet that needs to be improved. In any case, they 
believe that the way the model is displayed does not influence the participant’s trust, 
because tmst is based more on inteipersonal relationships.
MG2 believes that tmst relies on the existence of a reliable provision of
information. S/he argues that the required condition for trust in the budget setting
ai:
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routine, is the belief that the other person represents the financial situation fairly and 
that there is no indention to ‘dress it up \ S/he also thinks that time is necessary to 
establish tmst as a condition in the relationship. Regularity of contact proves to be 
beneficial in the relationship and establishes trust between the individuals involved.
S/he claims that when people are meeting often, for a period of time they get to know 
each other and that emphasises the secure feeling of trusting each other. S/he thinks 
that accui'ate and sufficient decision making infonnation is essential and the system 
providing this information should be competent, however, s/he states that when the 
people ‘know that the senior management want to use funds for the benefit o f the 
institution ’ they should tmst the decisions taken. S/he also admits that although the 
current IDRM becomes more transparent and the process is ‘an open book \ there is a 
difficulty to ‘understand it\  S/he clearly states that there is a difference between 
‘openness and understanding S/he states that the IDRM changed tlnough the years.
In terms of the timing of the infonnation in the budget process, s/he claims that all the 
interested parties have the required level of information in advance, but there were
■ ■
times in the past when this information was unintentionally not available. In any case, 
s/he thinks that this should not influence trust, because ‘i f  they need to know 
information they can ask for it’. S/he also perceives the first Star Chamber meeting 
as a primarily communication meeting, where the Deans are communicating to the 
central management ‘their hopes and aspirations. Similarly MGl emphasises the 
importance of openness in the process and s/he adds that ‘i f  people believe that the 
information that everybody has been told is the same and the circumstances in which 
each o f the negotiation is taken place is the same, then even if  in one year the outcome 
may not be what they would wish, they will live with i t ’. S/he also admits that 
^although open systems are difficult to run, because you have to invest a lot o f time in 
it, but they rarely go very wrong, very quickly ’.
f :
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Interestingly, MG3 believes that although during the last four years The 
University improved in terms of transparency, there is still a lot of effort required to 
improve the communication patterns in The University. S/he also addresses the issue 
of timing of information disclosure in the resource allocation process. S/he states that 
the question is not whether the process is going to be transparent, but when 
transpaiency is going to take place in the process. S/he thinks that transparency 
develops gradually through the process of the Star Chamber meetings. S/he also 
thinks that in parallel, the trust between the participants develops thi'ough the process.
5.3.6.7 Legitimate anticipations and trust
The participants of the Management Group seem to pay considerable attention 
on the appreciative and open profile on the position of responsibility they hold, which 
reflects both the need to comply with overall moral anticipations to maintain, care and 
grow The University, and to reciprocate fairly to the particular anticipations of 
individual Resource Units. Similarly they tend to seek understanding and support of 
their position from the Deans as a moral duty.
MG5 explains that the reason behind the top slice amount was to support more 
the academic side of The University, than being specifically administrative, or to ‘do 
with the fabric o f the buildings MG2 views her/his own role as being dedicated to 
providing ‘administrative support as well as to train the Deans...to coach them along' 
so they can deal with the demanding financial paper work. MGl demonstrates that 
due to fact that the faculties represent scientific disciplines that are meaningful and 
necessary in the community, the decision to support them with more resources is 
‘absolutely critical’. In her/his vocabulary the words ‘reasonable’, ‘sensible’, and 
‘good reason’ appear frequently indicating her/his need to persuade others that the 
decisions taken were based on such an approach. On the same motif, MG3 with an 
example, explains that the Management Group is dedicated to the support of sciences
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even if they face difficult financial periods ‘getting the faculty back to profitability as 
you legitimately do in the course o f the year
In that respect, they trust the Deans to reciprocate with responsibility and do 
not overspend or sacrifice the already limited resources on activities not in compliance 
with the ‘agreed strategy’ (MGl). MG2 explains that ‘i f  you actually develop that 
trust relationship they won’t spend it because they Imow that the senior management 
want to use it for the benefit o f the institution ’. MG2 also admits in times the Dean 
cooperated on this basis and it would be unfair for her/him to say ‘that the Deans 
never reciprocate to (her/his) expectations ’. Furthermore, MGl believes that even if 
the Deans were not happy with the outcome of the year’s negotiations, they have to 
accept the decision because they should appreciate The University’s effort to take into 
account all the different needs of all Resource Units.
S.3.6.8 Changes and trust
The issue of tmst is also discussed in the context of changes through time, that 
can be observed at different levels. In respect to the resource allocation process, 
changes have been diagnosed both in the process and the model employed. 
Additionally, various organisational and managerial changes took place in recent 
times in order to achieve The University’s ‘agreedstrategy’. Concerning the reasons 
that influence these changes, the Management Group participants hold different 
opinions, which are related to the nature of individuals and the influences of The 
University’s funding and institutional environment.
In respect to the changes applied to the IDRM model, they argue that it has 
been more transparent and with less complexity through the years. Although there is 
a tendency to overstate the improvements of the model in terms of complexity and 
length, they do not discuss its essential purpose in the resource allocation process. In 
that respect, MGl argues that although people ask her/him if there is a secret model
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that s/he operates, s/he states that there are strategies of what and how to do things but 
these strategies are not reflected on the model’s operation. In addition, s/he states 
that although there have been discussions of 'how much easier one wants to do things 
(...), at the end o f the day they will do it even if  the model was difficult to manage’. 
Moreover MG2 revealed that there have been considerations of ‘putting things 
together’, when referring to the other sources of financial information in The 
University such as the student record system, the finance system for overheads, estates 
utility charges, depreciation, space costs, "a couple o f capital projects’, ‘all sort o f 
things that have to pooled together and put in the IDRM'.
In tenns of the resource allocation meetings, they aclmowledge the usefulness 
of more frequent meetings and they tend to think that it may influence the 
participants’ trust. They also agree that altering the consistency of the Star Chamber 
meeting hom an individual basis to a tenitorial basis may affect the participants 
understanding of process. However, they tend to believe that if there is a reasonable 
claim from the Deans to design more types of contact, it is considered carefully. 
They acknowledge the fonnation of the Resources Strategy Group and the ‘task 
groups ’ as an implementation of their approach to ‘management by opemiess’.
In the discussion on the factors that affect such changes at The University’s 
resource allocation approach, the participants of the Management Group are placing 
the weight onto different perspectives. MGl and MG2 argue that there are structural 
influences of how the resources should be allocated efficiently by The University’s 
‘business’ enviromiient. MG2 states that ‘as universities have to become more 
business like, in everything that they do, inevitably there has to be a 
professionalisation o f the management academic ’. S/he thinks that the formation of 
resource allocation efficiency criteria and an advanced allocation model is a step 
further towards this professionalisation. MGl recalls the case when The University 
was asked by the people from the goveiiunent body ‘to set up a more managerial
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process o f looking at competence’ when appointing the Deans. S/he also admits that 
there might be a relative loss of trust towards the Principal because people may 
complain about the approach chosen as anti-democratic and ‘strong managerialist’ 
that is ‘not how a University should run ’.
On the other hand, MG3, MG4 and MG5 explain that the individuals involved, 
their personalities and actions, fundamentally drove the changes of the resource 
allocation process. Characteristically MG4 argues that ‘the whole thing is dynamic... 
it has been changing over the years ...and it is the individuals involved in the process 
for years ’. S/he also estimates that there will be changes the next year in expectation 
of the appointment of a new Principal. Furthermore, her/his belief of the influence of 
the individuals involved to the resource allocation changing process is emphasised 
when s/he states that it is not the resource allocation model that affects trust but the 
individuals concerned.
S.3.6.9 Confidence in system or trust in people
The participants of the Management Group tend to agree that there is a 
distinction between the confidence developed in a competent system and the tmst 
between the individuals involved. They all argue that although there might be 
stmctural disadvantages in the resource allocation process and the model, that should 
not be major factor that will influence tmst. They believe that openness and 
willingness to compromise with The University’s objectives will build a productive 
working climate and will facilitate tmst between the individuals involved. They 
consider the individual’s personality as an important factor that affects one’s 
behaviour and attitude, and they argue that knowing each other better will prevent 
dysfunctional behaviour and /or major misunderstandings.
More precisely, MG2 expresses an awareness of the distinction between 
confidence in the information provided in the resource allocation process and the trust
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between the individuals involved. S/he believes that when the process and the model 
employed is transparent and less complex, that improves the confidence in the 
robustness of the data provided. S/he also thinks that, when the personnel producing 
these data are knowledgeable and experienced that may also emphasise the confidence 
in the resource allocation process. On the other hand, s/he believes that trust is ‘a 
human thing ’ and reflects the assumption about the qualities of the other person. S/he 
explains that it is different when one feels confident about the information supplied 
and different when one feels that tliis infonnation will be kept confidential. In any 
case, s/he thinlcs that confidence in the robustness of the information affects the tmst 
between individuals and influences the working relationship. S/he states that ‘if  there 
is no confidence, the relationship becomes distant and that diminishes trust’.
MGl thinks that if there is a break down in someone’s trust it is, nearly always 
because there is a serious misunderstanding. S/he believes that The University’s 
process should be open because it is a ‘very intelligent’ community of academics. 
S/he also thinks that the Deans tmst the person who above them in the hierarchy if 
s/he is a reasonable one. S/he also thinks that in the academic environment people 
have specific customs of doing things, customs ‘sort o f Socratic dialogue ’. This is 
also the reason that there would be a reaction from Deans from whom ‘the Texas is 
coming’. In other words, s/he thinlcs that openness is an approach that would 
facilitate trust considering the customs and values that the academic community has.
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5. 4 Individual views - Heads of Resource Units
5.4.1 Participant RUl
The Head of RUl believes that tmst is built with the experience of working 
together. In order to develop tmst in a working relationship, s/he believes that there 
should be a good communication, consultation between the participants, regular 
meetings with each other, and delegation of responsibilities. S/he feels that in The 
University, these conditions are not developed to a satisfactory level and the major 
reason for that is the highly hierarchical and centralised stmcture of the ‘male way o f 
management’ that The University employs. S/he further argues that a female Dean 
would ‘not trust men as men trust each other’.
S/he views the Star Chamber as a negotiation process between non-equal 
parties and s/he argues the ‘real ’ negotiations are out of the Star Chamber. S/he feels 
that the Deans should develop The University’s strategy because they know what they 
can do and they are able to generate income. S/he feels confident enough to propose 
the agenda to the resource allocation negotiations and s/he believes that 
communication between the Deans is essential to establish a dynamic response to The 
University’s financial challenges.
S/he believes that the individual Star Chambers are designed in a way to ‘keep 
the Deans in their place ’ and the Management Group approach is ‘we are listening but 
we are not negotiating with you ’. S/he believes that the degi'ee of confidence and 
knowledge s/he obtained, developed through her/his own willingness to ‘make the 
other side understand’, and her/his relationship with other Deans.
In tenns of the IDRM, s/he argues that it is not providing incentives to 
generate income for educational development and its short-termism create uncertainty 
about the Resource Unit’s future. For that reason, s/he believes that, most of the 
Deans are trying not to disclose all the infonnation to the centre about their finances. 
S/he also thinks that the finance office instigation of a monthly return on expenditure
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indicates that they do not believe the Deans completely. S/he states that s/he was 
expecting a degree of technical support and training for her/his position as a budget 
holder, which s/he never received.
5.4.2 Participant RU2
The Head of Resource Unit 2 believes that trust develops in a two-way 
communication between equal partners, who are honest and do not try to take 
advantage of each other. S/he thinks that there is no trust between the participants of 
the resource allocation process because the central management ‘disregards and 
devalues’ the Deans, which deals with them in an antagonistic process trying to 
impose a flawed financial model.
More precisely, s/he argues that the Star Chamber meetings are a ‘financial 
arena, deliberately gladiatorial in its design ’. S/lie demonstrates that the antagonistic 
atmosphere is created giving an advantage to the ‘centre ’. S/he claims that it is a very 
formal meeting where ‘papers and calculators ’ are a proxy to make the Dean thinlc 
that ‘they Imow what they are doing’ and make her/him feel defensive and depressed. 
S/he believes that the financial presumption is that the Heads of the Resource Units 
are incompetent to manage their finances and the purpose of the meeting is to impose 
the IDRM to individuals, ‘who will look at it and do not understand it ’. S/he states 
that the purpose of the Star Chambers is to negotiate on particular costs, whereas s/he 
would prefer to discuss the way the IDRM is modelled. S/he claims that the 
Resource Strategy committee is a simple ‘talk meeting ’ where there are no reporting 
links to the Management Group. Overall, s/he thinks that the Management Group ‘is 
completely out o f touch with what is going on in The University because no Deans 
are participating in it.
S/he believes that the IDRM is a very flawed concept. S/he argues it is so 
complex that even the Principal and Director of Finance do not understand it
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completely. S/he claims that there is no transparency in the system because the 
model is designed with a ‘bit o f creative accountancy’, and shifts money between 
units formulating unfair surpluses and deficits. S/he suggests that the financial model 
appropriate to The University is one that will be Resource driven rather than Income 
driven. S/he argues that the Resource Units should be charged only for the services 
they use with a non-fixed rate. S/he disagrees strongly with the level and purpose of 
the top slice arguing that it is not clear where the top-sliced amounts are used.
5.4.3 Participant RU3
The Head of RU3 explains that tmst is based on the sense that the other person 
will behave ^reasonably’ and that s/he behave ‘in the right sort o f way’. S/he 
conceives the concept in the particular allowance to manage a budget and s/he argues 
that the ‘trust to delegate the confidence’ in one’s ability to manage the budgeted 
amount appropriately, will affect her/his expectations and the manner of her/his 
behaviour towards a particular individual. S/he also states that in the situation of the 
delegations of resources, the position of power of each of the sides definitely affects 
the tmst and expectation for each party.
In regards to the resoiuce allocation process s/he thinlcs that in some respect, 
the academic background of most of the participants in the process affects their 
attitude towards the whole concept of budget and constrained resources. S/he names 
this stance ‘academic creative law’, and s/he explains that ‘academics do not want to 
be and do not like to be managed..., (and) they are very distrustful...(because) they 
find it very difficult to come to terms with the fact that the resources may not be 
there.... or they may not be as many resources as there should be’. In addition s/he 
explains that her/his trust changes during the process and her/his devel o f trust and 
satisfaction’ is often higher at the end when s/he has 'got closer to what (s/he) 
wanted ’. S/he emphasises the importance of the intention to share information and
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the ‘power posture ’ at the meetings, where in particular at the first ones s/he feels that 
‘they are flexing their muscles ...and they are trying to give a sense o f the parameters
Referring to the IDRM, s/he claims that the ‘people who have the power 
there... can juggle the figures in one way, they can juggle the figures another way, they 
can make expectations for me\ S/he appears very much aware of the individual 
influences in the agreement and constmction of the model, along with the external 
changes that ‘the people creating the IDRM...have to react to things’, and therefore 
major changes may appear in the model. However, s/he argues that although the 
model operates on a yearly basis, that ‘has not stopped (her/him) trying to have plans 
for more than one year ’.
5.4.4 Participant RU4
The Head of Resource Unit 4 believes that trust develops when there is an 
open and honest communication between two parties. S/he also believes that it is 
important to know that the other's interests are compatible with the overall University 
objectives and to feel that there is no intention to take advantage of one's weak 
conditions. S/he feels that there is an essential need for agreement and understanding 
of both parties’ interests. S/he states that you ‘trust the tiger do what tigers do ’, 
meaning that s/he can place her/his tmst on someone only when s/he knows her/ 
her/his interests and intentions. Therefore s/he thinks that s/he tmsts the individuals 
involved, although not at the same level, because they all try to achieve the same 
objective to make the faculty a surplus one.
In terms of the Star Chamber process, s/he aigues that although it has to deal 
with very important issues that many people depend on, it is very unstructured, 
unpredictable and goes into unnecessary details- micromanagement- that could be 
discussed in another type of meeting. S/he thinks that there is an imbalance of 
experience in budget negotiations, and s/he therefore feels very uncomfortable with
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the fact that there is no predetermined agenda and minutes of the actual meeting. 
S/he thinks that the Stai* Chamber meeting is ‘intended to be a highly stressful meeting 
because it is orchestrated in this way \ S/he refers to the tones and the body language 
that increase the stress in the situation. S/he also believes that the Star Chambers 
consists of a more negotiation rather than a communication meeting.
S/He views the IDRM as a very complex formula that only a few people 
understand. S/he argues that although it is a fomiula, there is a certain point where a 
human judgment has to be exercised, and trust is required. In particular, when
discussing strategic allocations, a level of intervention exists. S/he also argues that 
s/he has never been given any type of instmctions or training of how to deal with the 
model. Additional to the model’s complexity, the Star Chamber atmosphere creates a 
level of suspicion for ‘second accounts’ (meaning other agenda’s of University 
resource objectives). S/he argues that the opaqueness of the situation diminishes trust 
and creates a disadvantage for the Deans. S/he thinks that s/he would be happy if ‘the 
detail o f how accounting is done ’ was more transparent. S/he also believes that the 
appearance of a deficit has to do with ‘rules o f the game ’, and is more a consequence 
of the complexity of the IDRM model or the political interests of The University’s 
centre.
5.4.5 Participant RU5
The Head of Resource Unit 5 believes that trust is not a generic feeling for a 
gi'oup of people but is strictly related to particular individuals. S/he thinks that trust 
is expressed when one wants to understand, be interested, and give value to the 
relationship with the other person. S/he also believes that trust is based on the 
estimation of the other person’s integrity. Additionally s/he gives importance to the 
history of the particular interaction. S/he demonstrates that her/his trust will fall 
when s/he feels that the other is trying to conceal information, they are not 
straightforward, and they change ‘rules o f engagement’ in the relationship without
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declaring it. S/he also explains extensively that the tmst in individuals should not 
depend on the systems employed, because that will form an unfair presumption about 
the individual skills and aspirations. To illustrate this point s/he explains that is not 
fair to state that the central administration of The University is not worth trust within 
The University, just because the systems employed are opaque and incompetent, and 
that is also the case for the deficit Resource Units.
In respect to the resource allocation process, s/he argues that it is not clear 
what the Star Chamber meetings are about. S/he thinks that they should not be called 
‘Star Chambers’ in the first place and should be renamed to fit their puipose as 
financial budget negotiations. S/he feels discomfort with the fact that there are not 
‘fixedpoints ’ with basic mles of engagement, which is illustrated with the changes (of 
the resource allocation model or process) decided by the Management Group every 
year. S/he claims that it is a very illogical and opaque process which is based on 
different and often contradicting data. S/he explains that the information that one 
should have, to be prepared for the negotiations is either coming from inaccurate 
databases (for instance, s/he explains that there are two staff records systems which do 
not give similar outcomes) or it is not disclosed by each parties purposely, in order to 
gain control on the process. S/he thinks that when there is opacity in the process then 
there is a ‘room to manoeuvre ’ and to manipulate information. However, s/he claims 
that if one wants to achieve a specific agreement then one has to approach the 
Principal outside of the Star Chamber to deal with it. S/he also thinks that purpose of 
the Resource Strategy committee has a very questionable role and it does not make 
decisions. Similarly, s/he sees the ‘task force’ as an ‘internalpressure group ’ which, 
in her/his experience, were the worst meetings because people were not well informed 
and had to work on inaccurate data.
S/he argues that the IDRM is very complex model that may be transparent but 
difficult to understand. Its opacity is related to the way the strategic allocations are
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formulated and more fundamentally to the quality of data used to build the model. 
That inaccuracy creates an uncertainty of whether the faculties are getting what is due 
to them. S/he also aigues that the model is used to give ‘notional deficits ' to specific 
Resource Units, which are not fair. S/he argues that one has to consider the volume 
of the income that a Resource Unit generates, which is related to the volume of the 
deficit, illustrated when imposing the top slice percentage. In her/his view the bigger 
the faculty is the more amount of deficit would appear in its accounts.
S/he suggests that major improvement required gathering accurate data. S/he 
also suggests that there should be careful consideration and changes on the central 
administration costs that the top slice pays, the time period that the financial planning 
covers, the documentation of the meetings and the incentives to generate income in 
The University.
5.4.6 Participant RU6
The Head of the Resource Unit 6 thinks that trust is related to the belief that 
the other person is fair and reliable when dealing with difficult situations, such as the 
financial discomfort of The University. S/he acknowledges the difficulties of The 
University to deal with a shortage of resources and s/he believes that trusting each 
other should be the way of challenging that difficulty. S/he believes that when one is 
reasonably open and honest about the situation, then the people will respond in the 
same way. S/he can also trust someone only when s/he knows that this person is not 
commenting on others’ behaviour or situations. In the particular University setting, 
s/he claims that although there are financial difficulties and the systems employed are 
maybe not the most effective ones, s/he tmsts the two major actors differently because 
s/he believes that they have different perspectives of The University.
176
Chapter 5: Analysis and Discussion
In her/his opinion, the IDRM is not an easy model to understand, but s/he 
explains that even if the way the resources are allocated was changed, that would not 
change the fact that there are not enough resomces to allocate. Therefore, s/he places 
her/his attention more on to the personal interaction with the people involved in the 
process and s/he expects that they should approach the allocation issues in a fair and 
reasonable maimer. S/he argues that tmst is essential in the resource allocation 
setting in order to deal with pressure and stress. S/he also claims that if the resource 
allocation meetings were to be designed on a territorial basis, that would be an ‘eye 
opener’ by learning about other’s attempts to improve their situation, and people 
would not take advantage as they can on the individual basis ones. S/he believes that 
one’s confidence to ask for money and explanations is a necessary skill to achieve a 
satisfactory outcome and control in the negotiations.
5.4.7 Participant RU7
The Head of Resource Unit 7 perceives tmst as the willingness to provide 
support and understanding in order to achieve one’s well-being and development. 
S/he argues that it is directly related to particular individuals who are interacting with 
each other and it is influenced from the other’s personality and respecting each other’s 
interests. More particularly, s/he explains that her/his tmst is directed not to the 
whole Management Group but to two specific individuals, the Principal and the 
Director of Finance. S/he explains that s/he tmsts one more than the other because 
s/he feels that s/he understands the academic purpose of The University better, and 
s/he is trying to cope with a degree of academic sensitivity towards The University’s 
challenges, although the whole University’s managerial approach should be revised. 
In contrast, s/he thinks that the second individual, not only does not see the ‘things 
back in academic ’ but s/he also see things ‘in black and white ’. S/he feels confident
177
Chapter 5: Analysis and Discussion
to ask for financial support and s/he believes that some Deans are better in 
manipulating the system than others.
S/he appears quite sceptical of whether The University’s management culture 
is compatible to the research and teaching challenges of Higher Education. S/he 
argues that centralised services and decision authority are causing major problems, 
when employing significantly late and inaccurate systems. In her/his proposed 
solution, s/he argues that a complete devolution of the management system would aid 
the demands of efficiency of both financial and educational purposes. S/he thinks 
that the Deans should be the ones who decide how the resources should be allocated, 
design the IDRM, plan, and control their finances for research and teaching. S/he 
argues that the cuiTent consistency of the Management Group is totally incompatible 
with The University’s mission and s/he suggests that the Deans should be involved 
more actively. S/he thinks that some administrative units represented at the 
Management Group such as the Finance Office, Information Services, and Estates and 
Buildings should not be active, and have more influence than they should, because 
they do not understand The University’s issues 'of excellence in teaching and 
excellence in research’. S/he also argues that there should be a degree of devolution 
to the Research and Enterprise, Finance, and Information Seiwices because the curi'ent 
services that are provided are not satisfactory both in terms of time and quality. S/he 
also believes that if these seiwices operated in a faculty level they would achieve the 
level of expert knowledge required by the paiticular needs of each faculty.
S/he believes that one of the important aspects that the Deans should work out 
together is the collaboration between them in order to develop strong links in social 
and educational terms. S/he believes that if the Deans managed to build a sufficient 
degree of conununication and cooperation, then The University would be more 
effective in its educational role and would manage to cope with the financial 
challenges.
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In teims of the IDRM, s/he thinks that as a planning tool is too short-term and 
s/he argues that The University’s planning model should operate on a three-year basis 
with the allowance to be reviewed every year. S/he also argues that the top slice is 
too high and s/he feels that s/he is ‘taxed to pay people who are too slow to come and 
help me ’ with specialised services. Moreover, s/he believes that financial 
performance should be measured considering the faculties past performance and 
future plans. Additionally s/he suggests that the faculties should be given incentives 
to 're-invest ’ the resources they generate, in order to develop in research and teaching.
However, s/he admits that the model has improved over the recent years because of 
the pressure that the Deans put on the Principal and the Finance Officer. S/he also 
thinks that it is more transparent because of the new software The University obtained.
In terms of the resource allocation process, s/he claims that s/he feels suiprise when
s/he realises that 'they are changing rules ...upping the top slice again’. S/he i
believed that they 'fiddled the sums ’ and that was how her/his ‘deficit was appearing'.
5.4.8 Participant RU8
The Head of Resource Unit 8 believes that trust is developed when you get to 
know someone tlu'ough time. It is built on various different contacts ranging from 
direct personal interaction, to the formal group interaction in a committee meeting.
S/he feels trust when s/he knows that s/he shares a common vision for the institution 
with anyone in The University. S/he believes that one feels trust when one realises 
where one fits in the institution. S/he claims that if there is an issue of mistrust in The 
University, it is more horizontal, with the other Deans, rather with the senior 
administrators. S/he claims that the tmst s/he received from the Management Group 
was not conditioned on her/his faculty financial situation, although her/his faculty had 
passed tlirough phases of both sui'plus and deficit situations. However, s/he argues
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that there is a tension between the faculties concerning the deficit ones because there 
is tendency to question whether they have the intention to ‘short out ’ their situation.
S/he claims that her/his experience in the Star Chambers has always been 
constmctive because there is tmst on both sides. However, s/he admits that the 
tension in the meetings may be sourced in the financial pressures of the circumstances 
and the financial position of the faculty in particular, because there are different types 
of issues to be discussed, but that does not affect the tmst between the participants. 
S/he argues that it was always been clear to her/him what the senior managers want 
from him, and they have always supportive and understanding. S/he also admits that 
although there is ‘not a piece ofpaper that tells you the rules o f engagement ’ and that 
‘you learn on the draw’, s/he always had the chance to discuss her/his agenda as 
comprehensively as possible. S/he also admits that the very nature of the Star 
Chamber requires the Deans to be ready to ‘discuss everything’ like operational, 
general strategic or staffing issues. S/he also argues that it is very rare to be surprised 
by unexpected changes in the resource issues, because the Deans are meeting monthly 
in the Resource Strategy Committee for an updating discussion. S/he also thinks that 
in this meeting, everybody has a chance to make an input and ‘single faculties are not 
in isolation
S/he believes that there is no perfect resource allocation model; therefore, the 
IDRM has some bad and good points. S/he mentions her/his involvement in a gi'oup 
with several other Deans whose task was to look at different models of other 
universities but, in her/his view, none of these other models were completely efficient, 
s/he also argues that, although some of the other Deans prefer it more, paying only for 
the central services that a faculty uses it would be very complex, non transparent, and 
an inefficient model because there will be no mechanism to justify what would be a 
fair price with very high transaction costs created by a huge bureaucracy. S/he
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suggests that if a top slice is justified to the use of the resources available, it will be a 
fair and reasonable solution.
5.4.9 Participant RUIO
The Head of Resource Unit 10 explains that trust is a sense of security that 
develops in a working relationship when both parties perform in a consistent fashion 
and they say things as they actually happened. S/he thinks that tmst is more cmcial 
when there are no written mles and well-defined responsibilities. S/he also 
distinguishes between the competence of people to perform on specific job and the 
tmst that the individuals deserve. S/he explains that the difference is founded on 
one’s awareness of academic and managerial issues. S/he believes that it is important 
to know that the individuals involved in the process have academic interests and are 
professionally competent.
S/he claims that the major difficulties in the resource allocation decision 
process in the lack of clear and open communication before the Star Chamber 
meetings and is the lack of certain mles of conduct. S/he also feels that there are 
'other agendas ’ that may be important but not open to all the interested parties and 
that causes a climate o f ‘noxious meetings \ The importance of the meetings is also 
an issue considered as an uncertain concept. S/he thinks that only at the last of the 
meetings there is 'something o f value ’ in terms of the budget. S/he also claims, one 
has to be 'lucky’ to have all the information required to negotiate before the meeting. 
However, s/he states that once the same problems keep arising and not getting fixed 
every year, unpredictability becomes predictable. Additionally, s/he argues that the 
proposition to conduct territorial Star Chambers is not well justified because the 
territories ai'e arbitrarily justified. S/he also thinks that the sort term resource 
planning, although influenced by external factors, is a major factor of uncertainty for 
the faculties. Furthermore, s/he argues that the IDRM paradoxically is called a
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‘model \ whereas in fact it does not flinctioning in a modelled fashion. It is built by 
non-determinist adjustments, which were created to solve some problems on an ad hoc 
basis.
5.4.10 Participant R U ll
The Head of Resource Unit 11 refers to trust in a Star Chamber context and 
states that s/he would feel trust if s/he knew that the agi'eements made were honoured. 
S/he thinks also that her/his trust is influenced by the IDRM’s transparency, and the 
reliability of the information gathered. S/he also needs to Imow that all the members 
of the process are operating for a common interest. S/he believes that all the 
individuals involved in the process are deciding in the best interest of The University 
as a whole.
S/he thinks that the resource allocation negotiations are not an equal setting 
and that the Principal along with the Director of Finance, control the budget 
completely. S/he views the whole system from a wider perspective and explains that 
as s/he gets the budget already developed in the Star Chamber and s/he tries to 
negotiate to change some aspects, the same happens in the faculty’s Management 
Group where s/he discloses the budget to the Heads of the departments. However, 
s/he claims that in faculty, after recent refoiins, the Heads of the department’s have 
more power than s/he has in the Star Chambers. S/he believes that the Resource 
Strategy Committee should gain more authority and a flexible size. S/he believes that 
empowering the resource strategy committee will effectively affect the resource 
allocation process rather that reconstituting The University’s Management Group, 
which has a very loose relationship with the Star Chambers. In any case s/he sees the 
power interventions as a chain of reactions where the Heads of the departments blame 
the Deans; the Deans blame The University’s Management Group; the Management 
Group blames SHEFC; and SHEFC blames the govenmient. S/he argues that the
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major inputs in the process are the personalities involved and to a very considerable 
degree, some stmctural factors such as the time when the grant letter is announced and 
the effective operation of The University’s administration. S/he states that the 
administrations’ competence is cmcial and it tends to be ‘standardpractice ’ to receive 
the IDRM on the morning of the Star Chamber meeting.
S/he thinks that the model is getting more transparent and that supports the 
collegiality between the Deans, because it is easier to see who is in financial difficulty. 
However, s/he states that the model’s outcome should not be perceived as the Dean’s 
incompetence to manage the financial situation.
5.5 Views of the Heads of the Resource Units
This section deals with the views of the Heads of the Resource Units as 
indicated in the interviews. Although the interviews were carried out on an
individual basis, the cross case analysis is concentrating in finding a possible pattern 
that expresses all or some of the Heads of the Resource Units. Although the outcome 
of the analysis indicates differences between the views, a more attentive consideration 
reveals some degi'ee of consensus in the views on the issues of concern in the resource 
allocation process. In other words, it is interesting to conceive that the Deans choose 
to mention to a degi'ee, the same events or issues that influence their perceptions in 
respect to the resource allocation process. Attempting to illustrate the notional 
‘position’ of the Dean’s views in respect to their tmst and agreement in the resource 
allocation and in the relationship with the Management Group, the following matrix 
was drawn. The matrix attempts to show the picture of tmst and agreement in the 
relationship as explained by the Heads of the Resomce Units, which is to an extent 
‘the view through the eyes of the Heads of the Resource Units’.
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Figure 5.2: Heads of Resource Units participants, 
trust and agi'eement notional position matrix
It is also important to clarify that the views expressed for the relationship with 
the participants of the Management Group were, although directed to particular 
individuals, tend to comment on the role of them i.e. the ‘Vice Principals’ or the 
‘Management Group’, rather than particular individuals from these groups. However, 
when refeiTing to the Principal and the Director of Finance, the views included 
comments directed to personality, attitude, and individual ‘input’ in the resource 
allocation process.
In respect to the way the Deans’ position themselves in the relationship with 
The University’s Management Group, some of them (RU8, RUl 1) present themselves 
as very tmsted and in their view, they tend to agiee with the Management Group (see 
also section 5.7). In their opinion, the instances of disagreement that occur, are based 
on differences of their role’s perspective which tend to emanate from sufficient 
consensus with The University when adopting an approach of openness and trust in 
the negotiations. Similarly, RU4 and RU5 believe that they trust the Management
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Group a lot although they do not agree in all cases. They tend to express a |
‘condition’ in their relationship, which is almost always accepted by the Management i-
Group and that is the major reason that they claim high level of trust. It may also be 
interesting to mention that both Deans represent units in deficit, which is a possible 
influential factor in their perceived trust and agreement with the Management Group.
The Head of RU3 expresses a relative high level of trust and agreement and the Heads 
of RUl and RU6 tend to think that they are more critical although optimistic for this 
relationship. The Heads of RU7 and RUIO argue their cases with a lot of scepticism |
and they are quite critical, and argumentative about their relationship with the 
Management Group. Finally, the Head of RU 2 appears not only critical but also very 
aggressive in her/his view. S/he, more or less, blames everybody and everything in 
the process for non supportive, ignorant, and arrogant attitude in resource allocation 
process and s/he makes her/his case stating ‘/  am not particularly interested in making 
people at the central administration o f The University happy!’.
More details of the issues that the Heads of the Resource Units commented on, 
during their interviews are analysed following.
5.5.1 Trust in general
The discussions with the Deans were built around the resource allocation 
process and their perceived trust; however there was an underlying need to clarify 
what trust is for them, when they trust and how trust changes. In some of the 
inteiwiews, the Heads of the Resource Units voluntarily revealed the meaning of the 
concept for them and some others had to be asked. In this part, the definitions given 
by the Deans are outlined, although the issues they perceived as related to trust are 
sited in the subsequent parts of the analysis.
More specifically, tmst is a value judgment of the other’s personal integrity 
(RU5), and exists between individuals and it is not generic for a group of people
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(RU5, RU6, RU8, RUIO). The Heads of the Resource Units trust people because of 
previous experience of working together (RUl, RU5, RU6, RU7), when they assume 
that the others are operating with a common interest and they have a vision for The 
University (RU4, RU5, RU8, R U ll), when they think that the other is fair (RU4, 
RU6), when they are honest (RU2, RU7), when the other keeps and value the 
agreements made (RUl, RU5, RU6), when they do what they say (RU6, RU7) and 
when one is fair with her/his dealing with other people (RU6).
They explain that trust exists as an intuition based on the assumed values of 
the other and it is built when one is getting to know the individual (RUl, RU5, RU6, 
RU8,). However, the Head of RUIO argues that ‘sometimes it is better not to Imow 
someone...if you Imow people will actually affect your trust inappropriately’. They 
also explain that trust is built with good lines of communication (RU2, RUIO). Tmst 
also declines when there is suspicion within the relationship (RU4) and when one is 
speaking about others with a gossiping intention (RU6).
Some of the Heads of the Resource Units also distinguish clearly the trust they 
have in individuals, to the confidence that the systems employed are working well. 
They tend to argue that trust is built when individuals interact with each other and it 
should not be affected if the ‘system is not working’ (RU5, RU6, RU7, RU8, RUl 1). 
On the other hand, some of them do not assume this separation and they tend to 
believe that the inefficiency of the system, is an indication of the intentions that the 
individuals who are involved have, and they argue that when the specific individuals 
change, the whole resource allocation process and atmosphere will change as well 
(RUl, RU2, RU3).
Another point that the Heads of the Resource Units make is that trust is 
changing through their interaction and it is related to their experience of the process 
(RU4, RU6) and to the cycle of the negotiations during year (RU7, RUl 1). However, 
when they were asked to comment on the gi’aphs relating to the organisational trust
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inventory employed for this study, most of them verified the indications as close to 
what they were expecting them to be for themselves and for the other Deans, whose 
indications were graphed anonymously,
5.5.2 Trust in University now
In the inteiwiews, the Heads of the Resource Units had the opportunity to 
express their estimate of the tmst level in The University nowadays, before the 
organisational tmst inventory graph was revealed to them. They also specified their 
view within in the Star Chamber context, where several signs of misconduct could 
have caused a change in the levels of tmst of the individuals involved.
In particular, one view expressed is that tmst might be very important in the 
relationships in The University but the current financial pressure in Higher Education 
also might have affected it. Specifically, the Head of RU6 explained that ‘the 
financial situation that we are unhappily at the last three years, has put a lot o f 
pressure where trust is really important. And in some areas I  think is broken a bit. 
Because when there is pressure then people start thinking: “oh! You are getting more 
than I  am, or. what about him? In that respect, competition about resources during 
periods of financial distress would affect the willingness to tmst others. In addition, 
there are views that support the idea that the deficit faculties may tmst the 
Management Group more than the surplus ones (RU4, RU ll). However, there are 
others who do not agree with this argument, they do not associate the tmst level of a 
faculty with its financial position (RU5, RU6, RU8,).
A presumption that the Management Group participants might have more tmst 
in the Deans in general, than the Deans for the Management Group, is articulated by 
the belief that the Management Group has the choice to recruit people who they tmst. 
Chai'acteristically the Head of RU5 claims that ‘your job as a senior manager is to 
make sure that you have people in place who you do trust '. However, there are
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estimations about lower trust indications with the finance office, which have resulted 
in either operational tensions, or in the impression that professional administrators do 
not understand the issues that the academic Deans are concerned with (RU2, RU3, 
RU6, RU7).
Furtheimore, the Heads of the Resource Units tend to argue that there is a 
declining confidence in The University’s management information systems, and this 
belief is also expanded in the infoiination provided for the decisions related to the 
resource allocation process (RU5, RU7, RU8).
Moreover, there aie views that direct the concerns about trust in The 
University to the relations between the Deans rather than with the Management Group 
(RU2,RU8). However, in general the common spirit tends to be that the Deans are 
growing an attitude of collegiality, getting more knowledgeable about the resource 
issues of The University and that they require more authority to decide about The 
University’s management related issues (RUl, RU ll).
Trust in the Star Chamber context is much more related to the individual 
interaction and although there are tensions related to the bargaining for resources, trust 
tends to be reflected in estimations about the compliance between the individual’s 
interest and the strategic direction of the institution, to the personality of the 
participants and other issues.
5.5.3 Accountability and trust
Considering the external financial pressures and the difficulties of the current 
resource allocation system of The University, the Heads of the Resource Units pay 
particular attention to the extent to which reporting of issues relating to the allocation 
is practiced. Firstly, a major concern relates to whether the Resource Units manage 
to generate savings or the way in which they spend their budget is reported to the 
finance office promptly and in detail. Secondly, the extent to which the intention to
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subsidise particular units is justified and acknowledged and / or widely accepted 
within the rest of the Resource Units. Generally, the Head of RUl 1 believes that the 
relationship between the Deans and the centre improved during the years in that 
respect '... When I  started, (...) i f  the finance office made a mistake you didn’t tell 
them that they made a mistake. It was always in your favour. You didn’t tell them 
that they made a mistake. And you kept that so that you can use it later as sort o f 
savings
The Heads of the Resource Units RUl, RU3, RU6, RU7, RU8 explain that the 
way the budget operates it is impossible to have detailed accounts on spending during 
the year and it is a matter of trust if the Units will choose to be open and accountable 
at the end. The Head of RU8 explains that ‘they cannot actually check if  we are 
fulfilling what actually the money is spend for...until next year they will not have the 
chance, until we report back, they will not actually have the chance to check i f  we 
have spent it in the way we meant to spent it...I suspect that there is again trust’. In 
that extent their views vary, with the Heads of RU3, RU4, RU7, RU8, R U ll, claiming 
that they have always been open and with detailed reports in order to ‘build a very 
good relationship...and get support in the Star Chambers...(as) have gone on the 
basis o f trust (RU3)’. Similarly, but with more hesitation, the view of the Heads of 
RUl, RU5, RU6 demonstrates a willingness to be open and have a detailed reporting 
practice but with a degree of cautiousness in doing so. For instance, the Head of RU6 
claims that s/he goes to the Star Chambers with a lot more openness than ‘potentially 
some other people do ’ because s/he believes that if s/he is ‘fair with my boss, s/he 
would be fair with m e’ but ‘nobody is totally open...I would be surprised if  s/he was 
100% open
The intention to witliliold information about the level and source of savings at 
the end of the financial period is highlighted by some of the Deans. The main 
argument is that although the operation of the IDRM does not allow them to keep
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some of the resources as savings, there is a great need to have some ‘room to 
manoeuvre’. This view is explicitly demonstrated by the Heads of RUl, RU5, RU6, 
RU7, RU8. They tend to argue this as a major problem of the IDRM and they 
propose that the model should be reviewed, with greater consideration of this 
particular need for flexibility.
The other issue that some of the Heads of the Resource Units are considerably 
concerned about is the extent of acknowledgement and justification of the cross - 
subsidisation provided to some of the Resource Units. The Head of RUl claims that 
7 do not know what is promised in other Star Chambers ’ and the Head of RU4 
explains that there is a fix on the model every year to support some units but ‘there is 
no account...no record o f the way that this is happening’. Similarly the Head of
RUIO claims that ‘there are other agendas maybe important but not written, so you 
understand them ’.
In general, reporting and acknowledging issues related to resource allocation is 
perceived as good practice of trust in The University. However, there are concerns 
for doing so, which vary to the extent that they are based on particular interests in The 
University or on the limited operational capacity of the model employed.
5.5.4 The resource allocation process and trust
5.5.4.1 The Star Chambers
The Heads of the Resource Units discussed the role, operation, and importance 
of the Star Chamber meetings in the resource allocation process. Their comments 
indicate a level of uncertainty about the purpose of the meetings, their atmosphere and 
conduct. To some extent, their explanations of the meetings are conflicting and that 
creates a need for careful inteipretation of whether their view is affected by their 
attitude towards the meetings or it is distorted by a degi'ee of very different 
experiences. The major issues discussed which indicate a different type of meeting
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for each Head of the Resource Units, are the formality of the meetings, the degree that 
the meetings follow a particular documentation and the operational or strategic nature 
of the discussions.
In particular, the extent to which the meetings are formal or informal, the 
Heads of the Resource Units have different views. The Head of RU5 states that the 
Star Chamber meetings are very informal, where there are no defined rules of 
engagement. Moreover, the Head of RU8 thinks that the earlier meetings are more 
infonnal than the later ones. In terms of the documentation of the meetings, the Deans 
seem not to agree on the type of ‘papers’ required during the meeting, and the extent 
to which the agenda of the meeting is discussed beforehand. However, it seems that 
all agree that there are no formal minutes of the meetings. The Heads of RU2, RU4, 
RU5, and RUIO argue that there is no agenda set by either side in the meeting and that 
makes them feel uncertain of what the issues of discussion are. The Head of RU5 
describes her/his surprise when at the meeting s/he wonders ‘what are all these big 
files sitting on the other side o f the table ', whereas s/he would prefer to discuss a set 
of agreed papers beforehand in order to negotiate in a ‘meeting o f that importance \ 
Similar comment is made by the Head of RU4, who thinks that an elementary rule of 
any meeting is that ‘the papers you have in front o f you are the same as the papers 
that your opponent has... (however) that is not the case at the Star Chamber...and if  
what shocked me profoundly at the Star Chamber process is that there is no agenda 
and no minutes ...and that I  find incredible! ’. On the other hand, the Heads of RUl, 
RU3, RU6, RU7, RU8 and R U ll seem to have a different approach and they argue 
that they are always prepared to discuss their own agenda, which they circulate at the 
meeting. For instance, the Head of RUl 1 states that 7 give them an agenda and I  say 
here are the issues I  want to discuss '. Similarly, the Head of RU8 states that ‘we use 
the operational planning document as a sort o f basis to the Star Chamber 
discussions’. S/he also says that s/he always circulate her/his agenda before the
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meeting. In addition, the Head of RUl explains that s/he takes her/his ‘business and 
finance plan" to the meetings and s/he is always prepared to give specific details of 
what s/he is looking for.
Another issue that seems to confuse the role of the Stai' Chambers is the nature 
and extent of particular discussions. It seems to be unclear whether the Star 
Chambers have an operational or a strategic planning character and to what level of 
detail these issues are discussed. The Head of RU8 explains that the discussions are 
wide ranging and occasionally they might be financial due to staffing issues, general 
strategy or operational and s/he claims 7 think you just come prepared to discuss 
everything The Head of RU2 argues that ‘there is no strategy involved at all, it is 
purely a financial arena’. The Head of RU6 views the discussions clearly as 
budgeting ones on ‘how you are going to meet your budgets ’ in contrast to the Head of 
RU5 who thinks that ‘it is completely confused’. More specifically RU5 explains that 
there is an uncertainty in the pmpose of the Star Chambers and especially the early 
ones which are based ‘a lot around fantasy ’ with discussions oriented to ‘wish lists ’. 
In any case s/he sees the meetings more as a game where the participants try to gain 
power controlling the information around the table. Similar language and views are 
held by the Heads of RU2 and RUIO. The Head of RU4 finds it difficult to 
comprehend with the ‘micro-management’ of the meetings, when discussions of 
particular posts are consuming the limited time of the meeting, whereas more strategic 
planning issues need to be analysed in greater depth and detail.
The atmosphere of the meeting is another controversial point, where the Deans 
seem to have different views and experiences. Their explanations range from 
interpersonal tensions in the meeting to the financial position of the units. The Heads 
of RUl, RU3, RU6, RU8, R U ll give a constructive indication of the climate in the 
Star Chamber meetings, although they had not always been in surplus situation or they 
have not agreed on a satisfactory outcome for them. Characteristically, the Head of
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RU8 explains that although her/his faculty had been in a deficit and then surplus 
situation s/he admits that her/his Star Chambers were always reasonable, and if there 
was any discomfort, it was more related to the financial position of the unit rather to 
create ‘atmosphere’ at the meeting. On the other side, the Heads of RU2, RU4, RU5, 
and RUIO are more akin to give a picture of intentional tension and stress in the 
meeting. They do not hesitate to characterise the Star Chambers as ‘noxious ’ (RUIO), 
a ‘gladiatorial arena’ (RU2) or that is ‘orchestrated to be stressful’ (RU4). 
However, there is a recognition that the stressful atmosphere may be created by the 
‘input o f some individuals ’ as the Head of RU6 indicates when s/he comments on the 
participants personality (see more in section 5.5.6.8). Similarly, the Head of R U ll 
believes that it is all about personalities and that ‘there are some Deans who are very 
large eagles and really like to go to battle ’.
In conclusion, the Star Chamber meetings are perceived in many different 
ways and their importance in the resource allocation process is related to the direct 
contact with the Principal and the Director of Finance, and the fact that they are the 
only officially authorised meetings for budget related discussions.
S.5.4.2 Resource Strategy Committee, Task Force and Individual contacts
The resource allocation process has developed through the recent years, and 
other meetings in addition to the Star Chamber, have an additional role in the 
interaction between the Heads of the Resource Units and the Principal or the Finance 
Office. Although their perceived importance in terms of influence on the decision 
process for funding distribution varies, the Heads of the Resource Units refer to them 
as very relevant to the issue. These contacts are the Resource Strategy Committee, 
the Task Force groups, and although not accepted widely, the interpersonal direct 
interactions with the finance officer and the Principal.
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The Resource Strategy Committee is also referred to as ‘the Deans’ group’ and 
according to the Deans, has a degree of input to the ‘collegiality’ between them. The 
Head of RU5 explains that it is a committee that ‘sits between the Management Group 
and the faculties" and it meets once a month. The Head of R U ll recalls that s/he and 
two other deans requested the Principal to reform the Group into a Committee, with 
the ability to achieve ‘’decision making power as opposed to just sitting around and 
talking about things ’ it made no difference- s/he says ‘it "s still not working \ Its size 
and limited authority result to characterisations as ‘debating chamber...very 
questionable’ (RU5), ‘enormous committee...it doesn ’t really make decisions ’ (RUl), 
‘talk shop...it doesn’t have reporting lines back to the centre’ (RU2). Major issues 
that can be discussed are the resource allocation process and the individual 
experiences within the Star Chambers, the IDRM reform and top slice, general 
financial update and strategic issues. However, there is some widely acknowledged 
usefulness in terms of the issues discussed and the interaction between the Deans. In 
that respect the Head of RU8 thinks that in the Resource Strategy Committee, 
everybody can express their experiences and thoughts about the resource allocation 
process and there is ‘a chance to make input i f  there is something you don’t like’.
The other development where Resomcing issues can be discussed is the ‘task 
force’ meetings. The Head of RUl explains that its function is to ‘see how faculties 
are meeting targets ’ where a ‘lot o f negotiation is going on ’ and it involves the Heads 
of the Resource Units individually, the territorial vice Principals and an officer of The 
University’s finance office. S/he also calls them ‘mini Star Chambers’ and gives 
emphasis to the regular character of them and their impact in the resource allocation 
process as important to ‘make the other side understand what we want ’. The Head of 
RU5 describes one of her/his experiences as the ‘worst meeting’ s/he ever had, and 
s/he believes that it functions more as an ‘internal pressure group ’. S/he argues that 
on occasions, the group has not been well informed and the atmosphere was of the
194
Chapter 5: Analysis and Discussion
‘most unsupportive nature In general, the task force meetings although relevant to 
the resource allocation process, do not intend to contribute with strategic or decision 
making insights.
The importance of individual influences based on interpersonal relationships in 
the resoui'ce allocation process is an issue that some of the Deans comment on, as an 
alternative approach achieving a desired outcome. The Head of RUl describes a time 
when the ‘real negotiations came outside the Star Chamber’. S/he refers to her/his 
direct interaction with the finance office where s/he found the agreements made in the 
Star Chamber ‘blocked’. Similarly the Head of RU5 explains that ‘people who want 
investment money they don’t do it at the Star Chamber...they do it outside ’.
5.5.5 The Resource Allocation Model
5.5.5.1 Critique of the Income Driven Resource Allocation Model (IDRM)
The Heads of the Resource Units tend to adopt a sceptical approach towards 
the usefulness of the resource allocation model employed, with some degree of 
disbelief in its appropriateness in the cuirent plamiing needs of The University. 
Although they acknowledge that it might be difficult to find a model that would reflect 
The University’s character as an old research University, they think that changes for 
improvement should be addressed to justify the purpose of the existence of the 
particular model. The major issues that make the model imsuitable are the level and 
use of the top sliced amounts, the yearly period of the model’s operation, the lack of 
incentives to generate income and the rational underlined at the strategic allocations 
drawn on the model each year. Furthermore, most of them argue that the model 
giadually became very complex, although they have different opinions on the extent 
to which this complexity is intended by the major Star Chamber participants, a 
condition which is emphasised with the believe that some arbitrary manipulations end 
in unfair outcomes. In any case, they thinlc that the model is improving in
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transparency but they warn that making the model visible does not imply that it is 
improving its understanding.
Specifically, the top slice level is questioned by almost everybody in terms of 
its necessity and value. The Heads of RU2 and RUl 1 argue that the uniform top slice 
system operates as a tax mechanism where the units pay for services that they do not 
use. RU7 believes that the top slice is high, firstly because ‘there is not enough 
tension to the centre to reduce its costs’, and ‘some faculties have been allowed to 
overspend", a fact that leads them to be in deficit and then they have ‘to be rescued’ 
by the safety mechanisms of the model. Moreover, s/he argues that the top slice 
amounts are spent for the provision of not ‘particularly good ’ central seiwices and s/he 
argues her/his case with examples of insufficient quality of financial and other 
services. Similarly, the Head of RU8 addresses the question of the top slice level to 
the value of money spent for The University central seiwices. The Head of RU2 
recalls a talk given by the Director of Finance to the Dean’s group, presenting to them 
the arguments for the increase in the top slice level from 43 to 48. 8% trying to 
convince them that the ‘top slice didn’t really go up... it is just the way we calculate 
it ’. S/he also states that it is not clear what the top slice pays for and all money ‘goes 
in to the black hole o f The University ’.
The other issue raised by the Deans is on the yearly basis of the model’s 
operation. They argue that it is difficult to plan for development due the short-term 
nature of the model. In the worst cases, due to the unpredictability of how the 
planning is carried out, the model instils feelings of uncertainty and surprise. In more 
detail, the Head of RU5 states that ‘budgeting on a yearly basis is hopeless ’ and the 
Head of RU8 calls the model ‘short sighted’ arguing that ‘there are a number o f plans 
and developments to formulate which are not only for one year ’. Similarly, the Head 
of RU7 believes that one of the biggest weaknesses of the model is that it discourages 
plamiing for savings and investments in the longer teim.
7
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Commenting on the EDRM’s operation, the Heads of Resource Units also 
express concerns about the rationality of the strategic allocations and the second and 
third reallocations (see section 2.5.4), where they believe that there is not a 
satisfactory justification of the ‘strategic’ usefulness of the allocations. They 
emphasise the demotivational effect of the second contribution applied to the surplus 
faculties. For instance the Head of RU5 wonders ‘why would anybody come into a 
surplus? ’ once a surplus amount is immediately taken away. Similarly, the Head of 
RU7 argues that the way the model works makes her/him feel that her/his efforts to 
generate income are left unappreciated and s/he is ‘not rewarded’ for that. The Head 
of RU8 argues that there are two major issues that concern her/him with strategic 
allocations. First that ‘there are lots o f them... and is difficult to see how many o f these 
are actually strategic and how many o f these are just for...a part o f the structured 
cross subsidy'. Second, the model operates on a t-1 basis that is the income of the 
previous year, whereas s/he believes that for rapidly growing departments the model 
should allow them to operate on t (the current income) basis, which would support 
them on further investment. The same argument is put fomard by the Head of RUl 
claiming that ‘to develop you need t, you need the money you are earning this year’.
Furthermore, some of the Deans are concerned with the degi'ee that the model 
is exposed to manipulations that are sheltered by its complexity, which in turn leads to 
difficulty in understanding it, although it is exhibited transparently on the website of 
The University. The Head of RUIO states that although the IDRM is supposed to 
operate in a modelling manner, the strategic allocations function more as ‘non 
deterministic adjustments’ rather than as rationally modelled justifications. S/he 
explains that these adjustments ‘'are made to solve problems on an ad hoc basis...so it 
is really not a modelling, is just to solve problems which is disappointing’. The Head 
of RU6 explains that the model is difficult because ‘money is flying out and in there ’ 
in a non predictable manner and the Head of RU2 claims that ‘the IDRM kept shifting
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money from one resource centre to the other and therefore what you negotiated had 
impact on somebody else The Head of RU4 says that ‘there are some very strange 
little columns to that spreadsheet, which very few people in The University understand 
completely and that’s not good \ Adding to this observation, s/he explains that ‘every 
year something complicated happens and they have to make things work...and they 
add three or four or five lines, and every year gets more and more complicated ’. In a 
similar tone the Head of RU2 adds that ‘with a bit o f creative accounting... they just 
fill in the deficits’ and s/he gives an example when ‘they took two and a half million 
just straight out o f the IDRM to try to make the books balance ’ but ‘it became so 
crucial that they couldn’t actually cope with that and then again they had to become 
nasty ’. S/he also argues that deficits are constructed by the way the model works and 
s/he argues that when ‘they argue that you are in deficit this year ’ and s/he says ‘no I  
am not in deficit...you make me like that’. Similarly RU7 say that they ‘fiddle the 
numbers ’ and the Head of RU3 says that ‘they can juggle the figures in one way, they 
can juggle the figures in another way...they can make expectations o f me ’. The Head 
of RU5 explains that ‘where there is opacity there is an ability to manipulate ’ and 
there are some key areas who have been given ‘notional deficits by the centre ’.
5.S.5.2 Changes of the Model
The need to review the IDRM is considered extensively by the Heads of the 
Resource Units and they tend to believe that although there is not a perfect model that 
allocates resources, the cuiTcnt one requires major changes that will alter its 
presentation and operation.
The Head of RU6 comments on the way that a lot of debates in The University 
address the need to replace the IDRM with some other model thinking that ‘o f course 
the IDRM has lots o f faults...but essentially changing the way things are distributed is
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not going to alter the fact that we do not have money to distribute \ The Head of RU8 
also refers to the discussions taking place around the issue of the model’s replacement 
and s/he states that ‘there is not a perfect system...if there was then it would have been 
invented many years ago ’.
There are also views that acknowledge the improvements of the model such as 
the one expressed by the Head of R U ll who believes that ‘it is getting better, the new 
IDRM is much more accessible...much easier to navigate’. The reason that some 
constructive changes occuned according to the Head of RU7, is that the Deans applied 
a degi'ee of ‘pressure to have the resource model modified however s/he recalls that 
there ‘was a strong resistance from the centre, particularly from the Principal and the 
finance officer to change...simply because they wanted to get the resource model to 
work in a way that The University finance is appeared to be balanced’.
Further more, they tend to express their preferred suggestions for the model’s 
improvements. Some more radical views want a complete replacement of the 
resource allocation model with other more sophisticated mechanisms, such as a 
formulation of financially independent Resource Units that will have the choice of 
buying the services required from the centre of The University or from other units. 
More of these views are expressed by the Heads of RU2, RU5 and RU7. However the 
Head of RU8 expresses her/his concern with this approach and argues that such a 
system would create a dysfunctional bureaucracy and it is also impossible to justify 
the fair level of the service’s price due to the lack of market conditions.
More suggestions talk about to the length of the planning cycle and the 
performance indicators that should reflect the units’ present performance and future 
development. Additionally, the Deans believe that the resource allocation model 
should operate in such a way to motivate investments, rewarding the efforts for 
developments and giving a financial flexibility to the way resources are allocated.
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For instance, some Deans suggest that the faculties should be allowed to use the 
money they eai'n that current year with an option of retaining some savings.
Finally, there is a tendency to believe that the model will change because a 
new Principal will be appointed to The University and a lot of changes will happen to 
meet her/his new management style, including the resource allocation model.
5.5.6 University management and trust
5.5.6.1 Overall
Some of the Heads of RUs argue that there is a definite effect of the power 
relationship on trust. However, some other Deans argue the power structure of The 
University is not related to trust. The views expressed on the question of whether 
power relationships affect tmst tend to indicate a level of association between power 
and tmst in The University for some of the Deans.
5.5.Ô.2 Hierarchical structure and trust
According to some of the Heads of the Resource Units, the power stmcture of 
The University appears to be regarded as an important factor that affects the 
relationships between the individuals involved in the resource allocation process. 
There are views that express a degree of awareness of the political power and the 
bargaining tensions for resources in the process that are related to one’s position in the 
hierarchical stmcture of The University. These Heads argue that when there is more 
power distance, and less equality between the posts of the individuals negotiating for 
resources, then trust is regarded as useful but difficult to develop. They also tend to 
mention the positional inequality in the hierarchical structure of The University as a 
condition that devalues the importance of tmst in their interaction. However, some of 
the Deans claim that the hierarchical structure does not affect the tmst between them,
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which is built on individual contact rather than defined structured roles and 
responsibilities.
In particular, the Head of R U ll believes that the units in The University have 
a strong power position and they want to maintain it, attempting to keep information 
to themselves. The Head of RU5 argues that the highly hierarchical structure of The 
University affects the trust in The University harmfully, and the Head of RU2 thinks 
that trust is devalued when the individuals who are ‘on the top o f the pile ’ choose to 
maintain a superior profile. Also, the Head of RUl demonstrates that the hierarchical 
power structure expresses a paificular management style with strong gender 
associations, which needs to consider change and to ‘flatten the hierarchies.... (but) 
each time, the hierarchy seems to go more and more pyramidal and is not flattened at 
all '. S/he believes that this ‘affects issues ’ and creates inequality in the relationship 
where the senior members approach the resource allocation discussions in ‘we are 
listening but we are not negotiating with you’. However, s/he believes that the 
subsequent change of the organisational structure that merged two faculties together 
strengthen their position towards the central management ‘both in terms o f political 
position and financial position now ’. Similar views are expressed by the Heads of 
RU3 and RU6 who insist that the position in the hierarchical structure affects ‘the 
manner in which I  ask them... and affects my sense o f whether or not I  trust them to do 
something (RU3)
On the other side, there are views that indicate a relevant confidence in the 
particular ‘strengths ‘ of the faculties, which seem not to be affected by the level of 
the faculty’s position in the power structm*e, and tmst towards others is much more 
related to the individual contacts in The University. The Dean of RU5 thinks that 
tmst is much more related to the individual’s personality and the relationship with 
her/his/ rather than that defined stmctured role expectations. Similarly, the Head of
201
Chapter 5: Analysis and Discussion
RU8 argues that one’s position in The University structure affects the bargaining 
power of the person but not the trust in their interpersonal relationship.
5.S.6.3 Decision authority and trust
The issue of participation in the decision making process and centralised 
pattern of authority distribution at The University was broadly discussed with the 
Deans. They direct their attention to the way the ‘final say’ in the resource allocation 
depends on the Management Group side of the table, which they perceive as an 
attempt to maintain control of the decision process. They explain that in the Star 
Chambers, their role is formulated into a ‘receptive’ mode where the acceptance and 
implication of the decision is expected. Furthermore, they propose that a more 
decentralised authority pattern would be more appropriate in The University, in order 
to deliver to their demanding responsibilities. Some of the Heads of RUs argue that 
one of the major issues that one should place attention on, is the consistency of the 
Management Group. They suggest that the immediate empowerment of the Deans as 
a group would facilitate more effective management of The University. They tend to 
argue that when the Dean’s opinion is sufficiently represented to The University’s 
decisions, then they may feel more trust in the reasoning and appropriateness of the 
decision.
In particular, the Heads of RU7 tend to argue that although the Resource Units 
are to a degree dependent on complying with their academic responsibilities, the 
decisions concerning the financial and strategic issues are controlled in a highly 
centralised manner. However, they give different explanations about the reasons that 
underlie such a centralised system, which vary fi'om the management style of the 
specific individuals who want to control the budget (RU2, RU5, RU8, RU ll), the 
incompetence of the monitoring systems that causes an feelings of insecurity to the
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centre that they ‘don’t feel in control’ (RU6), and there is limited contact of the senior 
management with the academic imits (RU3, RU7). Most of them believe that there is 
a need to devolve authority to the Deans and that can be achieved if the Management 
Group would trust the Deans more. Characteristically, the Head of RU6 states 7 do 
understand that you are responsible for £200 million business and you are in 
deficit...must be a nightmare... and all these independent units ...which financially do 
their own thing...and they (the finance office) don’t control it...and an actual trust is 
hugely important ...and my experience is that the finance office don’t trust what I  am 
doing ’.
The attempt to maintain the centralised character of the decision processes is 
pictured also in the Star Chamber meetings, where some of the Dean’s feel that their 
role is to ‘receive and implement’ an already decided budget. The Head of RU2 
argues that the structure of the Star Chamber is very ‘closed to providing proper 
dialogue...! think that’s a control mechanism’. In addition, the Head of R U ll 
explains that the Principal and the Director of Finance control the budget and ‘when it 
comes to crunch they say: no! You can’t do that ’.
The proposed solution to rebuild trust in The University is the distribution of 
decision authority to the Deans (Resource Strategy Committee) and the actual 
participation of the Deans in The University’s Management Group. In that respect, 
they demonstrate that the Deans are becoming more knowledgeable and more 
powerful in The University, a development that should be appreciated by showing 
tmst to them. The reason that the Deans feel that they should have a more active 
participation in the Management Group or more decision authority to the Resource 
Strategy Committee is as the Head of R U ll states that ‘they communicate...they can 
reach the feeling from the troops to get through to the Management Group’. 
Moreover the Head of RU 5 explains that the system of centralised authority, and the 
lack of Deans’ participation in the decision processes in The University, is a system of
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failure to achieve effectiveness and s/he believes that it is acknowledged that when 
something is going wrong it is ‘not that they don’t trust me or they don’t trust my 
judgment...The University is set up in such a way that people don’t truly have 
devolved power and authority ’.
5.S.6.4 Interests and trust
The interview conversations with the Heads of the Resource Units revealed an 
interesting association between their trust feeling and the belief that the individuals 
they are dealing with, have connnon interests. The importance of this belief is 
emphasised when the limited resoui'ces for the faculties stretch financial pressure. 
The notion of the ‘big picture’ along with the emphasis on common direction and 
interest is reflected by their estimation of the other’s attitude judgment that is 
indicated by experience of the personality, the ability to compromise and understand 
the academic role of The University and the intention to minimise competitiveness 
and to develop collegiality between the Deans. They all direct their explanation of 
their trust in relevance to these issues and also tend to justify their own trustworthiness 
in accordance with their ability to fit and understand The University’s broad role.
More precisely, some of the Deans expressed very confidently the view that 
they feel a part of The University’s ‘big picture’ and common vision, and they argued 
that they also feel tmst in the individuals who share this vision. The Head of RU4 
claims that ‘our emotions are compromising in terms o f trust...! am quite clear o f 
what The University wants to do...we both have the same aims...we both have an 
agenda which says that we have to balance the books ’. Similarly, the Head of RU ll 
believes that ‘we are actually operating in common interest’ and s/he recalls a 
comment expressed by the Principal indicating relief about the ‘bunch o f Deans who 
all point in the same direction ’. In addition, the Head of RU8 explains that knowing 
the individuals s/he is dealing with, affects her/his tmst when s/he says ' thank
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God...if I  was going into a meeting with complete strangers, who had a very different 
vision for the institution than I  have, that would with no doubt affect my level o f trust. 
Instead ... I  meet them to share views informally or formally about where the 
institution is going, then you realise where you fit  in the institution \
However, some of the Deans express some cautiousness over whether there is 
a ‘big pictirre’, and how specific understandings of The University’s role can be 
expressed by a common view, which affects their trust. The Head of RUl states that 
s/he ‘would like to see what the big joined up picture was...I don’t get the feeling that 
we all are in the same boat going to the same direction \ Moreover, s/he explains 
that s/he would feel trust only if s/he ‘Imew what the broad picture was and ...the 
Deans themselves were deciding what the strategy was ’. The Head of RU6 believes 
that as a Dean s/he has to have knowledge of the whole perspective of The University, 
however s/he feels different level of trust towards specific individuals s/he is dealing 
with, because s/he thinks that they are ‘operating in two different ways’. S/he 
explains that s/he trusts the Principal and what s/he is doing because s/he has a ‘vision 
o f The University" and s/he ‘is doing things to grow The University’, in contrast to the 
Director of Finance who ‘is there to hold on to some money ’. The Heads of RU3 and 
RU7, who argue that they have the feeling that the two individuals are working on 
different agendas and there are times that they have very ‘diverging views ', addressing 
the same point. They explain that this divergence is affected by the personality of the 
specific individuals and their professional experience.
The most extensive disbelief in the compliance of specific individuals within 
the mission of The University is expressed by the Head of RU2. S/he argues that The 
University’s mission statement ‘gets lost in finances’ and there are individuals in the 
Finance Office who ‘think that The University’s business is financial, where in fact 
The University’s business is educational ’. S/he believes that the overall approach to 
The University’s future is in a sense in contradiction with her/his faculty development
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and s/he argues that because the ‘Management Group is completely out o f touch with 
what is going on in The University her/his faculty’s specific needs are not considered 
at all. hi addition, s/he feels it is necessary to state that her/his loyalty is to the 
faculty and its people although The University comes against that and ‘maybe some o f 
the aggressive attitude comes from me \
S.5.6.4 Financial resources and trust
The acknowledgement of the strict higher education financial enviromnent and 
the impact of this on The University as a whole and the faculties as part of this whole 
was mentioned a lot by the Heads of the Resource Units.
However, the limited availability of financial resources is not considered as a 
self-sufficient cause for why some of the Resource Units have been shown a deficit 
outcome at the IDMR, and they argue in some cases they have been given notional 
deficits, which are either a result of the problematic rational of the model or an 
intentional attempt of The University’s centre to create higher expectations of the 
faculties. In other words the Heads of the Resource Units challenge the distributive 
fairness of the IDRM model, arguing that the top slice level and the judgments for 
subsidisation are used to impose a control on some faculties naming them 'deficit \  not 
acknowledging the income that the faculties generated from research or teaching. In 
that respect, RU5 complains that 'some parts o f The University actually believe that 
the financial difficulties in The University can be attributed to one or two key areas. 
And they blame them for that. But what they forget is the fact that those two areas are 
given notional deficits by the centre. But they are actually the biggest income 
generating parts o f The University. And they are actually supporting the other low^er 
earning faculties and they are paying a huge chunk to the central administration ’.
It is also interesting to consider the extent to which the financial position of the 
faculty affects the level of trust in the Management Group. To address this
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relationship two methods are considered in the present study. First, correlating the
actual results found in the IDRM to the outcome of the questiomiaire, assuming that 
the IDRM outcome reflects the actual financial position of the faculties, an 
assumption which has been challenged by the Heads of the Resource Units and that 
the questionnaire rating reflects the actual level of trust an assumption, an assumption 
which should be considered bearing in mind the limitations of the instrument 
(Appendix 16). Second, relating the responses expressed in the interviews by the 
Heads of the Resource Units when they were asked to guess the financial position of 
the faculty, whose Dean score the lowest or highest response to the questiomiaire 
(Appendix 16)
In either case, there is no consistent pattern of observation and it should be 
therefore concluded that the financial situation of the Resource Units is not a driving 
reason for tmst.
IS.5.6.6 Communication and trustThe discussion with the Deans about the importance of transparent and open 
infomiation communication in the resource allocation process, reveal a degree of 
uncertainty in relation to the accuracy of the information required, and the network 
through which this infonnation is transferred. Firstly, it is argued that during the 
resource allocation discussion, the infomiation relevant to the decision’s formation is 
not completely available to the Deans, and if it is, the timing of the infomiation 
released to them is considered stressful because it is presented to them late to respond. 
They argue that one has to be assured that the required infomiation is accurate and 
available in order to feel confident in the process. Some of them explain this 
argument while refening to the student numbers and staff numbers database, and the 
transparency level of the IDRM model. The communication flow on the required 
information, is also considered vital for their tmst. They tend to argue that there is
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communication network inefficiency in The University and therefore higher trust 
levels between the individuals are difficult but necessary to build. The discussion 
then follows the aspects of clarity, openness, and fi'equency of communication. It is 
also interesting to mention that although some of the Deans believe there is a 
communicative intention in the resource allocation process, some others argue that the 
process is a negotiation rather than a communication one, indicating a degree of 
misconception in the role of the Star Chambers.
The importance of access, accuracy, understanding and timing of the 
information provided for the resource allocation process is highlighted as crucial. 
One of the tendencies is to differentiate the information the Deans acquire from The 
University’s management information system and the one they gather tlirough their 
own sources. Some of them argue strongly that the need to work on their own 
sources is so crucial that, as the Heads of RU5 and RU7, had to organise their ‘mini 
University ’ with persoimel working on finance, research, and human resources issues 
of the faculty. Almost all of them expressed a worry about the infonnation services 
provided by The University. However, they tend to give different explanations that 
vary between the intentional climate of ‘dark suspicion ' (RUl 1) and the incompetence 
of The University’s administration that is very bureaucratic in chaiacter and it does 
not respond rapidly enough to the changes of the funding environment (RU8).
The other part related to infoimation provision is the clai'ity, opeimess, and 
frequency of the contacts between the individuals, which also affects their perceived 
trust. Furtheimore, it is very indicative that they are not convinced that the Star 
Chambers are trying to create conditions of negotiation that ensures sufficient 
communication at the same time. Participants tend to give different views on that 
matter and they separate their trust existence in either situation. The Head of RU4 
explains that ‘thisprocess in not to communicate something but (...) it is a negotiation 
process, how much, how close...how much money can be taken out o f the budget’.
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And the Head of RUl claims that ‘ I  thought I  was negotiating, I  wasn V negotiating, I  
was laying down my needs... However, they demonstrate that communication 
patterns are extremely important to maintain trust as the Head of RU2 argues that ‘to 
improve the trust...you need better lines o f communication with the central 
administration \
5.5.6.7 Legitimate anticipations and trust
In the perceived trust levels between the Deans and the Management Group it 
might be interesting to highlight the dimension of moral anticipations which trust is 
based on and develops thiough time. The revealed moral rights and obligations, to 
which they both exercise and expect reciprocity on basis of trust, are articulated 
around the perceived opeimess, care, fairness, loyalty and support between them and 
the Management Group.
Firstly, the Deans feel they need to make the Management Group believe that 
they are able to be trusted with financial resources, and to respect their right to use 
these resources for the faculty’s development and well being. Such rights on 
resources is for instance the expectation to ‘have the right to roll on the budgets’ 
(RUIO), the right to spent a ‘reasonable share o f the income’ (RU7) which they 
manage to generate thi'ough activities of research and teaching, to be rewarded for 
generating income (RUl, RU5, RU8), the right to get training in order to understand 
and work effectively with the budget (RU6). Secondly, they expect that they should 
have the right to be trusted in the decision making process by being infoimed about all 
the aspects that concern them in the process and to contribute with their views in a 
participative pattern because they are knowledgeable (RUl), they care and they are 
loyal to their faculties (RU2) in the context of The University’s vision.
On the other hand, they believe that the Management Group enjoys the 
faculty’s trust when they meet certain expectations. Therefore, to the Heads of the
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Resource Units, the Management Group is obligated to operate in the interest of The 
University, is obligated to reciprocate in the same way when they treat them fair 
(RU6), they are obliged to support them to meet The University’s mission statement, 
and they are obligated to keep the agreements they make during the process (RUl, 
RU ll). They also claim that The University should support them to deliver on their 
own responsibilities.
Within this kind of distinction, there are Deans who, in the context of the 
resource allocation process, are negotiating on the basis on trust because they Imow or 
expect that the Management Group will be fair (RU6), that they operate in the interest 
of The University (RU ll), they are concerned about the faculties real needs. 
However, there are Deans who believe that their expectations have been mislead and 
even lowered, due to uncertainty in the process (RU2, RUIO), and they either do not 
perceive that the reasons for particular decisions are well defined (RU2, RU7) or they 
think that they are completely in contrast to what they perceive as trustworthy 
behaviom* (RU2).
5.S.6.8 Other issues (personality, gender, training- professional vs 
academic)
Personalitv: The degree to which the particular process and model design is 
influenced by the involved individuals, is considered very important in interaction in 
terms of trust. Some of the Deans identify the personality and management style 
preference of the particular Principal and they argue that when the specific individual 
changes, the whole process and system might change. Characteristically, the Head of 
RUl claims that 'there is a degree o f uncertainty due to the change o f the 
Principal... because the whole IDRM might change... radically The same argument 
is supported by the Heads of RU4, RU6, RU7, and RUS. The Head of RU2 explains 
that the current Principal has a ‘very impressive background in terms o f financial
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management’ and that the ‘finances o f The University became (the Prinsipahs) baby 
when s/he was appointed as vice chancellor and Principal However s/he is more 
reserved about the input of the Finance officer ‘not sure where history will write 
her/his (PrincipaP^ partnership with the (Director of Finance) as a financial success 
or not.,,it might be a risk o f not been regarded as the financial savours o f The 
University
Similarly, for other Deans the Principal’s personality seems to influence their 
tmst and they differentiate her/him from other individuals involved in the process. 
The Head of RU6 clarifies that it is ‘not the rest o f the Management Group ’ who is 
represented at the Star Chambers. Within a gioup (such as the Finance Office) there 
are some members who s/he trasts in different levels. S/he explains that s/he trusts the 
Principal more because s/he is ‘transparent(...) reasonable(,.,) fa ir ’ and s/he thinks 
that s/he believes the same for her/him, but s/he has reservations about the ‘finance 
team ’ and s/he explains 7 suppose they don’t feel that they trust me ’. However, the 
view that the system’s failure should not be regarded as a persons’ failure and tmst 
should be maintained in the individual level is quite noticeable. For instance the 
Head of RU5 explains that although her/his Resource Unit faces several problems 
which are partly caused by the systems in operation ‘'continued help to this faculty 
depends on a trusting relationship between me as an individual and the Principal as 
an individual’. S/he explains that s/he believes that the Principal tmsts her/him 
because dmows that I  am trying to address the financial situation although s/he has 
different view about the Director of Finance.
In terms of negotiations, all of the Heads of Resource Units explain that they 
would never change their negotiations content on the others’ personality but they may 
consider their way of negotiation, in that respect. The Head of R U ll explains that 
the ‘atmosphere’ in the Star Chambers depends on personalities and s/he thinks that 
the Management Group members will not tmst someone who is a ‘trouble maker ’. In
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that respect, the Head of RUIO believes that ‘personalities shouldn’t be part o f the 
process ...otherwise you get into the situations where it is hard to pass...people 
making decisions on the basis o f attitudes rather than people work in the interest o f 
The University’. Further, the Head of RU7 explains that ‘some Deans are more 
influential than others’ and they are better able to ‘manipulate the system ’. The Head 
of RU8 claims that the Star Chamber process 'has been hard work, but it is quite a 
positive experience’. For the Heads of RUl, RU3, RU6, they argue that they feel 
confident in arguing their case when they are ‘annoyed’ about things they don’t like in 
the process.
Gender: some of the Dean’s recommended that it might be interesting to 
consider the gender of the participants when discussing tmst and the decision 
processes of The University (RUl, RU4, RU6, RU ll). The Head of RUl 
demonstrates that there is an ‘imbalance’ of gender in the management of The 
University and a female dean would not ‘trust men as much as men trust each other ’. 
S/he believes that there would be less hierarchical authority stmcture and more 
consultation if  there were more females, but s/he states that if there was a female 
Principal who followed the same management style s/he would not tmst her/his either. 
The Head of R U ll thinks that ‘i t’s a pity that we don’t have a female vice Principal' 
and s/he recalls when one of the female Deans was the convenor of the Dean’s gi'oup, 
practices changed a lot and ‘it was much less o f that premature male posturing’. 
However s/he explains that ‘being a woman (does not) automatically makes you 
good’. The Head of RU6 explains that being a female in the Star Chamber process 
might be different. S/he states ‘/  think it is different but I  am not sure it is for worse 
or better. It is different. But people make assumptions that (females) don’t Imow 
anything about figures or money! Which is absolutely wonderful!... (but should not) 
feel disadvantaged in any way. It is just different. Not disadvantage ’.
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Professional vs academic -  training: one of the issues discussed with the Deans 
was the necessity for professional experience or training of the Head of the Resource 
Units and the effect of such experience on the trust level developed in the resource 
allocation process. They tend to argue that they do not associate the ‘professional’ 
experience with the successful management of The University’s faculties because the 
role has academic importance along with the financial management of the unit. More 
precisely, the Head of RUIO states that ‘it will be useless to have a professional 
manager' and s/he feels the same for the Principal’s position who has to be ‘both the 
chief administrator in a sense but also a person who makes academic decisions The 
same view is expressed by the Heads of RUl, RU2, RU3, RU5, and R U ll. In 
addition, they aclmowledge that the Faculty’s Secretary, who accompanies them in the 
resource allocation negotiations, is the person with the financial and administrative 
expertise required to support the faculty’s effective administiation (RUl, RU8).
In addition, they appreciate the importance of training courses to increase 
awareness, although they claim that more purpose-designed courses for the Deans 
about the resource allocation model (IDRM) and process do not operate in The 
University. The explanations on this vary, as an intended limited support mechanism 
for the Dean’s understanding of the model or process (RU2) to the extent that the 
hequent changes of the model and the process cannot be followed in the Deans 
promotion in The University’s administration after being Heads of a Department. 
Characteristically, the Head of RUl explains that the IDRM ‘changed considerably 
since (s/he) was the Head o f the Department’ and that the Management Group don’t 
‘view their position as being trying to give us assistance and understanding... but one 
would have expected training ’.
Further, on the expertise support provided by The University’s central 
services, the proposed assistance by an administrator who will hold a post in the 
faculty, but s/he would be reporting to the Finance office, is perceived with caution by
• J
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the Deans. Although a similar post is monitored by the Human Recourses service of 
The University with a lot of appreciation by the Deans, the similar finance persomiel 
post is not broadly accepted (RU2, RU4, RU6, RU7). The Head of RUl thinks that 
this proposition was perceived with ‘absolute horror at the thought that there will be 
financial moles in every faculty and in fact working for the centre rather than the 
faculty
Generally, the Deans seem to be aware of the necessity of specific financial 
knowledge but they think that ‘it will not be acceptable between academic colleagues' 
(RUl) to appoint a professional manager in the faculties, even more when they 
become more knowledgeable on resource issues in Higher Education (RU3, RU6, 
RU ll).
5. 6 Organisational Trust Inventory Analysis
5.6.1 The responses to the Organisational Trust Inventory
The information gathered from the questionnaire responses varies on an 
individual basis. However, an overall view of the responses might be valuable to 
draw an understanding of the general attitude formed between the members of the Star 
Chambers. It is necessary also to mention the time dimension of the responses, which 
may influence the sensitivity of the attitude measured. Therefore, the following 
analysis should be considered as an attempt to highlight a few points in the overall 
picture taken from the responses to the organisational trust inventory, and not as a 
generalised fact. The following graphs show the level of tmst as drawn by the 
responses to the questionnaire. The particular graphs are indicative of the trust 
attitude on average, and more detailed analysis undertaken, involving the different 
dimension of attitude and tmst along with the ‘checking’ questions and other teclinical 
‘tricks’, are placed at the relevant appendix of the present (Appendix 16).
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The level of trust, as a reflective attitude, is captured in dual form, as it is 
expressed in the two parts of the Organisational Trust Inventory. The first part of the 
questionnaire referred to the trust of the participant in others, and the second part 
referred to what the participants thought that the others would feel for them in terms 
of trust. The trust existing in the relations between the members of the committee, as 
they were identified before, should be levelled in the same degree as both parts of the 
questionnaire indicate. However, it would be imprecise to define the exact level of 
trust as the average between the two degrees drawn from each part of the 
measurement, because that might drive us to arbitrary explanations of what this 
number reveals.
In respect to the questionnaire of the Heads of the Resource Units, the first part 
attempted to obtain the level of the perceived attitude that the respondents had toward 
the Management Group. The second part attempted to gain information about the 
level of trust that the Head of Resource Units perceived that the Management Group 
has for them.
Organisational Trust Inventory Resource Units 
(Part 1 and part 2)
7.00 6.00
6.00  - -
w 5.00 —  -A
- - 2.-08 2.062.00  -
1.00 - -
3.67 
3:44- 3 4 2 -----
RUl RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8 
Resource Units
Figure 5.3
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The Figure 5.3 shows the level of trust as it is expressed in both parts of the 
questionnaire. In teclinical terms, the perceived level of trust is the weighted average 
of the responses given in a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates less trust and 7 more 
trust. In respect to individual responses the graph shows that RU 3, RU4, RU5 and 
RU8 in both parts of the questionnaire indicated high level of trust. RU 1, RU6 and 
RU7 responses show a medium level of tmst that might be interpreted as a cautious 
response to tmst. The lowest rating is the one given by RU 2.
In respect to the differences in strength between the two parts of the 
questionnaire, it is possible to observe a degree of consistency at the responses of the 
Heads of RU2, RU5, RU6 and RU8. It seems that these participants have similar 
level of tmst in the Management Group, as they believe that the Management Group 
has for them. However, the Heads of RUl, RU3 and RU4 indicated a relatively 
significant difference (more than 0.50) from the tmst level that they believe that the 
Management Group have to them. On the other hand, a very significant difference 
(more than 1 degree) exists at the level of perceived tmst of the Head of RU7, which 
after interpretation, it seems that the Dean thinks that the Management Group tmst 
her/him more that s/he trusts them.
In respect to the responses gathered from the participants of the Management 
Group, the next graph shows the first part of the questioimaire which indicated what 
the participants think about the Heads of the Resource Units in terms of trust. The 
Management Group responses to the questionnaire indicate an overall high level of 
trust (more than 4). The response provided by MG2 is high but it is subjected to the 
stmctural effects of the questionnaire, which proved inconvenient to the participant.
It is interesting to observe a degree of consistency between the two participants 
who provided a detailed response. In particular, MGl and MG3 found it necessary to 
differentiate in the first part of the questionnaire the Heads of RU2, RU5, RUIO and 
RUl 3. With careful interpretation, that means that the two Management Group
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participants trust these Heads of Resource Units less than the rest of them. Other 
interesting ratings in the first part of the questionnaire are those given to RUIO and 
RUl2 from MGl and MG3 respectively.
organisational trust inventory - part A 
management group
w 5.5
0) 4.5
■ MG1 
□ MG2
■ MG3
resource units
6  'So A A  . ' f t
Figure 5.4
Table. 5.1: Organisational Trust Inventory - Part A 
Management Group
RUl RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8 RU9 RUIO R U l l  RU12 RU13 
MGl 5.19 4.94 5.19 5.19 5.17 5.19 5.19 5.19 5.19 sTÔô 5ÏÏ9 5 J9  5.03
MG2 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22
MG3 4.78 4.17 4.83 4.81 4.39 4.72 4.86 4.72 4.89 4.94 4.81 4.33 4.53
The second part of the questionnaire also shows a higher level of trust from the 
three participants of the Management Group (MGl, MG2, MG3). The structural 
effects of the instrument are also observable at the responses, although MGl and 
MG3 provided a more detailed response. A degree of consistency can be observed in
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the second part of the questionnaire, where the participants MGl and MG3 gave the 
Heads of RU2, RU5 and RU l3 lower ratings, meaning that they think that these 
particular individuals trust them less than the rest of the Heads of the Resource Units. 
Similarly, in the second part of the questionnaire RU 4, RUIO are differentiated by 
M Gl,andRU12by MG3.
organisational trust inventory - part B 
Management Group
2 5.15
5 5.05
Q) 4.9
Resource Units
^  ^
■ MGl 
□ MG2
■ MG3
Figure 5.5
Table 5.2: Organisational Trust Inventory - Part B 
Management Group
RUl RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8 RU9 RUIO R U ll RU12 RU13
MGl
MG2
MG3
5.11 5
5.25 5.25
5.19 5.11
5.11
5.25
5.19
5.08
5.25
5.19
5
5.25
5.17
5.11
5.25
5.19
5.11
5.25
5.19
5.11
5.25
5.19
5.11
5.25
5.19
4.72
5.25
5.19
5.11
5.25
5.19
5.11 5.08
5.25 5.25
5.11 4.97
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5.6.2 Management Group Participants responses- Design difficulties
The responses from the participants of the Management Group tend to reflect 
the particular nature of the individual inquires which expressed concerns about the 
design of the questionnaire. The main reason for such an issue was firstly, the 
number of units to be assessed and secondly, the time and attention given by the 
respondents considering their busy daytime schedules.
In order to help the respondents in providing with their answers, a potential 
design restructure of the questionnaire applied. The focus was to help the 
respondents to evaluate the statements given, for all the thirteen (13) Resource Units.
The outcome of this consideration was a development of a Management Group 
Questionnaire, which differed from the one given to the Head of the Resource Units 
only in its outlined structure. The number and wording of the statements remained 
the same. However, due to further individual enquiries, a specific format of reply 
was suggested.
In particular, in the case of The University’s Principal, a meeting was 
organised to justify the type of acceptable responses to the questionnaire. The 
meeting took place on the 18 April 2002 at 4:30 pm at the Principal’s office, where 
my supervisor explained the questionnaire design to the Principal. During this 
discussion, no further information was provided in order to achieve an unbiased 
response. The suggestion discussed in order to provide acceptable answers to the 
statements was that the Principal could score all the statements with her/his preferable 
rating, notifying it at the side and to specify whether the statement had a different 
value for some of the Resource Units. For example, if the statement ‘we think that Y 
is competent’ was rated with a ‘strongly agree’ value for most of the Resource Units 
but with a different value for some other, then the Principal had to specify the units 
and the rating given for this particular case. After this clarification, the Principal’s 
response to the questionnaire received by the researcher on the 25^ '^  of April 2002.
i;
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A similar enquiry was raised by the Director of Finance who expressed, by 
email, her/his difficulty in dealing with the questionnaire due to her/liis ‘extremely 
busy’ timetable. Replying to her/his enquiry a letter was attached to an email sent by 
my supeiwisor, addressing the importance of the research topic and acknowledging the 
potential difficulties of the questionnaire. A recommended response foimat was 
provided illustrating an example of possible response. Further to this clarification, 
the questionnaire was by the researcher on the 24 of October 2002.
The third participant, a Vice Principal, who replied to the questionnaire, did 
not express any difficulty with the design of the instrument and provided full and clear 
indications of her/his response.
5.6.3 Management Group Participants’ responses -  explanation by MGs
The responses of the participants of the Management Group to the 
questionnaire indicate an overall high level of trust. Specifically, in both parts of the 
questionnaire, the three participants of the Management Group who replied to the 
questionnaire rated the Resource Units with high scores. This indication can be 
obseiwed in both parts of the questionnaire in respect to the perceived trust of the 
Deans. The outcomes of the questionnaire was presented to the interviewees in a 
graphical format, revealing the level of trust between them and the faculties, which 
were indicated anonymously.
The process of approaching the graph’s discussion had three major steps. 
First, the inteiwiewees were asked to guess the outcome of the questionnaire. The 
reason for this was to justify their sincerity when discussing tmst issues during the 
intei-view. This approach revealed an interesting fluctuation of attitude in their 
speech. More precisely, MGl in expectation of the revealing graphs built a series of 
defensive arguments of whether s/he thinks that s/he deserves the tmst of the Deans.
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s/he explains that s/he believes that the Deans trust her/him because they never 
complained, because s/he tried to assist them in difficult times, s/he also thinks s/he 
treats them fair, and s/he hopes that her/his effort to improve the IDRM model is 
appreciated. On the other hand, MG2 thinks that the Deans see her/him as their 
‘enemy number one ’ because of her/his stewardship role, however s/he thinks that 
they believe that what s/he is saying and doing is ‘actually right’. In addition, MG3, 
estimates that the Deans trust most of the Management Group, most of the times, 
however s/he wonder whether the Management Group tmsts most of the Deans most 
of the time.
The second stage of the graph disclosure included their comments on the 
highest and lowest level of tmst given by the Deans. Characteristically MG2 believes 
that the reasons that the lowest level achieved is possibly because the Head of the 
Resource Unit is ‘more distant', is ‘feeling lonely’ or s/he is not a very senior 
management person. On the other hand, s/he thinks that persons with the highest 
level of trust is getting on well with the Management Group, and there is an openness 
and fairness in sharing information. MG3 believes that the person who trusts the least 
is either a new Dean or a Dean of a deficit faculty. In the case of a new Dean, MG3 
believes that the Dean might have low tmst because s/he needs time to develop a 
working relationship based on trust. Similarly, if the Dean is responsible of a deficit 
faculty then time is also needed to convince the Dean that the intentions of the 
Management Group are to support the Resource Units to become a surplus of break 
even faculty. In contrast, MG3 thinks that the person who expressed the lowest 
indication is a Dean of a surplus faculty, because s/he thinks that the Dean could be 
not happy when the top slice is quite high. S/he also states that s/he has in mind a 
particular' individual ‘who has been very vocal in her/his views’. In addition, s/he 
explains that the faculty might be a deficit one, because s/he can think of a particular 
individual who thinlcs that her/his faculty is in deficit because of the system.
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The next stage focused on the possible explanations of the variation of the 
level of trust expressed by the participants of the Management Group who had a 
variation in their ratings. The discussion was constructed with considerable attention 
and respect to the inteiwiewee’s opinion, so they made the comments for specific 
Head’s of Resource Units deliberately, hi other words, the questions at this stage 
were not addressed to specific faculties, although the comments revealed a degree of 
consistency in the views of the two participants of the Management Group. More 
precisely, they expressed similar concern for a specific Head of Resource Unit (RU2) 
who they both scored lower in the trust scale. MGl said that there were some 
‘difficulties because o f the openness I  sought to give to the Dean, but I  felt there were 
occasions s/he did often, a whole o f a lot o f other things without letting me Imow '. It 
is also very interesting to mention that s/he referred to a specific case when s/he 
explained previously that s/he had been supportive of the faculty during a turbulent 
period. For the same individual, MG3 comments that s/he believes that the Dean 
was feeling ‘isolated and unloved’ although few years ago the Management Group 
worked very hard to persuade her/him that they ‘like them (the faculty) and they are 
very useful wonderful people ’. Similai' pattern is implied to RU5 which although got 
the second lowest rating by both interviewees, the score was commented only by one 
of them. S/he specifically said that there is a belief that the Resource Unit, used to 
not report on large amounts of money received by ‘non academic activities ' and they 
maybe ‘still hiding some money under the mattress, which I  suspect they probably 
are’.
In respect to other Resource Units, both participants gave their explanations 
for the different ratings to cases they choose to comment on. MGl explanations tend 
to have a more open type of reasoning. For instance, s/he says that s/he rated RUl 3 
lower because s/he felt that s/he didn’t ‘get told things ’ s/he was over concerned with, 
although s/he believes that there were things that were overlooked rather hidden
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puiposely. S/he also comments on her/his rating for the surplus RUIO because 'there 
was a sort o f feeling that I  was aware that they thought I  was taking their money 
MG3 comments are based on the role ambiguous role of RU l2 to the services 
provided in The University.
5.6.4 Resource Unit Participants’ response -  explanation by RUs
The responses of the Heads of the Resource Units indicate a degi'ee of 
variation between them. Overall they all accepted the graph revealed to them and 
they added comments and obseiwations for their own response or the responses of the 
rest of the Deans. It is also important to notice that none of the Head’s of the 
Resource Units mentioned a difficulty in responding to the questionnaire related to its 
design and the delay or reluctance to provide with responses is primarily due to their 
busy time-tables. However, some of them mentioned that their response refers to 
particular individuals involved in the resoui'ce allocation process rather that ‘the 
Management Group’ as a whole. It is also important to concentrate on the particular 
individual comments as revealed following.
More precisely, the Head of RUl agreed with the drawn level of trust and s/he 
added that due to her/his experience in the Star Chamber, the level of two columns of 
the graph would be 'more equal now ’ bringing the lower one up, and s/he adds that 7 
think they trust me as much as I  trust them although s/he specifies that ‘there is a 
problem on an individual basis’. S/he also thinks that the Dean who scored the 
lowest level is just a cynical person.
The Head of RU2 on seeing the graphs, commented for her/his own response 
that I ‘got (her/him) on a good day!\ S/he explained that s/he thinks that the 
Management Group had a ‘very impoverished opinion o f the Deans ’ and that they tend 
to find a few chosen individuals. On justifying the possible reasons that some of the 
Deans scored quite high levels of trust, s/he explained that the specific individuals
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may ‘have a more user-friendly financial relationship with the centre or they may be 
‘more aligned with the thinking o f the attitudes o f the people o f the centre' or they 
were ‘less pragmatic in the responses ’ thinking that the results will be shown to the 
Principal.
The Head of RU3 accepted the gi'aphed level of trust of her/his response, and 
that s/he feels ‘comfortable with that \ S/he also claimed that s/he was not surprised 
with the variation of the views because some ‘Deans found it such a negative and 
untrusting experience’ which could explain their attitude, although her/his own 
experience has been good. S/he explains that ‘given (her/his) best understanding o f  
The University’s resource position (her/his faculty) got a reasonable deal’. For the 
lower indication s/he thinks it is a surplus faculty ‘because that Dean would be very 
disillusioned with the way...the faculty worlcs very hard, and every time it generates a 
surplus, this surplus has to be given across The University ’.
The Head of RU4, before being shown the graphs, started explaining that 
her/his trust levels may change every year depending on the Star Chamber’s process 
and outcome and it is possible one year to be ‘quite happy’ and the next year to feel 
‘miserable ', if s/he is ‘unlucky and they haven’t given enough money ’. At this stage 
s/he also stated that s/he trasts the Management Group because s/he believes that they 
are trying to achieve the same objectives, and that they have been open and honest in 
the meetings but that does not mean that they do not disagree. At the moment s/he 
saw the giaphs s/he seemed relieved that her/his response was one of the higher and 
quite surprised with the level of the lowest one. For her/his response s/he said 
although her/his faculty had a lot of financial difficulties s/he thinks that ‘if  you have 
come out from a very hard period in a very positive way...then that is ok’. 
Commenting on the responses of the rest of the Deans s/he stated that their 
consistency for both parts of the questionnaire is predictable because ‘i f  you trust 
somebody then they trust y  ou... there are both sides creating the atmosphere ’.
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The Head of RU5, before the giaphs were revealed, s/he proclaimed that s/he 
had been extremely open and transparent with her/his dealing and therefore the 
Management Group should tmst her/him. S/he also clarified that her/his tmst differs 
on an individual basis and s/he ‘distrusts ’ those who do not understand the ‘conflicting 
interests % S/he also stated that the ‘continued help for this faculty should be depended 
on a trusting relationship between me as an individual and the Principal as an 
individual’. However the success of The University ‘depends on how the system take 
place’ and the system ‘involve a whole lot o f individuals, it involves databases, it 
involves evidence, it involves thinking, it involves interaction between other people 
within that system which can create instability’. On being shown the graph, s/he 
restated her/his view that ‘any management system should ultimately depend on trust 
between individuals ’.
The Head of RU6, before seeing the graphs, also clarified that her/his response 
would differ for each individual in the Star Chambers. S/he made it very clear that if 
s/he was completing a different questionnaire for the Principal and the Finance Office 
that would vary because her/his ‘experience with worldng with the Principal is that 
s/he has been fair in terms o f budget... and investments and whatever ...and (I) have a 
lot o f trust on her/him ...and her/his commitment to do her/his things.,.. (But) don’t 
have the same level o f trust with the Finance Office ’. For the overall variation of the 
Dean’s responses s/he said s/he is ‘not surprised given the make up o f the Star 
Chamber group ’.
Although the Head of RU7 questionnaires’ response showed a very significant 
variation between the first and the second part, s/he accepted the graph stating ‘ok! 
That’s what I  thought!. . . I  think that makes sense to me ’. Her/his explanation of 
having being in the ‘middle’ is that s/he has got on reasonably well with the Principal 
and much less well with the finance officer.
■f
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The Head of RU8 on finding out her/his questionnaire outcome said that ‘it is 
probably right' because her/his experience of the Star Chamber’s has been relatively 
good. S/he thought that the variation of the rest of the responses might depend on 
different experiences and that it should be indifferent to the financial position of the 
faculties and has ‘more to do with attitudes...perhaps the nature o f the personal 
relationship \
2 2 6
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5.7 Management Group participants vs Heads of Resource Units
This section attempts to provide a comparative analysis between the 
participants of the Management Group and the Heads of the Resource Units as a 
group. In order to demonstrate the comparison, the attention of the analysis is based 
on the degree of agreement or disagreement of the participants on the issues that 
influence their trust in the study’s context. Therefore, an indicative position on the 
matrix of agreement and trust gives the potential strength of the comparison. In this 
sense, the participants who agi'ee more on the particular issues of the resource 
allocation process are found closer on the matrix and those who disagree more are 
further from each other on the matrix. The matrix itself is based on the researchers 
interpretation and understanding of the possible position of each participant and her/ 
her/his match with the rest of the group/s, as a result of their own self- explanation, the 
views of the others and the response to the organisational trust inventory. The 
intention behind this subjective justification is demonstrative rather than ‘judgmental’ 
and it is not attempting to test the ‘honesty’ or ‘reliance’ of the individual’s 
statements. For example, if an individual during the interview course expressed a 
very cynical self image (for instance RU ll), but a quite optimistic belief in others, 
then this participant is positioned on the higher trust level of the matrix in comparison 
to others who were trying to give a optimistic self image but their conversation
■?:
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outcome showed anything else except agreement or trust in the relationship (for 
instance RU5).
agreement
more less
less
trust
M61,
AA63,M64
M65
RU8 RU3RUll RU4 
N\,GZ RUl, RU6
RU7 
RU5, RUIO
RU2
Figure 5.6: Tmst and agreement notional position 
matrix
More precisely, the participants of the Management Group, in general, have 
shown a relatively high level of tmst in the Heads of the Resource Units and they 
seem to think that the Heads of the Resource Units tmst them too. The reasons for 
this high level of tmst might be found in various explanations such as superiority in 
the relationship, or belief of sufficient communication and understanding in the 
relationship or acknowledgement and respect of the legitimate needs and aspirations 
of each side. In respect to individual expressions, MGl seem to feel very confident 
that the Deans tmst her/him and her/his decisions and that s/he manage to demonstrate 
a degi'ee of approachability and openness that results in a relatively close position to 
the Heads of the Resource Units. In addition, the relatively broad appreciation of 
her/his efforts, personality, and vision expressed by the majority of the Deans in
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combination to the very higher outcome to the OTI formulated her/his position on the 
matrix.
MG2 was positioned at a relatively high level of tmst because s/he insisted 
continuously that s/he tmsts the Heads of the Resource Units and s/he believes that 
they trust her/him in return. However, her/his tendency to contradict her/his 
statements and the relatively distant ‘corporate police ’ role s/he chose as her/his self- 
confessed image, resulted in a lower position on the trust axis than MGl. 
Furthermore, the opinions expressed by some of the Heads of the Resource Units 
about the particular individual’s personality and input in the resource allocation 
process were also considered. Her/his response to the questionnaire is also indicative 
of a possible inability to fit in to the very high level of tmst in the matrix.
MG3 and MG4 are very close to each other in their views and it seems that 
the Heads of the Resource Units consider them quite optimistic as individuals and 
their efforts in the resource allocation process, although their role is not broadly 
appreciated by the Deans who they see them as very supportive individuals but with 
potentially problematic role in the relationship. The questionnaire response provided 
by MG3 indicates this optimism and apparently shows a compatibility with the views 
of M G l. Although MG5 is a participant from the central administration, seems to 
have a quite critical view about the role of the Management Group participants in the 
resource allocation process and s/he appears very sympathetic to the Heads of the 
Resoince Units. However, her/his involvement in the resource allocation process was 
not directly related to either parts, and as the Head of RUl explains her/his unit is 
‘semi independent’ and therefore her/his view can be interpreted as a ‘third party 
observer ’ in the relationship.
The Heads of the Resource Units have also demonstrated a wide diversity of 
views. Starting from the individual holding the lowest position on the trust axis, the 
Head of RU2, a cautious interpretation is necessary. More precisely, the rational of
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placing her/him on the lower trust and agreement levels is based on the comparative 
basis with the other Heads of the Resource Units, therefore this position means that 
s/he expressed the most pessimistic view and it does not mean that s/he is the most 
unhappy participant. This point is very important considering that none of the Heads 
of the Resource Units ‘see her/his face’ on the lowest trust column when they were 
asked to comment on the OTI graph. However, both of the Management Group 
participants (MGl and MG3) who provided a thorough response to the questionnaire 
mentioned her/his case as one of concern.
Other Heads of Resource Units who are positioned relatively low on the axis 
are RU5 and RUIO. In particular, the case of RU5 is a very interesting one. 
Although her/his questionnaire responses indicated a relatively high level of trust and 
during the interview, s/he tried to provide a nice image, there are several indications 
that support the opposite. First, the participants of the Management Group both in 
their interviews and in their questionnaire response expressed a degree of concern 
over their relationship with her/him. Second, several other Deans mention her/his 
case in their inteiwlews and they appear divided on comments for her/his faculty 
difficulties, her/his personality and competence, and the support they claim her/his 
faculty finds at the resource allocation outcome. A possible explanation of the 
change of her/his view might be a particular situation s/he faced during the process of 
the particular planning year. In particular, her/his questionnaire responses were 
received after the first Star Chamber meeting and before the second one and very 
close to the day the Grant Letter was announced (the letter announced 21st of March 
and her/his response received 4th of April). Although her/his faculty agendas, and 
minutes of the faculty meetings had restricted access (see appendix 10), other Deans at 
the same time expressed a vague but optimistic view of the amounts of the allocation 
due to the overall high perfoimance of The University at the recent Research 
Assessment Exercise. However, in the interview with RU5, s/he revealed s/he was
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negotiating with the faculty’s institutional an'angements for ‘inappropriate cross 
charging’ but ‘you get to a point in the negotiations where the centre o f The 
University has to be involved and then there is a sort o f backing off’., and then on 
trying to find possible reasons s/he says ‘incompetence? No, no, no. Has to do with 
management culture really’. S/he also claims that the task force is an ‘internal 
pressure group... o f the most unsupportive nature which may also be considered a 
comment for the particulai' years’ resource allocation process. One of the very 
indicative descriptions of the particulai* event is the one of MG5 who said “the worse 
occasion was last year (the participant interviewed later in time) when the (Dean 
RU5) went ‘fine! This is not enough; i f  you want me to sack twenty (...) academics I  
will do it! But you have to take the consequences that we are issuing a public outcry 
because I  can not take the responsibility for this’...s/he knew perfectly well that this 
was not going to work. So at that point the Principal backed down and the faculty 
(...) magically got the money to continue to employ ’. Considering all these points the 
position of RU5 on the matrix in one of low trust and low agreement, which is 
believed that to be changed from a higher position at the beginning of the process. 
RUIO is also positioned at quite a similar level due to her/his ‘vocaT (MG3) views in 
the process. The participants of the Management Group mentioned her/his case. It is 
interesting that several participants thought that this Head of the Resource Unit could 
be the one rating the lowest level of trust in the questionnaire gi*aph.
The Heads of RUl, RU6 and RU7 are positioned at medium level of trust and 
agreement due to their cautiousness in their views. The tlu*ee of them seem 
knowledgeable and supportive to the changes for improvement made in the process, 
willing to contribute constructively. However, they appear to have a degree of 
reservation on whether they should support the decisions Members of the 
Management Group, because they do not ‘Imow what the big picture was’ (RUl), or 
do not agi'ee with the centralised authority pattern of The University (RU7), or simply
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think that the centre do not tmst them much (RU6). Their OTI results also support 
this position.
RU4 and RUl 1 position is on a quite high and with similar level of tmst but it 
seems that they have differences in their views. In particular the Head of RU4 
expresses her/his tmst to the individuals of the Management Group, but is less 
prepared to agi'ee with them on several issues. Her/his tmst seems to be conditional to 
her/his faculty support by the centre based on the belief that they have the same 
objectives. MG3 explains extensively that one of the strategies of The University 
was to support the Resource Unit 4 because it had been faced with difficulties outside 
of their control. The outcome of the OTI of the Head of RU4 is quite high too. The 
Head of R U ll tends to be more optimistic in accepting the arguments given by the 
centre and s/he argues that her/his trust is not blind. The Heads of RU3 and RU8 are 
on a higher tmst position on the axis. They both demonstrated a high degree of 
‘management’ or ‘financial’ knowledge and they tend to provide a very supportive 
and understanding attitude to the difficulties that the centres of The University have to 
face. Their OTI response also gave a higher indication of tmst.
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5.8 Summary
The following discussion di’aws on the main themes that emerged from the
interviews with the participants, as an attempt to focus and synopsize the arguments
supporting the multifaceted role of trust in the resource allocation thesis.
The table 5.3 below includes the views given by the participants from the
Management Group and the Heads of the Resource Units on what trust is, where it can
be found, how it grows and how it declines.
Table 5.3: Trust
Participants from the Management Group
Trust:
Exists between individuals, Is a human thing,
W hen one feels that s/he has been listened to,
gets with an instant impression
Exists when the other
is a reasonable person, does not take
advantage, gives a fair representation o f
requirements
Builds with:
A function o f personalities, Accuracy o f 
information. Senior position in the interaction 
Time, Openness, dialogue, communication, 
good reason, Knowing the other. Working 
together, Ability to feel a part o f the gi'OUp, 
Willingness to compromise 
Declines with
M isunderstanding, Tendency to keep 
infonnation, Presumption o f outcome and 
situation, suspicion, surprise, mistakes and 
inaccurate infoim ation 
hi University now
Always high, efforts are appreciated, better 
than before
Heads o f  the Resource Units
Trust
Exists between individuals, is not generic. Is 
a value judgm ent o f  personal integrity, 
intuition for others’ values 
Exists when the other
Is fair, honest, keeps and value agreements 
made, do what they say, fair with others 
Builds with
Good lines o f communication. Previous 
experience, working together, stage o f the 
process 
Declines with
Suspicion, when one is talking about others. 
In University now
Is broken a bit maybe because o f financial 
pressure, M anagement Group may trust the 
Deans more cause they choose individuals, 
not good with finance office, no good 
management information system, common 
vision, personalities, better than before
232
Chapter 5: Analysis and Discussion
It should be said that the participants from both groups when explaining the 
notion of trust in general, all gave different but personal views on what they think trust 
is, and these views are considered individually. In general, both groups gave very 
similar contexts of where trust can exist and develop. However, in regard to their 
perceived level of tmst in their current interaction, there are differences in views, 
which will be analysed later, but here tend to demonstrate that the participants of the 
Management Group think that there is more trust in their relationship with the Deans, 
and the Deans seem to think that there is an issue of tmst in the relationship. To 
avoid misunderstanding, this explanation will be developed further in the subsequent 
parts of the section.
Table 5.4: Accountability and trust 
‘let the other know’
Participants from  the Management Group
‘Openness’ and ‘dialogue’
But
Reservation on giving information before 
the decision is taken
Little explanation about the reasoning of 
the model’s ‘adjustments’
Heads o f  the Resource Units
Savings or expenditure of budget is
acknowledged or reported ‘back to the
centre’
1. Very open, detailed accounts at the 
end (RU3, RU4, RU7, RU8, RUl 1,)
2. Willingness to provide this information 
but cautiousness to do so (RUl, RU5, 
RU6)
Need to know about the reasons of ‘cross 
subsidisation’ of other units.
The above table 5.4, shows the opinion of the two groups about the intentional 
efforts to ‘let the others know’ as a form of ‘trust them to know’ about issues of 
importance in the resource allocation process. Both groups argue that they are 
willing and they make efforts to some extent (more or less), to maintain accountability
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of issues that concern both groups. Firstly, the participants from the Management 
Group argue that there is sufficient ‘opemiess’ and ‘dialogue’ in the process, and if 
there is some inefficiency that is due to teclinical (for instance the IDRM complexity) 
rather that intentional intricacy. However, with closer consideration of this claim, it 
is possible to gather a level of inconsistency and reservation in the group that might be 
either an effect of the centralised authority pattern (they do not let the Deans know 
because they never considered them part of the Management Group, they are the next 
lower level of authority- never given decision making power), or insufficient 
communication modes (listening but not doing it), or simply a presumed stance of 
moral rights and obligations (because Deans are not considered part of the 
Management Group, therefore they do not have the right to express disagreement but 
they have the obligation to be loyal to the decisions of the Management Group) that 
they reciprocally expect in the particular context. On the other hand, the Head’s of 
the Resource Units opinions vary to the extent that they trust the Management Group 
to know about the way they use their budgets, or the amount of savings they manage 
to generate. These differences can be explained considering the possible effect of the 
centralised authority pattern of The University (which does not involve the Deans in 
the Management Group), the different ‘messages’ that the Deans acquire from the 
distant relationship with the Management Group in respect to the resource allocation, 
and the perceived reciprocity to their legitimate anticipations.
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Table 5.5: Resource allocation process
Participants from the Management Group
Star Chambers 
Inclusive pattern, Flexible, 
Communication of hopes and aspirations 
But disagreement on:
Fonnality
Individual or territorial group Star 
Chambers
Resource Strategv Committee
The outcomes of the Star Chambers are
shared
Task force: inforinaF relaxed 
Individual contact -  as a indication of 
approachability, inclusiveness, and 
openness
Heads o f the Resource Units 
Star Chambers
Uncertainty about purpose, atmosphere, 
conduct
1. No papers
But optimistic attitude -  confident to set 
their own agenda (RUl, RU3, RU6, RU7, 
RU8,RU11)
No papers and pessimistic attitude (RU2, 
RU4, RU5, RUIO)
2. not sure if  operational or strategic 
but optimistic(RUl, RU3, RU6, RU8) 
pessimistic (RU2, RU4, RU5, RU7, RUIO)
3. Atmosphere of the meeting 
Good (RU3, RU4, RU6, RU7, RU8, RUll)
Bad (RU2, RU4, RU5, RUIO)
Resource strategv committee 
Increases collegiality between the Deans 
But no communication with the centre 
No influence on centre’s decisions 
Task force: mini Star Chambers, but also 
‘internal pressure gi'oup’
hidividual contact: real negotiations, way 
to achieve a favourable outcome
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In respect of the resource allocation procedure employed in The University, 
the participants choose to raise a variety of issues perceived to be influential to the 
trust between them. These issues were further explored in the semi-structured 
inteiwiews. It is argued that it is possible for trust to evolve as the process evolves in 
different stages. In general, the main resource allocation meetings, the ‘Star 
Chambers’, are perceived in very different ways by the participants. The participants 
of the Management Group tend to argue that they are the only possible way the 
negotiations can take place and the style and frequency of the meetings is 
appropriately flexible and feasible. Although they agree that the Star Chambers can 
be a very different experiences for each faculty, they argue that this is due to the 
individual attention paid to particular needs and settings. However, they tend to 
argue that focus is to retain trust and also to find the most reasonable solution to the 
financial situation of The University as a whole. However, the highly centralised 
hierarchical pattern of the decision authority, the limited participation of the Heads of 
the Resource Units to the Management Group (no academic Heads of Resource Units 
are members except the case of the Executive Dean of Medicine), result to the 
questioning of trust. This attitude is expressed as a cautious belief in what the senior 
management believes is the ‘big pictm-e’ or the award of ‘notional deficits’ as an 
attempt of the central management to control the Units.
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Table 5.6: Power and trust
Participants from the Management Group
Hierarchical structure
Senior management -  responsibility of 
trust
Very hierarchical systems with trust - 
openness
Decision authority
Centralised but Devolved responsibility 
system
Inclusive pattern
Very approachable centre
Many different meetings for resource 
allocation
Political
Big picture -  managerial skill
Changing the way Deans are elected
Need of academic Deans to see the ‘big 
picture’
Financial
Limited resources for University
University in deficit
Financial pressme -  tmst is important
Heads o f  the Resource Units 
Hierarchical stmcture 
Unequal distribution of power 
Different views on trust and Hierarchy 
Decision authority
No participation in resource allocation 
decision making
Very centralised authority
Tmst could be built with more 
participation
No Deans in Management Group 
Political
‘Big picture’ -  affects tmst
1. belief in common vision -  fit into the 
whole context (RU4, RU8, RUl 1)
2. not sure if there is a ‘big picture’ but 
accepting to fit (RU2, RU3, RU6, RU7)
3. no big picture -  no fit (RU2)
Financial
Financial pressure -  trust is important
Financial position not necessarily affect 
on trust
‘notional deficits’
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One of the main arguments of the participants of the Management Group is 
that the Star Chambers should be individually, faculty based, in order to have 
sufficient flexibility, closer consideration of each faculty’s needs and to maintain 
levels of dialogue and communication. They tend to quote the improvements made 
on the infoimation system of The University and the IDRM model itself, in order to 
provide a less complex and highly transparent system. On the other side, the 
‘individual attention’ claimed by the paiticipants of the Management Group tend to 
have different meanings to the Heads of the Resource Units. This refer to not very 
well developed communication pattern which tends to be not transparent, very 
complex, and quite formal and distant with very centralised character (table 
communication). In respect of the resource allocation, one of the main issues of 
concern among the Heads of the Resource Units is the accuracy and availability of 
important information for both sides. It is argued that the management infoimation 
system that provides data to the already complex IDRM has been found inaccurate 
and inappropriate in several occasions (for instance, the student and staff numbers 
statistics). Therefore the Heads of the Resource Units face potential difficulties in 
acquiring with confidence the required information. Their views vary to the point 
that the system’s inefficiency influences their trust to the Management Group. Some 
argue that the system should be separated from the individuals involved and others 
that the system is reflecting the individual’s intentions to keep and hide infoimation in 
order to maintain control of the process.
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Table 5.7: Trust and communication
Participants from  the Management Group Heads o f  the Resource Units
-  Dialogue, opemiess, transparency, -  Uncertainty if info is accurate or
focus on quality of information in not
the process -  No open communication of views
-  IDRM -  user friendly, -  No available info to all important
improvements meetings
-  Deans prefer their own sources
than the info gathered from centre
-  ‘Mini University’
The other dimension that should be considered in the analysis, is the role of 
trust as a value that ensures reciprocity, acceptance and cultivation of moral 
anticipations in the resource allocation process. Both sides argue that they should be 
tmsted to deliver, maintain, and care for the units they are responsible for. In that 
respect, the Management Group participants are viewed responsible for The 
University as a whole and the Heads of the Resource Units responsible for the 
Resource Units in the context of the whole University.
Trust and legitimate anticipations/ obligations
Participants from the Management Group Heads o f  the Resource Units
-  Moral responsibility to maintain, -  Moral support and reciprocity to
care and grow The University anticipations on the basis of trust
-  Expect appreciation, support. -  Opeimess, care, fairness, loyalty
understanding -  Right to roll the budgets; spend a 
reasonable share of income; be
-  Promote a Reasonable, sensible, rewarded for efforts; be trained
good reason profile -  Should know all the relevant 
aspects in the process
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Chapter 6: Conclusions
6.1 Introduction
This dissertation reported a research undertaken to investigate the role of trust 
in the resource allocation process of an old Scottish university. The focus of the 
investigation was developing an in-depth understanding of the trust relationship 
between the members of the resource allocation process of The University. In 
particular, the study was concerned with the conditions of the social interaction, and 
the relation of the participants’ trust with a variety of aspects of the process. The 
broader context of the study incorporated insights from British higher education 
refomi and the challenges facing the universities to reinvent their processes and 
managerial aiTangements. The initial thought of the study was that organisational 
processes, such as the resource allocation process, should be understood as embedded 
in the organisational context where they occur. In that case, trust between the actors 
interacting in these processes would be an important aspect; it could facilitate a better 
operation of the resource allocation process specifically and, in general, the 
University’s governance in general
The study gathered evidence with the use of an organisational trust inventory 
together with a semi-structured interview with the senior members of the resource 
allocation Committee, the Star Chambers. The present chapter provides concluding 
remarks for the study’s inquiry (section 6.2). Also, the subsequent sections attempt to 
address the study’s observations toward the themes considered in the literature review 
(Chapter 3), such as importance of accounting processes and trust in organisational 
governance (section 6.3.1); the impact of public sector reform in British higher 
education (section 6.3.2); the social embeddedness of trust and accounting (section 
6.3.3); the sources of trust in a relationship (section 6.3.4); the objects of tmst (section 
6.3.5); and a final discussion on accounting change (section 6.3.6). At the end of each
240
Chapter 6: Conclusions
section, a number of suggestions for further research are proposed. The final section 
(section 6,4) discusses with the empirical and theoretical limitations of the study.
6.2 The role of trust in the resource allocation process
6.2.1 The thesis
The need to study accounting practices in their organisational context has 
been addressed in the literature chapter (Chapter 3) as a prerequisite to understand the 
holistic coordination and interdependence of accounting with other organisational 
functions. The fundamental assumption is that organisations are complex and 
dynamic entities, and it is difficult and unrealistic to study an aspect of the 
organisational activities, such as accounting, as being an abstract function with clearly 
defined boundaries with other related functions, such as management. Therefore, the 
exploration of the systems operating in an organisation should not focus only on a 
particular accoimting practice, but on a wider understanding of how such practices are 
performed within the organisation (see section 3.2).
However, numerous and diverse theories for organisations have been 
developed, while a variety of different frameworks for organisational context 
conceptualisation have been proposed. The relevant section of Chapter 4 (section 
4.2.1), referred to the variety of existing organisational theories, concentrating on a 
socio-political perspective of the organisation. In this case, attention is placed on the 
importance of human perceptions and social dynamics in shaping organisational 
practices, including accounting. The fundamental reason why different organisational 
theories have been proposed is that these theories are derived from different 
assumptions about human nature, knowledge, truth, reality and methodology. In 
Chapter 4 (section 4.2) an indicative review of this wide spectrum of theoretical 
assumptions, along with their various perspectives of organisational theory are 
associated with the related assumptions of epistemology, ontology, human nature and
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methodology. The referred frameworks of assumptions cover the fundamental 
philosophical perspectives within social sciences.
A particular reference to the sociological theory of Structuration (Giddens, 
1984) has been demonstrated (section 4.4). The usefulness of Structuration Theory in 
the present study lies in the suggestion that understanding social phenomena, such as 
accounting and trust, should be accomplished by exploring their role as being both 
media and outcome of social stnictmes of signification, domination and legitimation, 
which are produced and reproduced during social interaction. This interaction is 
viewed as a deliberate attempt of knowledgeable actors to communicate, exercise 
power, and sanction within the particular context. The continuous interplay of social 
interaction and social structures, during a given time period and a defined space 
construct social systems. In that respect, The University’s resource allocation process 
is viewed as an interaction between the study’s participants that produces (and at the 
same time is produced by) stmctures of communication, domination and legitimation 
attempting to construct a system of governance (i.e. management of organisational 
possibilities), hi particular, following the suggestion of Roberts and Scapens (1985), 
the present study is based on the assumption that accounting systems (rules and 
procedures) have been in place to account for an organisational reality of the 
participants of the study. Trust in this perspective should enhance the social order 
within the interaction (Sydow, 1998) and facilitate the production and reproduction of 
governance.
The main observation evident fr om the study is twofold. First, the participants 
who indicated more trust towards others were found to be willing to be more 
accountable, even when elements of the process were not favourable. Their attitude of 
trust also facilitated a much more tolerant perspective, while adopting a cooperative 
stance in order to overcome the difficulties faced in the procedure of the resource 
allocation. Second, the participants who expressed less trust tended to be willing to
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make less effort to be accountable and they also tended to perceive the complexities 
and difficulties of the system or the resistance to cooperate during the process as 
deliberate efforts of the ‘other side’ to manipulate the process.
This obsei-vation suggests that the relation of trust and accounting practices 
should be understood in a dialectic order, rather than a ‘cause and effect’ relationship 
as has been suggested in the literature (section 3.3.3.1 and 3.3.3.2). However, this 
general observation combines a vai'iety of distinctive issues, which although related to 
trust as a broader attitude, are essential to investigate and be interpreted individually.
-Such issues are named as the effect of authority and organisational stmcture of The
University to the participants tmst attitude, the communication patterns between the 
participants and other issues which are expansively discussed in Chapter 5, and are 
summarised in the following section (6.2.2) as an attempt to answer the question 
‘what is the role of tmst in the management of The University’s resource allocation 
process?’.
6.2.2 The evidence
The resource allocation process of The University included a process of 
committee meetings, between the Principal with the Director of Finance, the Heads of 
the Resource Units of The University, and the Income Driven Resource Allocation 
Model. In addition to the official meetings, the Star Chambers, references to other 
types of meetings (such as the Resource Strategy Committee, task force groups and 
individual contacts) that are related to the resource allocation decision and provide a 
more complete picture of the social interaction between the participants were also 
considered in the study (section 5.3.4 and 5.5.4).
The participants from the management group tend to refer to the resource 
allocation process as open, inclusive and appropriate (section 5.3.4). Although they 
tend to give an optimistic account of the purpose of the meetings, they also present
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contradicting views with regard to the formality and conduct of the meetings. 
Similarly, when referring to the IDRM they tend to emphasise its improvements and 
they hope that the model’s users would appreciate the effort to change the model into 
a more ‘user friendly’ one. In general, they tend to support the view that trust between 
them and the Heads of the Resource Units should be not affected by the official 
meetings or the model, but from their intention to communicate the accumulated 
messages of the process (section 5.3.6.6). They also tend to express the view that
■;
although The University’s authority structure is quite hierarchical and centralised 
there is a potential for trust, once the University’s processes are inclusive and open 
(section 5.3.6.2 and 5.3.6.3). Also, they tend to anticipate an understanding, 
appreciation and acceptance of the ‘big picture’ of The University’s circumstances, 
which should be expressed with trust (section 5.3.6.4 and 5.3.6.7).
The Heads of the Resource Units demonstrate a degree of reservation on 
whether the current Resource Allocation process is conducted appropriately 
considering The University’s circiunstances (see section 5.5.4 and 5.5.5). However, 
it is evident that those who expressed more trust within the process tend to be willing 
to be more accoimtable (i.e. to let the ‘others’ know), than those who expressed less 
trust (section 5.5.3). In that respect, the Deans who expressed more trust tend to be 
willing to commimicate their faculty’s views more openly and appeared to be willing 
to share their views during the resource allocation process (section 5.5.6.6). Also, 
they seemed to view their opinions as influencing the decision process in a more 
collegial (equal and participative) approach (section 5.5.6.2 and 5.5.5.3). In addition, 
they appear to be willing to reciprocate to the Management Group legitimate 
anticipations, and they tend to express the view that their own legitimate anticipations 
have been respected as important from the others (5.5.6.7).
In between the two groups, trust appears to be associated with the belief that 
patterns of authority influence, communication and reciprocity to legitimate
Ï
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anticipations would value accordingly the participants effort to let the ‘others’ know 
about important aspects of the process. However, it is also observable that the good 
operation of patterns of authority, communication and sanction should be facilitated 
with trust in the first place in order to enable the participants’ to ‘let the others know’.
In addition, a selection of other issues has been found to be related to the level 
of tmst between the participants, such as personality, gender, and professional training 
(section 5.5.6.8). However, it had been difficult to relate the interpersonal tmst level 
with the financial position of the Resource Units or the financial situation of The 
University as a whole (5.3.6.5 and 5.5,6.5). It is interesting to observe that for the 
participants of the study the issues related to trust and accounting are social or 
political rather than strictly economic. It can be also observed that the participants 
associated the purpose and importance of the resouice allocation meetings with the 
overall University management culture, which supports the literature’s view that 
accounting processes and tmst relationships, should be examined considering the 
context in which they occur.
In many respects, it can be concluded that there are indications that the 
resource allocation process would be managed better with more tmst between the two 
groups.
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6.3 Contribution to the literature
6.3.1 Accounting and trust for organisational governance
The present study argues that trust between the resource allocation process 
members, has an important role since it facilitates better managment of the process 
and supports structiues of accountability between the participants. It is also argued 
that tmst contributes to the democratic governance of the organisation. The 
enliancement of accountability along with the participative -  inclusive pattern of the 
procedures, can be entranced when the participants trust each other. The main 
assumption of this supposition is that tmst and accounting depend on a specific 
context of interaction. Important elements of this line of argument, such as the 
operation of internal organisational process of accounting (management accounting), 
governance (as a management of a range of organisational possibilities), and social 
interaction have been developed in the existing academic literature.
More precisely, in section 3.2.2 of the literature review chapter it has been 
demonstrated that management accounting, and in particular budgets, should be 
carefully examined in their role of the broader governance of the organisation. The 
literature suggests that the organisation’s internal accounting practices should be 
considered under the combination of strategic, operational, financial and behavioural 
issues (Anthony, 1965; Otley, 1994); with a considerable attention on the socio­
political effect of accounting which requires an understanding of the norms, values, 
role expectations and power inequalities within the organisation (Schiff and Lewin, 
1970; Merchant, 1981); combining qualitative and quantitative information for 
performance evaluation and control (Lowe, 1970; Emmanuel et al, 1990); 
considering the boarder organisational context in order to eliminate the effects of the 
‘only financial’ information such as ‘inflexibility’, ‘short-termism’, ‘abstraction’ 
(Hopwood 1983; Merchant, 1985). The present study argues that, along with the 
mentioned considerations, particular attention to the role of interpersonal tmst
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between the actors who are involved in internal accounting practices (such as the 
resource allocation process), should enhance the perceived role of accounting as an 
element of the overall governance of the organisation.
It has been also demonstrated in the literature review (section 3.3.2) that trust 
is necessary for democratic forms of governance (in which the economic and social 
well being of the governed population is vital). Given the assumption that human 
behaviour is not based on a strictly economic rational (section 3.3), and also that 
humans decide not only by calculation, but under the influence of the ‘world’ or 
‘context’ in which their references are embedded, the ‘prepoliticaly constituted self 
theorem is not accepted and an approach more in favour of the ‘deliberative’ form of 
democratic governance is considered (section 3.3.2). In that approach, discursive 
accountability is shaped both by the individual’s identities (personality as a part of 
identity), needs and interests and the political interaction with others. This type of 
accountability is motivated by an increased willingness to participate in, and control 
over, the collective decision process, generating an inclusive decision making process 
(see Warren, 1992; 1996; 1999). Bringing this view to the language of Roberts and 
Scapens (1993), the discursive democratic organisational governance pattern can be 
viewed as a combination of an inclusive process (accounting system: rules and 
procedures), and a deliberative pattern of stmctui'es of power, communication and 
legitimation.
In alignment with the above mentioned thoughts, and as it is demonstrated in 
the sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.2, trust is also considered to be a very important value in 
organisational governance. It has been argued that trust’s extrinsic and intrinsic 
value facilitates participative forms of governance (Speitzer and Mishra, 1999); 
smoothes the power inequalities in the organisational interactions (Meyerson et al, 
1996); enliances information sharing and the development of ‘common’ interests and 
understanding (Hardy et al 1996; Butler, 1999); by creating a sense of fairness and
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collaboration during financial crisis (Mislri'a, 1996), reflecting to the anticipation of 
support by others (Minkes, 1997; Albercht and Travaglione, 2003), and enliancing 
self-direct and flexible teams (Creed and Miles, 1996). Therefore it could be expected 
that interpersonal trust should provide for more democratic and flexible systems of 
decision making in the organisation. Therefore, it is argued that a deliberative 
accountability pattern should be enhanced with trust.
Reflecting on the above mentioned arguments described in the literature, it has 
been evident in the study that although all the participants admit that both the resource 
allocation process and the Income Driven Resource Model bare complexities and 
inefficiencies, they adopted a different attitude towards the ‘others’ and their 
association with the accounting system on the basis of trust. This observed tmst 
attitude is found to be stronger in some of the participants and less strong to others. It 
is believed to be a factor of individual engagement in democratic and inclusive 
decision process with a particular element of willingness to be accountable to others 
for the overall well being of The University resource circumstances. In particular, as 
explained in the section 5.3.6, the participants of the Management Group tend to 
believe that tmst in the University should not be affected by the fact that the processes 
and the systems are complex and in some degree inefficient. They think that trust 
should be sustained by the ‘approachable’ management style and the ‘dialogue’ 
culture of their administration. Similar views have been expressed by the Heads of 
the Resource Units who indicated positive tmst levels. They tended to express a 
willingness to not emphasise the systems’ problems but rather to develop 
interpersonal contacts which enable the decision process (section 5.5.4.1). Therefore, 
their expressed views are related to the level of interpersonal tmst in the process.
However, the present study was not indented to contribute to the literature 
debate of whether tmst and accounting operate as substitutes or complements to each 
other, although the relevant literature attempted to this clarify them (section 3.3.3).
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The fundamental distinction between the two relationships (either as substitutes or
complements) is based on varying assumptions of human nature and the perceived 
role of accounting as a determinant of human behaviour. This issue could be better 
addressed with different type of evidence that is based on a possible experimentation 
between the varying types of expected human behaviour (exposing the participants to 
various dilemmas of choice and behaviour).
6.3.2 Higher education institutions reform
In respect to the literature review of Chapter 2, the British higher education
reform should be considered as being a dynamic and diverse process, especially
concerning the particularity of the British universities’ responses. It has been
demonstrated at section 2.4 that the two major classifications of the British
universities as ‘old’ (pre 1992) and ‘new’ (post 1992) can be founded on deep and
.very complex characteristics ranging from the governing structure of the institutions 
up to the belief of what constitutes ‘higher education’ learning -  with distinctive 
approaches on research and teaching (Ackroyd and Ackroyd, 1999). Although the 
present study was not seeking to justify the rightness of the differentiation between the 
old and new universities, the references gathered by previous reports found to be 
useful.
Old, research lead, civic University is associated with difficult internal change 
(Salter and Tapper, 2002); highly centralised administration (Hackman, 1985); 
collegial structure (Ackroyd and Ackroyd, 1999); enhanced role of Vice Chancellor as 
an academic leader and chief executive together with limited participation of staff and 
students (Knight, 2002); and attachment to civic role (Patterson, 2003). These 
characteristics are combined with the general issues facing the Higher Education 
academic culture, such as difficulty to measure research and teaching performance 
(Ranter and Summers, 1987); resistance to the management academic construction
■■I
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(Parker, 2000); critical approach to the appropriateness of the Research and Teaching 
assessment schemes (Humplirey et al, 1995); and response to the pressure of ‘new 
managerialism’ (Deem, 2004). hi addition, university’s resource allocation models 
need more careful consideration of the internal behaviour patterns that might affect the 
implementation of such processes (Thomas, 2000). When the resource allocation is 
based on a computerised model, it tends to be perceived more transparent and fair 
(Angluin and Scapens, 2000). In any case it has been argued that the models are 
historically and culturally situated in the context of each particular institution 
(Jarzabkowski, 2002).
Further, Tomkins (2001) argues that trust is necessary at the early stages of the 
development of accounting systems. We should therefore suggest that considering the 
introduction and newness of the ‘accounting systems’ to Higher Education, trust is 
important. Similarly, adopting the Jones and Dugdale (2001) language, managing with 
the use of accounting procedures is not yet an established regime in higher education 
and learning is considered necessary. This learning should be facilitated with trust, 
which should support the way to democratic and fair accounting processes.
In the present study the above-mentioned considerations gathered in the 
literature have been reflected on the perceptions of the participants, and in particular 
to the trust attitude between them. At this point it is necessary to clarify that the 
homogeneity of the study’s participants gioups (all senior administrators with 
distinctive academic achievements and qualifications -  [see appendix 14] ) have been 
considered in respect to their references on ‘academic’ excellence instead of ‘just’ 
financial benefits from the resource allocation procedures. It is also believed that the 
‘old research led’ University character influenced the participants’ views in respect to 
their references to the role of higher education professional manager as oppose to the 
traditional academic senior administrator (see section 5.5.6.8).
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The present study was not intended to compare the trust differences between 
academics and professional managers. However, this will be interesting to address in 
future studies. More specifically it would be feasible to undertake a comparative 
study of the trust between senior administrators in pre and post 1992 universities.
6.3.3 The social embeddedness of accounting and trust
The present study adopted the view that the behaviour of individuals, gi'oups 
and organisations is based on factors other than strictly economic rationality (similar 
views found for instance in Cyert and March, 1963; Weick, 2000). The existence of 
social and political binding between the participants of the study is considered 
important to understand the role of trust and accounting between them. Influenced by 
the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens (1984), the interaction between humans 
is perceived as being situated (embedded) in the context where the particular 
interaction occurs. Within this interactional context ‘structural properties’ produced 
and continuously reproduced creating ‘societal totalities’ that is a macro level can be 
refeixed as ‘institutions’ (Giddens, 1984). To the extent that the everyday conduct of 
the individuals is producing (and reproducing) their boundaries of reference and 
reasoning, the rationalisation of their actions can be found in the particular context 
rather in a ‘universal’ or ‘external’ source of reason and tmth. Therefore, their 
behaviour should be explained while considering the context of their interaction. The 
adoption of this stance affects the understanding of the participants perceptions about 
the practice of accounting as a process and an outcome of the interaction (see also 
Hopwood 1978), and the feeling of trust as a medium and outcome the same 
interaction (see Nooteboom, 2002). The structural properties produced and 
reproduced in the interactional context of the participants can be demonstrated as 
interplay between authority, meaning and moral references.
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The question that is not intended to be answered by the present study but it 
would be interesting to address in an another enquiry is: to what extent the accounting 
praxis and trust is based on economic or social reasoning. Therefore, a further 
theoretical and empirical investigation may give an interesting insight to the 
understanding of both accounting and trust.
6.3.4 Trust: Extrinsic or intrinsic value?
In the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, it was demonstrated that trust could be 
conceived as encompassing an extrinsic (instrumental) value as well as an intrinsic 
one. The extrinsic value of trust implies some sort of a rational calculation of the 
prospective outcome of a trusting relationship between two parties, which very often 
is associated with the feeling of confidence to a person or system. On the other hand, 
the intrinsic value of trust implies a social binding or the belief that an unspoken 
communal or moral law underlies the attitude of trust.
In the present study, the distinction between the instmmental and intrinsic 
value of trust was found to be difficult because the participant’s perceptions were 
‘embedded’ (i.e. situated) in the particular context (also the questions asked to the 
participants were not intended to resolve this enquiry). However, although the 
functional conditions of the relationship between the participants can explain the 
development of trust and of accounting, the intrinsic value of trust and accounting can 
also be a challenging perspective for the study. Especially, when some of the 
participants argued that trust ‘is a human thing’ meaning that its existence is related to 
individual ‘intuition’ rather than of how best the conditions of the relationship work 
(on this issue the stronger views were the ones of MG2, MG4, RU6, RU ll). 
However, this observation is believed not to be strong enough evidence to conclude 
that intrinsic or extrinsic trust is more weightened in this particular case.
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In any case, it would be interesting to address with more consideration the 
question ‘what is trust’ and whether is could be distinguished as baring an extrinsic or 
an intrinsic value in another study.
6.3.5 Objects of trust
The argument of the section 3.3.1.4 was based on the literature discussing the 
issue of distinction between objects of trust (people, or systems). In that perspective, 
trust develops in an interaction between individuals who are also affected by the 
context of this interaction. Nooteboom (2002) and Sydow (1998) acknowledged the 
possibility of trust to be directed to ‘an abstract construct’ which can be either an 
individual engaged to a role or a social system and that it is also a construct of 
abstraction developed tlirough the particular interaction. The literature perspective 
that the object of trust is difficult to be separated fiom the context of reference is 
found to be useful in the present study. In particular, is it difficult to distinguish 
between personal trust and systems’ trust, especially when considering that the 
participants references were situated in the particular context of interaction (the 
resource allocation process).
However, some of the participants seemed to be very certain of the distinction 
between their tmst towards others and their trust in the abilities of the technical 
infonnation systems (section 5.3.6.9 and section 5.5.1). It is worth mentioning that 
although the distinction between human and technical system tmst was difficult to 
make, the participant’s associations between the two were interesting. In particular, it 
was observed that the participants with lower tmst tended to emphasise the system’s 
complexities and irrationalities as intentional faults caused by the ‘others’ in order to 
manipulate and control the process (RU2), or just a disbelief about the explanations 
presented for the system’s problems (RUI, RU3). In that sense, the limited trust in the 
individuals seems to give ‘flesh and bones’ to the suspicion that the system employed
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is intentionally complex and inefficient. On the other hand, considering the references 
of some of the participants, those who expressed a higher interpersonal tmst tend to 
not associate the complexities and difficulties of the system with their belief in 
individuals, and they also tend to be less willing to accuse the individuals involved for 
these complexities (RU6, R U ll, RU8).
However, considering the difficulty to clearly separate the participants’ tmst 
towards the individuals and/ or the system, it can be suggested that comparative 
investigation would be interesting to address the association between interpersonal 
and system tmst. In that respect it would be interesting to address the question: who 
or what to tmst. Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate whether 
inteipersonal tmst is associated with competent technical systems and vice versa. That 
inquiry may investigate the tmst relation between individuals and the tmst between 
individuals and two different technical systems within the same organisational 
context; for instance human resources procedures and resomxe allocation procedures.
6.3.6 Accounting change
The view that accounting and organisational practices should be conceived as 
dynamic processes, instead of static ones, is demonstrated in the literature review of 
section 3.2.3. In agreement with Shields (1997), who argues that research in 
management accounting should consider The wider institutional dynamics and 
unpredictability of changes’, the study adapted a rather non-static and wide view of 
the phenomenon observed. That need was facilitated with the in depth and ongoing 
investigation of the participants views and actions, Furthemiore, the argument found 
in the literature that a rather political and social activity of interests shapes the 
accounting practice and the organisational change observed in the study (see 
Hopwood and Miller, 1994; or Burns and Scapens, 2000).
.
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In particular, the views of some of the participants were very strong in 
supporting this approach, for instance the need to feel more involved in the 
Management Group consistency or the more direct involvement of the Resource 
Strategy Committee in the resource allocation process. It is also interesting to obseiwe 
that although the resource allocation decision was rather centralised, the academically 
devolved -  collegial structure of the University’s Resource Units facilitated the view 
expressed in the literature by Burns and Vaivio (2001) that The local actors within 
larger decentralised structures are the real architects and mobilising agents of change’. 
Finally, it is necessary to mention that the changes obseiwed included both systemic 
ones (resource allocation process changes, timing and type of meetings, changes in the 
model), as well as changes in the structures of conduct between the participants 
(authority interplay, meaning sharing and communication, moral rights and 
anticipations sourced in their interaction). In that respect, the Gidden’s (1984) 
conception of change as evolution in the fonn of an ‘orderly process of change 
passing thi'ough discernible stages’, is a convenient definition to agree with.
However in must be admitted that a more considerate analysis and conception 
of the observed changes could be undertaken, which although it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, it might be an interesting angle to explore in another study.
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6.4 Policy implications
In this section, some implications of research into trust within accounting 
practices will be considered for accounting theory and policy.
The first implication for accounting theory is that the concept of trust offers an 
interesting insight into social relations of accountability between individuals or 
groups. The evidence of this study suggests that trust relationships enhanced 
structures of accountability as a way of communication, influence and moral 
behaviour. In the same way, individuals who were found to be willing to ‘let the 
others’ know’ as a fonn of accountability, tended to be willing to trust others more. It 
is, therefore, important to conceptually investigate the dialectic nature of trust and 
accountability in organisational processes. Further, the present study argued that trust 
is an important aspect for governing aiTangements, with accountability a major aspect. 
Therefore, it is necessary to broaden the scope of trust within organisational process 
for more advanced understanding of social systems of governance within 
organisations.
The second implication is that trust and accounting practices are shaped by the 
nature and extent of social and political interactions between individuals and groups 
within an organisation. This has important implications for higher education resource 
allocation policies, in which attention to the embeddedness of accounting practices 
and trust relationships in the social and organisational environment of universities 
should be carefully considered. In particular, the effective implementation and 
operation of resource allocation procedures and models within universities would be 
governed better while considering tmst and accountability stmctures attentively.
Finally, dialogue across disciplinary, sectorial and professional lines is 
necessary for conceptual and operational advancement. Tmst relationships within 
organisational practices could be affected by political tension, scarcity of resources, 
and professional conflict. However, it would be better understood and explained with
256
Chapter 6: Conclusions
a continuous reflection and interpretation within a more inclusive than one discipline 
perspective. It is therefore suggested that not one discipline can provide a sufficient 
framework of understanding or realistic suggestions for change of social phenomena 
as accounting practices and organisational tmst,
6.5 Limitations of the study
The study of the role of tmst in the resource allocation process developed 
while considering and challenging a number of practical and theoretical limitations of 
conducting the research. However, there were limitations that unavoidably occuiTed 
and drastically affected the research process.
A major challenge for the study was the required consideration of the 
sensitive and confidential nature of the participants’ perceptions and their tmst 
relationship during the resource allocation process, hi addition, the necessity to gain 
access to a single-case organisation important enough for in-depth exploration was 
required. The choice of the particular University provided both an advantage of 
access and a limitation of generalisability of the study’s findings. In that respect the 
present study does not claim that the findings are generalisable, although it would 
seem likely that other Universities employ similar strategies and processes.
Another impoiiant consideration was that the time period of the research was 
restricted to meet the PhD completion timescale, and therefore only one budgeting 
period was considered in the study. Nevertheless, archival information and awareness 
of the subsequent developments after the study’s investigation period were considered 
carefully while constructing the context of the case. Yet, it should be admitted that 
the study’s findings could be better supported by considering a second budget period 
exploration on comparative basis.
In respect to the theoretical side of the inquiry, a fundamental limitation to 
acknowledge is that for some readers the assumptions and analysis employed in the
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study may be not acceptable. Although similar conclusions could be drawn from 
other perspectives, different insights could be gained by analysing the case from other 
philosophical stance. An additional difficulty has also been the integiation and 
synthesis of different literatures. Literature relevant to the concept of trust can be 
found in many disciplines including philosophy, sociology, management, psychology 
in addition to accounting and finance. However, this work attempted to introduce the 
concept of trust within management accounting perspective while shifting accounting 
from its conventional link with traditional economics to a broader interdisciplinary 
social science perspective. However, it should be admitted that the tension between 
these literatures have neither been solved nor reconciled in this work.
Finally, it can be admitted that several other avenues for further research can 
be suggested based on work done for this thesis.
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APPENDIX 1: University types in Angluin and Scapens (2000)
Type of Universities
traditional English civics
London University Colleges 
English 1960s ‘new’ universities 
Older Scottish universities 
Scottish 1960s ‘new’ Universities 
The University of Wales colleges 
Northern Irish civic
technological English technological universities 
Scottish technological universities
new Former polytechnics
Former Scottish central institutions
Northern Irish fonner polyteclinic
APPENDIX 2: Higher Education student numbers
a. The University’s staff and student numbers 
Source: Planning Office, The University’s Web Site
The University’s Student Number by mode of study
UG PGT PGR
Full- Part- Full- Part- Full- Part-Unknown Unknown UnknownTime Time Time Time Time Time
1999- 14681 3941 2 859 1519 2 1066 356 400
2000 - 14803 3931 3 894 1802 6 1109 394 401
2001 - 14805 4776 1046 1570 1 1121 37802
2002 - 15016 4379 1 1170 1362 1061 33903 
2003- 15249 4457 1188 1390 1017 34404
Staffing October 2003
Total Staff Headcount 6,084
Total Staff FTEs 5,155
Male Headcount 2,824
Female Headcount 3,260
Full-time Headcount 4,525
Part-time Headcount 1,559
Internally Funded FTEs 3,640
Externally Funded FTEs 1,515
b. Higher Education Student population
Source: Department for education and skills, http://www.dfes.gov.uk/
Higher Education Student Population: Number of Home HE students (including 
Open University) by mode of study, United Kingdom (thousands)
Full time Part time total
1988/89 579.1 382.8 961.9
1989/90 616.2 402.2 1018.4
1990/91 667.3 425.4 1092.7
1991/92 756.6 452.7 1209.3
1992/93 862.1 468.2 1330.3
1993/94 955,6 492.3 1447.9
1994/95 1014.3 562.8 1577.1
1995/96 1020.9 622.2 1643.2
1996/97 1032.8 658.3 1691.2
1997/98 1061.6 664.8 1726.5
1998/99 1068.8 682.8 1751.6
1999/00 1074.1 693.8 1768.0
2000/01 1084.8 72Ô.4 1805.2
2001/02 1117.8 736.4 1854.2
Higher Education student population: Number of home HE students (excluding 
Open University) by level of study, United Kingdom (thousands)
postgraduate First degree Other underg total
1988/89 110.4 476.5 289.8 876.7
1989/90 119.2 514 296.2 929.4
1990/91 133.6 560.3 303.7 997.6
1991/92 157.1 634.5 318.3 1110.0
1992/93 167.9 723.6 334 1225.5
1993/94 186.4 804.5 345.7 1336.6
1994/95 223.9 855.3 387.5 1 1466.7
1995/96 223.9 872.7 425.4 1522.0
1996/97 232.5 882.0 451.6 1566.1
1997/98 237.1 906.5 459.1 1602.7
1998/99 245.9 915.5 461.1 1622.5
1999/00 250.1 920.2 460.1 1630.4
2000/01 258.2 923.8 471.8 1653.8
2001/02 264.7 949.2 489.4 1703.3
t :J
APPENDIX 3: The Russel Group and Universitas 21
а. The Russel Group 
Source: http ://www.russellgroup.ac.uk
The Russell Group is an association of 19 major research-intensive universities of the 
United Kingdom. Foi*med in 1994 at a meeting convened in the Hotel Russell, 
London, the Group is composed of the Vice-Chancellors/Principals of the Universities 
listed opposite. There are also a number of active sub-groups.
In 2001/02, Russell Group Universities accounted for over 60% (more than £1.5 
billion) of UK Universities’ research grant and contract income, over 55% of all 
doctorates awarded in the United Kingdom, and approximately 35% of all students 
studying in the UK from outside the EU. In the 2001 national Research Assessment 
Exercise, 78% of the staff in grade 5* departments and 57% of the staff in grade 5 
departments were located within Russell Group Universities.
The aims and objectives of the Russell Group are to promote the interests of 
Universities in which teaching and learning are undertaken within a culture of 
research excellence, and to identify and disseminate new thinking and ideas about the 
organisation and management of such institutions
The Russel Group Universities
1. The University o f  Birmingham
2. The University of Bristol
3. The University of Cambridge
4. Cardiff University
5. The University of Edinburgh
б. The University of Glasgow
7. Imperial College London
8. King's College London
9. The University of Leeds
10. The University of Liverpool
11. London School of Economics & Political Science
12. The University o f  Manchester
13. The University of Newcastle
14. The University of Nottingham
15. The University of Oxford
16. The University of Sheffield
17. The University of S outhanipton
18. The University College London
19. The University of Waiwick
b. Universitas 21
Source; http://www.universitas21.com
Universitas 21 is an international network of leading research-intensive universities. 
Its purpose is to facilitate collaboration and cooperation between the member 
universities and to create entrepreneurial opportunities for them on a scale that none of 
them would be able to achieve operating independently or through traditional bilateral 
alliances.
Established in 1997, Universitas 21 cuirently has 16 member universities in eight 
countries. Collectively, its members enrol about 500,000 students, employ around 
40,000 academics and researchers and have over 2 million alumni.
Univesitas 21 Universities
- McGill University
- The University of British Columbia
- The University of Virginia
- The University of Birmingham
- The University of Edinburgh
- The University of Glasgow
- The University of Nottingham
- Lund University Sweden
- Fudan University
- Peking University
- The University of Hong Kong
- The National University of Singapore
- The University of Melbourne
- The University of New South Wales
- The University of Queensland
- The University of Auckland
APPENDIX 4: Comparison of The University’s Governance Practices with 
Scottish Higher Education Funding Council Guidelines 
Source; The University’s Web Site
SHEFC Benchmark The University’s Practice
1. Code of conduct for Court members 
following Nolan principles
Adopted in 1996; reaffirmed in 2000
2. Role of Chairman fomially defined Defined in Universities (Scotland) 
Acts, 1858 etseq (esp. 1966)
3. Efficiency and effectiveness of Court 
meetings
Responsibility for ensuring effective 
conduct of Court business emphasised 
in guidance provided to Rectorial 
candidates
4. Awareness of Court's strategic role Induction and 'refresher' sessions held 
for all Court members in which 
Court's overall strategic role is 
highlighted
5. Formal and explicit delegation of 
authority
Reaffirmed in 2000 as one of the 
outcomes of the Review of the 
Effectiveness of Court
6. Fonnal induction process In place
7. Definition of non-executive and 
executive responsibilities
Reaffirmed in 2000 (see 5 above)
8. Reports required on action taken under 
delegated authority
Any action is reported for 
homologation or endorsement to the 
next meeting of the Court
9. Explicit definition of the role of the 
Secretary of Court
Reaffirmed in 2000 (see 5 above)
10. Review of standing orders every 5 
years
Standing orders introduced in 2000 as 
part of Review of Effectiveness of 
Court
11. Register of members' interests Register (of the interests of Court 
members and of all senior staff) has 
been kept since 1995. Updated 
annually and open to inspection on 
request. Declai ations of interest also 
required during the conduct of 
business at Court and main 
committees.
12. Code on "whistleblowing" Adopted in 1997; expanded and 
revised in 2000 in line with 
recommended AHUA good practice
13. Maintenance of Couif at its full 
membership
Court is maintained at its full 
membership allowed by law
14. Court should, where practicable, not 
exceed 25 members
The Court has 25 members
?''î;t"a
15. Balance among Court members in 
relation to skills, expertise, gender and 
age
Nominations Committee attempts to 
meet this criterion although most 
places on Court are outwith its control
16. Membership of Court to be published 
in Annual Report and Accounts
Membership published in Annual 
Report and Accounts for 1999/2000 
onwards
17. Members should serve for tliree years Term of office of four years specified 
in legislation
18. Meehanism for removal of members 
to be included in standing orders
Mechanism included in The 
University’s Standing Orders for 
Court.
19. Members should not serve for more 
than 9 years
Court guidelines specify a maximum 
of two teims of office, i.e. 8 years
20. No more than one temi beyond state 
retirement age
The University does not comply with 
this benchmark as it does not accept 
the reasoning for it
21. Remuneration Committee, 
Nominations Committee and Audit 
Committee should all be established 
by Court
All three Committees are in place
22. Committees to be provided with clear 
remits and terms of reference
Membership of all key Committees 
should be published in the Annual 
Report and Accounts
In place for a number of years; 
revisited and reaffimied in 1999
The University does comply with this 
benclimark. Additionally 
memberships of other Committees are 
published and openly available on the 
University’s web site
23. Governing body to be represented on 
the board of directors of related 
companies
Related companies rationalised under 
Holdings Ltd where the Board is 
nominated by the Court
24. Formal reports to be made to Court on 
companies' performance
Holdings reports regularly and 
formally to Court via the Finance 
Committee. Annual accounts also 
presented to Court
25. Legal advice to be provided for 
members
Legal advice is provided to members 
on request
26. Perfomiance measures to be adopted 
and monitored, with outcome of 
monitoring to be publicly available
The Review of Effectiveness of Court 
in 2000 started to address this issue; 
measures are developed in conjunction 
with other HEIs and are being 
introduced over the next year.
APPENDIX 5: Financial statements 2003
Source: The University’s Finance Office, Financial Statements 2003 (The 
University’s Web Site)
CONSOLIDATED INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT 
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31ST JULY 2003
Income
Funding Council gmnts
Tuition fees and education contracts
Research grants and contracts 
Other income
Endowment and investment income 
Total hicome
Expenditure 
Staff costs
Other operating expenses 
Depreciation
Interest payable and other similar charges 
Total Expenditure
Deficit on continuing operations after depreciation 
of fixed assets at valuation
Gain on disposal of assets
Insurance reinstatement proceeds
Surplus/(deficit) on continuing operations after depreciation 
of tangible fixed assets at valuation and disposal of assets
2003 2002
£000 £000
115,974 106,484
38,752 35,528 ■
76,872 73,238
-V.A,
47,971 42,566 I6,214 7,029 1285,783 264,845 :a
1
170,793 161,741
a:
100,075 89,057 114,700 13,699 1
437 3,959 j
286.005 268.456
(222) (3,611)
2,376^ 734 1,
4,250
:a:i
6.404 (2.877)
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31ST JULY 2003
2Q03 2002
£000 £000
Realisation of property revaluation gains
of previous years 2,537 5,019
Historic cost surplus/(deficit) for the period 12,242 .5jt0.3
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF HISTORIC COST SURPLUS/(DEFICIT)
Surplus/(deficit) on continuing operations 6,404 (2,877)
Difference between historical cost depreciation and
the actual charge for the period calculated on the revalued amount 3,301 3,261
THE UNIVERSITY 
BALANCE SHEETS AS AT 31ST JULY 2003
Consolidated
Fixed assets
Tangible assets 
Investments
Endowment assets
CuiTent assets 
Stock 
Debtors 
Investments
Cash at banlc and in hand
Creditors; amounts falling due 
within one year
Net current assets/(liabilities)
2003
£000
352,377
2.568
354,945
90,195
537
45,771
15,074
2002
£000
350,156
2.795
352,951
91,206
573
44,877
171
2003
£000
352,218
2.447
354,665
90,195
537
44,927
14,292
61,382
58.769
2.613
13.439 
45,621 73,195
62.553 68.429
(16.932) 4.766
Creditors; amounts falling due 
after more 
than one year 97
Provisions for liabilities and charges 11.815 11,345
97
11.815
Total net assets
Represented bv:
Deferred income 
Specific endowments 
Reserves
Revaluation reserve 
General reserve 
Total reserves
Total funds
107,529
90,195
201,049
37.068
238.117
435.841
93,519 107,529
91,206 90,195
206,856
24.299
231.155
415.880
201,049
38.941
239.990
437.714
2002
£000
340,443
2.555
342,998
91,206
573
44,440
5
10.036
55,054
59,845
(4.791)
Total assets less current liabilities 447,753 427,225 449,626 429,413
11.345
435.841 415.880 437.714 418.068
93,519
91,206
206,856
26.487
233.343
418.068
APPENDIX 6: Research Assessment Exercise - The University’s results 
Source: Research and Enterprise, The University’s Web Site
12001
|UoA
1 1
j?
111
|l4
ill18
20
21
22
|23
|24
25
,28
|29
IÎ30A
| 3 ^
|30C
|34
UoA Name
Clinical Laboratory Sciences
Coinmunity-based Clinical 
Subjects
Hospital-based Clinical Subjects
Clinical Dentistry
Anatomy
Physiology
Pharmacology
Nursing
Other Studies & Professions 
Allied to Medicine
Biochemistry
Psychology
Biological Sciences
Veterinary Science
Chemistry
Physics
Earth Sciences
Environmental Sciences
Pine Mathematics
Applied Mathematics
Statistics & Operational 
Research
Computing Science
Civil Engineering
Electrical & Electronic 
Engineering
2001
Rating
Mechanical Engineering 
Aerospace Engineering 
Naval Architecture
Town & Country Planning 
(Urban Studies)
3a
n/a
n/a
n/a
3a
n/a
n/a
5*
5
" 5"
^4
n/a
5
5
1996^
Rating
4
1992
RatingXI
3 b 2
4 3 (
Î
_ _ _ _ _ _ 4
3 a 3
3a
n/a 3
2 2 ]
4 2
5 5
. . . .
3/4
4 5
3a
3a 3
3a 3 ]
4 4
_ _ _ _ _ _
4^
4 5
5* 5
3
5 4
3a 3
3 [
]  ^ 3
5* 5
Comments
%
Î
Î
I
143
160
!61
162
163
166
Geography
Law
Economics & Econometrics 
Politics & hiternational Studies 
Social Policy & Administration 
Social Work 
Sociology
Business & Management 
Studies
Accountancy
American Studies
Middle Eastern Studies
European Studies (Russian & 
East European Studies)
Celtic Studies
English Language & Literature 
(inc. Scottish Literature)
French
Geiinan, Dutch and 
Scandinavian Languages
Italian
Russian, Slavonic & East 
European Languages
Spanish (Hispanic Studies)
Classics & Ancient History
Archaeology
History
History of Art, Architecture and 
Desiçi
Library & Info Management 
Philosophy
Theology, Divinity and 
Religious Studies
Drama, Dance & Perfonning 
Arts
Music
Education
Sports-related subjects
4
5_
4
4
n/a
4
n/a
n/a
S’*'-
4 
5’^
5 
4 
3b
3a
4_
_
3a
4
3a
y
5
n/a
4
4 
2
n/a
5
3a
4
3a
3 b
3a
3a
4
3a
n/a
3a
3a
3
3
2
2
3
4 
2^
_
n/a
2
staff- Ï
2001 1996 1992J Notes j
Weighted
Average
Rating:
Number of 5* 
rated Units:
Number of 5 
rated Units:
5.69
4
19
4.79
2
5
3.36
n/a
7
The Staff-Weighted Average takes account of the ! 
numbers of staff in each unit. j
The Scottish staff-weighted average moved from | 
4.49 in 1996 to 5.37 in 2001. (Note that 1992 used a j 
five-point scale; a seven-point equivalent average j 
figure for The University's wouid be 4 .70 .)  |
The UK staff-weighted average moved from 4.61 in 
1996 to 5.42 in 2001.
Number of 4 
rated Units:
Number of 3a 
rated Units:
20
4
28
16
12
n/a
The  UK position is for HEIs with 10 or more UoAs, | 
based on staff-weighted average. 1
Number of 3b 
rated Units: 1 3 22
I
1
Number of 2 
rated Units: 0 2 15
}Percentage of 
1 staff in 5* and js rated Units: 67 14 15 :
Percentage of 
staff in 4 
rated Units:
29 55 22
Percentage of 
1 staff in 3a and 
|sb  rated 1 Units :
4 30 49
■Percentage of 
[staff in 2 
[rated Units:
0 1 15
jUK Position; 26 33 ^1 % 1
APPENDIX 7: Star Chambers
Source: The University’s Web Site
Purpose
Star Chambers at The University are the financial discussions which take place at 
regular inteiwals which enable better setting of targets for income and expenditure. 
They take place between the Heads of Resource Units (on an individual basis) and the 
University’s Principal / Director of Finance, assisted by supporting staff as 
appropriate.
Topics covered
Though there is no set format to star chamber session, typically they cover: 
Backgroimd development -  since last meeting 
Any short term plans ~ what happens next?
Longer term plans -  aspirations and investing in the future 
Consideration of core, strategic and marginal activities 
Integration of faculty academic and financial plans 
Changes to faculty academic and organisational structures 
Flexibility and efficiency
Setting strategic parameters and long term budgets 
Consideration of the IDRM setting of each faculty CLA and CLB 
Departmental and QAA reviews, if any 
Staffing strategies, retirais, vacant posts and void management 
Gaps between I & E / pay / non pay
Faculty waivers and discounts, Erasmus and Socrates programmes 
Course costs, recharging and commercial considerations 
Increasing income e.g. by CPD, development opportunities 
Better use of endowments and scarce resources 
Equipment issues
Assets, accommodation, minor works, health and safety issues 
Special circumstances and needs (including strategic support)
Opportunities for contributions towards The University’s savings targets or reserves
Historical Note in Star Chambers
In English history, was a civil and criminal court, named after the star-shaped ceiling 
decoration of the room in the Palace of Westminster, London, where its first meeting 
were held. Created in 1487 by King Henry VII, the Star Chamber comprised some 20 
or 30 judges. It was abolished in 1641 by the Long Parliament. The Star Chambers 
became notorious under King Charles I for judgements favourable to the king and to 
Archbishop Laud (for example, the branding on both cheeks of William Prymie in 
1637 for seditious libel). Under the Thatcher government 1979 -  1990, the temi was 
revived for private ministerial meetings at which disputes between the Treasury and 
high -  spending departments were resolved.
APPENDIX 8: The 2002/2003 Income Driven Resource Model
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APPENDIX 9: Quality Assurance Agency awards for The University 
Source: Scottish Higher Education Funding Conncil,
http://www.shefc.ac.uk/
The assessment scale used in 1992-93 was: Excellent, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory.
1992-93 
Economics: SATISFACTORY
Electrical & Electronic Engineering: SATISFACTORY
The assessment scale used from 1993-4 onwards was: Excellent, Highly Satisfactory,
Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory
1993-94
Chemistry: EXCELLENT 
Civil Engineering: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY 
Computer Studies: EXCELLENT 
Geography: EXCELLENT 
Geology: EXCELLENT
Mathematics & Statistics: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY 
Mechanical (inch Manufacturing Engineering): HIGHLY SATISFACTORY 
Physics: EXCELLENT
1994-95
Business & Management: SATISFACTORY 
Music: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY
1995-96
Finance & Accounting: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY 
History: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY 
History of Art: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY 
Law: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY 
Philosophy: EXCELLENT 
Politics: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY 
Social Work: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY 
Sociology: EXCELLENT
Theology & Religious Studies: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY
1996-97
Cellular & Molecular Biology: EXCELLENT 
Organismal Biology: EXCELLENT 
Dentistry : HIGHLY SATISFACTORY 
English: EXCELLENT 
French Studies: EXCELLENT 
Medicine: EXCELLENT 
Nursing: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY 
Veterinary Medicine: EXCELLENT
1997-98
Drama: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY
European Languages: assessed under Revised Method: profile here 
Psychology: EXCELLENT 
Social Policy: EXCELLENT
«
APPENDIX 10: Chronology of events based on minutes 
of Resource Unit Management committees
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APPENDIX 11: The questionnaire matrixes -  for Part 1 and Part 2
WE/OTHER 
Part 1
dimension 
of belief
dimension 
of Trust
less trust
1 2 3
more trust
4 5 6 7
more trust
1
less trust
5 6 7
Number of Question
Competence 28 We feel confident that
Y will make a competent 
decision
Openness 15 We feel that Y is
straight with us
Affect Concern 19 We feel that Y is
(feel) concerned about our
problems and needs.
Loyalty 9 We feel that Y is
responsible and 
supportive
Fairness 24 We feel that Y clearly
explains the reasons of 
the decision
Reliability 23 We feel that Y will
keep its word
25 We worry about Y’s ability 
to take correct decisions.
11 We feel that Y does not tell 
us the complete truth.
21 We feel that Y tries to get 
the upper hand
2 We feel that Y never 
reciprocates to our 
expectations.
3 We feel that Y never 
explained clearly the reasons 
for the decisions
33 We worry about Y’s 
willingness to do what they 
say.
Competence 16 We think that Y meets 
its negotiated obligations 
to our department / unit.
Openness 36 We think that Y
negotiates openly
Cognitive Concern 26 We think that Y 
(think) knows exactly what we
want.
Loyalty 20 We think that Y takes
the responsibility for 
crucial decisions
F airness 18 We think Y ’ s
attention is focused on 
our requirements
5 In our opinion Y
22 We don’t think that Y is 
competent.
lOIn our opinion Y does not 
disclose all the information we 
need for negotiation
32 We don’t think that Y has 
any idea of our requirements
29 In our opinion Y never 
takes the responsibility
; j ï
Reliability
emphasises equity and 
fairness as very 
important
17 In our opinion, Y is 
reliable
7 We think Y misrepresents its 
position in negotiations.
Intend
(behave)
Competence
Opemiess
34 We are not going to 
question the correctness 
of Y’s decisions.
27 We intend to speak 
openly in our 
negotiations with Y.
31 We intend to work 
openly with Y because 
they will not take 
advantage of us.
6 We plan to monitor Y’s 
compliance with our 
agreement
Concern
Loyalty
Fairness
Reliability
4 We plan to support Y’s 
decisions
1 We are not willing to 
question the clarity of Y 
‘s explanations.
35 We intend to check 
whether Y meets its 
obligations to our department / 
unit
30 We don’t plan to contribute 
to Y ’s decisions because they 
are not concerned about our 
position
13 We are not going to 
express our loyalty to Y
14 We intend to ask Y to 
distribute resources according 
to our needs
12, We intend to watch for 
misleading infomiation from 
Y in our negotiations
8 We intend to monitor Y 
closely so that they do not take 
advantage of us.
1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3=Slightly Disagree, 4= Neither Agree nor 
Disagree, 5=Slightly Agree, 6=Agree, 7=Strongly Agree
Ia
I
i:
OTHER/US 
Pai't 2
less trust more trust more tmst less tmst
7 1
dimension
ofbelief
dimension 
of Tmst
Number o Question
Competence 19 Y feel confident that we 
will make a competent 
decision
Openness 14 Y feel that we are straight
with them.
Affect Concern 1 Y feel that we are
(feel) concerned about their
problems and needs.
Loyalty 28 Y feel that we are
responsible and supportive
Fairness 34 Y feel that we clearly
explain the reasons of the 
decision
Reliability 25 Y feel that we will keep 
our word
8 Y woiTy about our ability 
to take correct decisions
13 Y feel that we do not tell 
them the complete truth
22 Y feel that we try to get 
the upper hand.
18 Y feel that we never 
reciprocate to their 
expectations
12 Y feel that we never 
explained clearly the reasons 
for the decision
2 Y won*y about our 
willingness to do what we 
say.
Competence 16 Y think that we meet our 
negotiated obligations to 
their department / unit
Openness 10 Y think that we are
negotiating openly.
Cognitive Concern 3 Y think that we know 
(think) exactly what they want
Loyalty 21 Y think that we take the
responsibility for cmcial 
decisions
Fairness 29 Y think our attention is
focused on our requirements
15 In Y’s opinion we 
emphasise equity and 
fairness as very important
Reliability 17 In Y’s opinion, we are 
reliable
9 Y don’t think that we are 
competent
27 In Y’s opinion we do not 
disclose all the information 
they need for negotiations
24 Y don’t think that we 
have any idea of their 
requirements.
30 In Y’s opinion we never 
take the responsibility
6 Y think we misrepresent 
our position in negotiations
Intend
(behave)
Competence 4 Y is not going to question 
the coiTectness of our 
decisions
Openness 26 Y intend to speak openly 
in their negotiations with us.
32 Y intend to work openly 
with us because we will not 
take advantage of them
Concern
Loyalty
Fairness
Reliability
20 Y plan to support our 
decisions
23 Y are not willing to 
question the clarity of our 
explanations
5 Y plan to monitor our 
compliance with our 
agreement
35 Y intend to check whether 
we meet our obligations to 
their department / unit
31 Y don’t plan to contribute 
to our decisions because we 
are not concerned about their 
position
33 Y are not going to express 
their loyalty to us
36 Y intend to ask us to 
distribute resources 
according to their needs
11 Y intend to watch for 
misleading information from 
us in our negotiations.
7 Y intend to monitor us 
closely so that we do not take 
advantage of them.
1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3=Slightly Disagree, 4= Neither Agree nor 
Disagree, 5=Slightly Agree, 6=Agree, 7-Strongly Agree
APPENDIX 12: The questionnaire as sent to the Heads of the Resource Units
Date: 7 February 2002 Melina Maria Manochin
Department of Accounting and Finance
73 Southpark Avenue
University of Glasgow 
G12 8LE Glasgow
e-mail: 9909699m@student.gla.ac.ukProfessor X telephone: 0141 330 5667(address) PhD Supeiwisor: Mr Ken Shackleton
Subject: questionnaire about the Role of Trust in the Resource Allocation process.
Dear Professor X,
I would kindly ask you to contribute to the project concerning the Role of Tmst in the 
Resource Allocation Process, which was mentioned and discussed with Professor Z in 
November and December 2001. The project is focused on the social interaction of 
organisational units and the influence of the formulated climate on the process and 
outcome of the managerial decision of distributing resources. In the relevant 
literature, the role of Trust is increasingly related to the development of a co-operative 
organisational climate eliminating tension and conflict, enhancing system stability, 
contributing to a significant reduction of transaction costs and supporting 
organisational change. The outcome of the project may be a contribution to the 
management accounting discipline and literature.
The process of the project includes identification, collection, categorisation and 
analysis of information derived f  om the perceived tmstworthiness between 
organisational units when negotiating for budgetary allocations of resources. Bearing 
in mind The University plamiing cycle and organisation, the project will be developed 
in accordance with the chronological order of the Star Chamber committee meetings. 
Thus you will be asked to contribute with your opinion and feedback in a series of 
contacts from Febmary to July 2002.
In the first instance a questionnaire will be administered to you in order to identify the 
organisational tmst level. This research instrument is valid and accepted by several 
academics and researchers. Cummings and Bromiley (1996) originally formed the 
present Organisational Trust Inventory; however, the instrument is reformed in 
accordance to the research requirements of this project. The Questionnaire is 
developed in two forms. The first one is related to the belief / expectations YOU 
fomiulate when you interact with the OTHER (Notified as Y) department / 
organisational unit (i.e. the Central Management Unit). You are asked to respond to 
the questions circling the relevant answer to you in the scale of 7 rating from Strongly 
Disagree to Strongly Agree.
Example:
Neither
Strongly Slightly Agree nor Slightly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 We think Y negotiates important details fairly 1 2 3 4 ( 5 ) 6  7
The second part includes responses of your level of trust as perceived in the eyes of 
others. You will be asked to estimate how the OTHER (Notified as Y) department / 
unit i.e. the Central Management Unit, may believe /expect YOU to behave. Again 
your response will be notified circling the relevant answer to you in the 7 scale rating 
from Strong Disagree to Strongly Agi'ee.
Example:
Neither
Strongly Slightly Agree nor Slightly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Y think we negotiate important details fairly 1 2 3 4 (5) 6 7
I would like to mention that although at the preface of the questionnaire you will be 
asked to identify yourself, the analysis of the project will keep this information 
confidentially and you will be referred as X.
Finally I would like to thank you in advance for your agreement to respond to this 
survey.
Melina Manochin
Organisational Trust Inventory (Part 1)
Name
Position
Years in the cuiTent position
Do you have previous experience in this position? Yes / No 
Relevant Courses Attended:
Age (tick box as appropriate):
20 - 30
30 - 40
40 - 50
More than 50
Nationality
Gender
Please choose the unit or department about which you can most knowledgeably report 
the opinions of your department or unit
1. Your department is__________________________________(enter name of
department / unit)
2. The other department or unit about which you are responding
IS
(Enter name of department / unit)
Please circle the number to the right of each statement that most closely describes 
your opinion toward the other department. Interpret the Y as defined in the 
accompanying letter when referring to the other department about which you are 
commenting.
Neither
Strongly Slightly Agree nor Slightly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. We are not willing to question the claiity of Y ‘s explanations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. We feel that Y never reciprocates to oui* expectations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. We feel that Y never explained clearly the reasons for the decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. We plan to support Y’s decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. In our opinion Y emphasises equity and fairness as very important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. We plan to monitor Y’s compliance with our agreement. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. We think Y misrepresents its position in negotiations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. We intend to monitor Y closely so that they do not take advantage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
of us.
9. We feel that Y is responsible and supportive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. In our opinion Y does not disclose all the information we need for 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
negotiations.
11. We feel that Y does not tell us the complete truth. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. We intend to watch for misleading infoiination from Y in our 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
negotiations.
13. We are not going to express our loyalty to Y 1 2 3 4 5 6
14. We intend to ask Y to distribute resources according to our needs 1 2 3 4 5 6
15. We feel that Y is straight with us 1 2 3 4 5 6
16. We thinlc that Y meets its negotiated obligations to our department 1 2 3 4 5 6
/ unit.
17. In our opinion, Y is reliable. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. We think Y’s attention is focused on our requirements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. We feel that Y is concerned about oui* problems and needs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. We think that Y takes the responsibility for cmcial decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. We feel that Y tries to get the upper hand. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. We don’t think that Y is competent. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23. We feel that Y will keep its word 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24. We feel that Y clearly explains the reasons of the decision 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. We worry about Y’s ability to take correct decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. We think that Y knows exactly what we want. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27. We intend to speak openly in our negotiations with Y. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
28. We feel confident that Y will make a competent decision. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
29. In our opinion Y never takes the responsibility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30. We don’t plan to contribute to Y’s decisions because they are not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
concerned about our position.
31. We intend to work openly with Y because they will not take 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
advantage of us.
32. We don’t think that Y has any idea of our requirements. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
33. We woiTy about Y’s willingness to do what they say. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
34. We are not going to question the coiTectness of Y’s decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
35. We intend to check whether Y meets its obligations to our 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
department / unit.
36. We thinlc that Y negotiates openly. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Organisational Trust Inventory (Part 2)
Neither
Strongly Slightly Agree nor Slightly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Y feel that we are concerned about their problems and needs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Y worry about our willingness to do what we say. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Y think that we know exactly what they want. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Y is not going to question the correctness of our decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Y plan to monitor our compliance with our agreement. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Y think we misrepresent our position in negotiations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Y intend to monitor us closely so that we do not take advantage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
of them.
8. Y worry about our ability to take correct decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Y don’t think that we are competent. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Y think that we are negotiating openly. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. Y intend to watch for misleading information from us in our 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
negotiations.
12. Y feel that we never explained clearly the reasons for the decision 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Y feel that we do not tell them the complete tmth. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. Y feel that we are straight with them. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. In Y’s opinion we emphasise equity and fairness as very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
important
16. Y thinlc that we meet our negotiated obligations to their 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
department / unit.
17. In Y’s opinion, we are reliable. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. Y feel that we never reciprocate to their expectations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. Y feel confident that we will make a competent decision. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. Y plan to support our decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. Y think that we take the responsibility for cmcial decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. Y feel that we try to get the upper hand. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23. Y are not willing to question the clarity of our explanations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24. Y don’t think that we have any idea of their requirements. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. Y feel that we will keep our word. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. Y intend to speak openly in their negotiations with us. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27. In Y’s opinion we do not disclose all the information they need 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
for negotiations.
28. Y feel that we are responsible and supportive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
29. Y think our attention is focused on our requirements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30. In Y’s opinion we never take the responsibility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31. Y don’t plan to contribute to our decisions because we are not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
concerned about their position
32. Y intend to work openly with us because we will not take 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
advantage of them.
33. Y are not going to express their loyalty to us 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
34. Y feel that we clearly explain the reasons of the decision 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
35. Y intend to check whether we meet our obligations to their 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
department / unit.
36. Y intend to ask us to distribute resources according to their needs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I
J
APPENDIX 13:The questionnaire as sent to the Management Group participants
Date: 7 February 2002 Melina Maria Manochin
Department of Accounting and Finance 
73 Southpark Avenue 
University of Glasgow 
G12 8LE GlasgowProfessor T e-mail: 9909699m@student.gla.ac.uk(address) telephone: 0141 330 5667 
PhD Supervisor: Mr Ken Shackleton 
K.Shackleton@accfm.gla.ac.uk 
Subject: questioimaire about the Role of Tmst in the Resource Allocation process.
Dear Professor Z,
I would kindly ask you to contribute to the project concerning the Role of Tmst in the 
Resource Allocation Process, which was mentioned and discussed with Professor Z in 
November and December 2001. The project is focused on the social interaction of 
organisational units and the influence of the formulated climate on the process and 
outcome of the managerial decision of distributing resources. In the relevant 
literature, the role of Trust is increasingly related to the development of a co-operative 
organisational climate eliminating tension and conflict, enhancing system stability, 
contributing to a significant reduction of transaction costs and supporting 
organisational change. The outcome of the project may be a contribution to the 
management accounting discipline and literature.
The process of the project includes identification, collection, categorisation and 
analysis of information derived from the perceived tmstworthiness between 
organisational units when negotiating for budgetary allocations of resources. Bearing 
in mind The University planning cycle and organisation, the project will be developed 
in accordance with the chronological order of the Star Chamber committee meetings.
Thus you will be asked to contribute with your opinion and feedback in a series of 
contacts from February to July 2002.
In the first instance a questionnaire will be administered to you in order to identify the 
organisational tmst level. This research instmment is valid and accepted by several 
academics and researchers. Cummings and Bromiley (1996) originally formed the 
present Organisational Tmst Inventory; however, the instmment is refoimed in
Ï
accordance to the research requirements of this project. The Questionnaire is 
developed in two forms. The first one is related to the belief / expectations YOU 
fonmilate when you interact with the OTHER (Notified as Y) department / 
organisational unit (i.e. each Planning Unit). You are asked to respond to the 
questions filling the box at the right of each Planning Unit, with the relevant answer to 
you in the scale of 7 rating from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.
Example:
Neither
Strongly Slightly Agree nor Slightly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree
1 2 3 4 5
3. We think Y negotiates important details fairly
Agree
6
Strongly
Agree
7
CMED 1 DENT 2 VETS 3
ENGN 7 CSMS 1 LFIN 2
IBLS| 4 I SO CS[T] PHSCS
ARTS| 3 I E D C N g ]  INFO| 5 |CADSp6
The second part includes responses of your level of trust as perceived in the eyes of 
others. You will be asked to estimate how the OTHER (Notified as Y) department / 
unit i.e. the Central Management Unit, may believe /expect YOU to behave. Again 
your response will be notified by filling the box at the right of each Planning Unit, in 
the 7 scale rating from Strong Disagree to Strongly Agree.
Example:
Neither
Strongly Slightly Agree nor
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
Slightly
Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
Y think we negotiate important details fairly
CMED 1 DENT 2 VETS 3 IBLS 4 socs 5 PHSCS 6
ENGN 7 CSMS 1 LFIN 2 ARTS 3 EDCN 4 INFO 5
Strongly 
Agree 
7
CADS[ 6
asked to identify yourself, the analysis of the project will keep this information 
confidentially and you will be referred as Z.
Finally I would like to thank you in advance for your agreement to respond to this 
survey.
Melina Manochin
Abbreviations
CMED: Clinical Medicine 
DENT: Dental School 
VETS : Veterinary Medicine 
IBLS: Institute of Biomedical & Life Sciences 
PHSCS: Physical Sciences 
ENGN: Engineering
CSMS: Computing Science, Maths & Statistics 
LFIN: Law & Financial Studies 
SOCS: Social Sciences 
ARTS: Arts & Divinity 
EDCN: Education 
INFO: Information Services 
CADS: Central Administration
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Organisational Trust Inventory (Part 1)
Name
Position
Years in the current position
Do you have previous experience in this position? Yes / No 
Relevant Courses Attended:
Age (tick box as appropriate):
20 -30
30 -40
40 -50
Please choose the unit or department about which you can most knowledgeably report 
the opinions of your department or unit
3. Yom* department is the MANAGEMENT GROUP
4. The other department or unit about which you are responding is other PLANNING 
UNIT
Please fill in the number to the right of each Planning Unit that most closely describes 
your opinion toward the other Planning Unit. Interpret the Y as defined in the 
accompanying letter when referring to the other department about which you are 
commenting.
■
More than 50
Nationality_________________
Gender
J
f |
Neither
Strongly Slightly Agree nor Slightly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 We are not willing to question the clarity of Y ‘s explanations.
CMED DENT VETS IBLS SOCS
ENGN I I C S M S [2 ] L F IN [2 ]  A R T S [ ^  EDCN[
PHSCS I 
INFOl CADS
2 We feel that Y never reciprocates to our expectations.
1  IBLSi 'CMED
ENGN
DENT[
CSMSf
VETS
LFIN ARTS
SOCS
EDCN
PHSCS
INFO
3 We feel that Y never explained clearly the reasons for the decisions
1  IBLSi ' ' 'CMED
ENGN
DENT VETS SOCS
C S M S [ ^  E F IN [2 ]  ARTS I | EDCN[
PHSCS)
INFOl
CADS
CADS
,
4 We plan to support Y’s decisions
CMED DENT VETs 2 [ j  IB L S 2 21 socs
ENGN CSMS 1 LFIN] [ j  A R T S 2 2  EDCN
PHSCS[
INFO[ CADS
5 In our opinion Y emphasises equity and fairness as very important
1 socsl 'CMED [ 2 ]  DENT| | V E T S [ ^  IBLS| PHSCS
ENGN 122] CSMS[ 2 1  L F IN [2 ]  A R T S [2 ] E D C N |2 ]  INF0| j CADS
6 We plan to monitor Y’s compliance with our agreement.
1 socslCMED 2  d e n t ] 2  VETS IBLS
ENGN CSM S22  LFIN ARTS edcn [
7 We think Y misrepresents its position in negotiations.
1 socslCMED
ENGN
DENT)
CSMSi
VETS)
l f in I
IBLS)
ARTSi e d c n [
FHSCS) I 
INFOl I CADS
PHSCS
INFO CADS
I
.5 /
strongly
Disagree
1
Disagree
2
Neither
Slightly Agree nor Slightly 
Disagree Disagree Agree
3 4 5
Strongly
Agree Agree
6 7
8 We intend to monitor Y closely so that they do not take advantage of us.
1 VETSi I IBLSi ' ' 'CMED
ENGN
DENT)
CSMSi l f in [ ARTS
9 We feel that Y is responsible and supportive
21 DENT[22] VETSCMED
ENGN CSMS LFIN
IBLS)
ARTSi
SOCS)
EDCNf
SOCS
EDCN
PHSCS)
in f o )
PHSCS
INFO
CADS
CADS
10 In our opinion Y does not disclose all the information we need for negotiations.
VETS““CMED
ENGN
DENT
CSMS LFIN
IBLS)
a r t s )
11 We feel that Y does not tell us the complete truth.
“1 d e n t ) I v e t s ) ' ' 'CMED IBLS
SOCS
EDCN)
socs)
ENGN ) I CSMSi I LFINI I ARTSl I EDCN)
I II II. Ill iiimmI I I I*... ÉW. »... ".'I II If L
PHSCS
INFO
PHSCS
E4F0
CADS
CADS
12 We intend to watch for misleading information from Y in our negotiations.
1 v e ts )  ) IBLS) I socs) ' ' 'CMED
ENGN
DENT)
CSMS) LFIN ARTS e d c n [
PHSCS
INFO CADS
13 We are not going to express our loyalty to YH L^s)CMED
ENGN
socs PHSCS I I
CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCnI I in fo )  I CADS
14 We intend to ask Y to distribute resources according to our needs
PHSCSCMED
ENGN
DENT
CSMS
VETS
LFIN
IBLS
ARTS
SOCS
EDCN INFO CADS
strongly
Disagree Disagree
Slightly
Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree
Slightly
Agree Agree
Strongly
Agree
20 We think that Y takes the responsibility for crucial decisions
IBLSCMED
ENGN
DENT
CSMS
VETS
LFIN ARTS
21 We feel that Y tries to get the upper hand.
] VETS I I IBLSj2CMED
ENGN
d e n t [
c s m s F l f in [ ARTS
SOCS
EDCN
SOCS
EDCN
PHSCS
INFO CADS
PHSCSj I
INFO| I CADSj I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15 We feel that Y is straight with us
CMED DENT VETS 1 IBLS s o c s | 1PHSCSj '
ENGN CSMS| 1 LFIN ......1 ARTS e d c n | 1 INFO CADS
16 We think that Y meets its negotiated obligations to our department / unit.
CMED 1 DENT VETS 1 IBLS so c s j 1PHSCS
ENGN CSMS LFIN ARTS e d c n | 1 INFO CADS ■s:
17 In our opinion, Y is reliable.
CMED DENT VETS IBLS so c s l 1PHSCS
ENGN CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCNj___ 1 INFO CADSj :
18 We think Y’s attention is focused on our requirements
CMED DENT VETS IBLS so c s j 1PHSCS :
ENGN CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCNj j INFOj CADS
19 We feel that Y is concerned about our problems and needs. »1
CMED ] DENT| VETS IBLS so c s j j PHSCS a■
ENGN CSMS LFIN ARTS| 1 EDCN) 1 INFO CADSj"......1
strongly
Disagree
1
Slightly
Disagree
3
Disagree 
2
22 We don’t think that Y is competent.
1 VETS
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
4
Slightly
Agree
5
Agree Strongly
Agree
6 7
CMED
ENGN
DENT)
CSMSi LFIN
23 We feel that Y will keep its word
CMED
ENGN
DENT)
CSMSf
VETS
LFIN
IBLS)
a r t s )
IBLS[
a r t s !
socs
EDCN
SOCS
EDCN
24 We feel that Y clearly explains the reasons of the decision
1  DENTI VETS I IBLSi I SOCSfCMED
ENGN I I CSMS I I LFIN]
]
ARTSi EDCN[2
25 We worry about Y’s ability to take correct decisions.
1 socslCMED
ENGN
DENT VETS IBLS
CSMS] ] LFIN] I ARTS] | EDCN]
26 We think that Y knows exactly what we want.
CMED 1 d e n t ] 2  VETS ] IBLS 2  socsJ22 PHSCS
ENGN CSMS] 2  LFIN arts[ 2 2  e d c n [ 2 2 INFO ] CADS j
27 We intend to speak openly in our negotiations with Y.
1 socslCMED
ENGN
DENT
CSMS
VETS
LFIN
IBLS
ARTS EDCN
28 We feel confident that Y will make a competent decision.
1 IB L S rCMED I I DENT
ENGN [ 2 2  CSMS
VETS)
l f in I ARTS
SOCS
EDCN)
PHSCS
INFO
PHSCS
INFO
PHSCS
INFO
PHSCS
INFO
PHSCS)
in f o )
CADS
CADS I I
CADS| I
CADS
PHSCS 
INFO CADS
CADS
il_
Neither 
Agree nor
Disagree Slightly Disagree
Disagree 
2 3 4
29 In our opinion Y never takes the responsibility
Strongly
Disagree
1
Slightly
Agree
5
Agree
6
Strongly
Agree
7
CMED
ENGN
DENt I I V E T S [2 ] IBLS[2I1 SOCS2Z1 PHSCS[
C S M S [2 ]  LFINI I A R T S [22  EDCN[ in f o F CADS
30 We don’t plan to contribute to Y’s decisions because they are not concerned about our 
position.
CMED
ENGN
1 d e n t 2  VETS IBLS 1 s o c s j 2  PHSCS
1 CSMS| 2  LFIN ARTS ED CN f 1 INFOj CADS
31 We intend to work openly with Y because they will not take advantage of us.
PHSCS ~CMED
ENGN
DENT)
c s m s )
VETS IBLS
l f in [ ARTS
SOCS
EDCN
32 We don’t think that Y has any idea of our requirements.H DENT| I VETS I I IBLS[22 SOCS|CMED
ENGN CSMS l f in [ ARTS e d c n [
33 We worry about Y’s willingness to do what they say.
VETSCMED
ENGN
DENT
CSMS LFIN
IBLS
ARTS
SOCS
EDCN
34 We are not going to question the correctness of Y’s decisions.
IBLS I ' ' 'CMED
ENGN
DENT VETS SOCS
INFOl
PHSCS
INFO
PHSCS)
INFOl
PHSCS
CADS
CADS
CADS
C S M S [2 ]  LFIN[ I A R T S 2 2  E D C N [2 ] INF0| | CADS| |
35 We intend to check whether Y meets its obligations to our department / unit.
CMED 2 2 2  DENT2 VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
ENGN CSMS LFIN| I ARTS I I E D C N [22  INF0| | CADS
36 We think that Y negotiates openly.
CMED
ENGN
2  d e n t  v e t s IBLS 1 s o c s j 1 PHSCS 1
CSMSj 1 LFIN ARTS 1 EDCNj 1 INFOj CADSj 1
O r g a n i s a t i o n a l  T r u s t  I n v e n t o r y  ( P a r t  2)
Neither
Strongly Slightly Agree nor Slightly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Y feel that we are concerned about their problems and needs.
Strongly
Agree
7
CMED DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
ENGN CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
2 Y worry about our willingness to do what we say.
CMED DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
ENGN CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
3 Y think that we know exactly what they want.
IBLSCMED
ENGN 
Y is no
CMED
ENGN
DENT
CSMS 
to ques
DENT
CSMS
VETS
VETS
LFIN
ARTS
S o f  01
IBLS
ARTS
SOCS
LFINj  )  EDCN
4 t going stion the correctness our decisions.
SOCS
EDCN
PHSCS
INFO
PHSCS
INFO
CADS
CADS
5 Y plan to monitor our compliance with our agreement.
CMED
ENGN
6 Y think we misrepresent our position in negotiations.
7 Y intend to monitor us closely so that we do not take advantage of them.
CMED
ENGN
DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
CMED DENT 1 VETSj n  IBLS SOCS PHSCS
ENGN CSMS 1 LFIN] J  ^TS EDCN INFO CADS
DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
strongly
Disagree
1
Disagree
2
Slightly
Disagree
3
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
4
Slightly
Agree
5
Agree
6
8 Y worry about our ability to take correct decisions.
9 Y don’t think that we are competent,
CMED
ENGN
DENT VETS
CSMS LFIN
IBLS
ARTS
SOCS PHSCS
10 Y think that we are negotiating openly.
11 Y intend to watch for misleading information from us in our negotiations.
12 Y feel that we never explained clearly the reasons for the decision
1 VETSCMED
ENGN
DENT
CSMS I I LFIN
13 Y feel that we do not tell them the complete truth.
VETS I IBLS I I SOCSCMED
ENGN 
Y feel 1
CMED
ENGN
DENT PHSCS
CSMS LFIN ARTS
14 that we are straight with them.
Strongly
Agree
7
CMED DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
ENGN CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
CMED DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
ENGN CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
IBLS SOCS PHSCS
ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
I
ÿI
.
EDCN INFO CADS
#
:
"I
I
!
CMED DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
ENGN CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO| CADS
I
I
EDCN INFO CADS ;
Î
;;
Neither
Strongly Slightly Agree nor Slightly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
6
Strongly
Agree
15 In Y’s opinion we emphasise equity and fairness as very important
CMED DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
ENGN CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
16 Y think that we meet our negotiated obligations to their department / unit.
CMED
ENGN
DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
17 In Y’s opinion, we are reliable.
CMED DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
ENGN CSMS LFIN ARTS| EDCN INFO CADS
18 Y feel that we never reciprocate to their expectations.
DENT| I VETSCMED
ENGN
IBLS SOCS PHSCS
CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
19 Y feel confident that we will make a competent decision.
CMED DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
ENGN CSMS LFIN ARTS e d c n | INFO CADS
20 Y plan to support our decisions
CMED DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
ENGN CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO
Y think that we take the responsibility for crucial decisions
CMED DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
ENGN CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO
| I CADS I I
CADS
strongly
Disagree
1
Disagree
2
Slightly
Disagree
3
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
4
Slightly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree
5 6 7
22 Y feel that we try to get the upper hand.
CMED
ENGN
DENT VETS IBLS
CSMS LFIN ARTS
SOCS PHSCS
2 3  Y are not willing to question the clarity of our explanations
CMED
ENGN
24 Y don’t think that we have any idea of their requirements.
CMED
ENGN
25 Y feel that we will keep our word.
v e t s FCMED
ENGN
DENT
CSMS
IBLS SOCS
LFIN| I ARTS| I EDCN
26 Y intend to speak openly in their negotiations with us.
IBLSCMED
ENGN
DENT VETS SOCS PHSCS
|~  ] EDCN| I I N F 0 [ 2 ]  CADS
DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
PHSCS
INFO CADS
27 In Y’s opinion we do not disclose all the information they need for negotiations.
PHSCSCMED
ENGN 
Y feel t
CMED
ENGN
DENT
CSMS 
are res
DENT
CSMS
VETS
LFIN
28 hat we ponsible and supportive
VETS
LFIN
IBLS
ARTS
IBLS
ARTS
SOCS
EDCN
SOCS
EDCN
INFO
PHSCS
INFO
CADS
CADS
CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
strongly
Disagree
1
Disagree
Slightly
Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree
Slightly
Agree Agree
CMED
ENGN
2 3 4 5 6
Lir attention is focused on our requirements
DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO
Strongly
Agree
7
CADS
30 In Y’s opinion we never take the responsibility
VETS ICMED
ENGN
DENT
CSMS
IBLS SOCS PHSCS
LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
31 Y don’t plan to contribute to our decisions because we are not concerned about their 
position
CMED
ENGN
DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO 1 CADS
32 Y intend to work openly with us because we will not take advantage of them.
socsl ' 'CMED
ENGN
DENT
CSMS
VETS IBLS PHSCS
LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
33 Y are not going to express their loyalty to us
DENT| ' I VETSCMED
ENGN CSMS
IBLS
ARTS
SOCS
EDCNLFIN
34 Y feel that we clearly explain the reasons of the decision
SOCSCMED
ENGN
DENT
CSMS
VETS
LFIN
IBLS
ARTS
PHSCS
INFO
PHSCS
CADS
EDCN in f o Q  c a d s Q
35 Y intend to check whether we meet our obligations to their department / unit.
CMED
ENGN
DENT VETS IBLS SOCS PHSCS
CSMS LFIN ARTS EDCN INFO CADS
36 Y intend to ask us to distribute resources according to their needs
CMED
ENGN
DENT VETS
CSMS LFIN ARTS
L J SOCS PHSCS
EDCN INFO CADS
APPENDIX 14: Question Sheet given to participants at the beginning of the
interview
(a) To what extent do power relationships affect trust?
Power relationships
Two dimensions
Political Financial
(Position of respondents in The 
University’s stmcture- both parties)
(Resource issues positive /negative 
financial position)
(b)Does holding the Star Chamber process, involving three meetings 
over a period o f time, affect feelings?
How?
Wliy?
When? (if there is an effect)
(c ) Do individual Management Group / Resource Units meetings {one
at time) affect feelings?
How?
Why?
When?
APPENDIX 15: Sheet of questions held by the interviewer during the interview
(agenda)
Melina : draft of questions
Section 1:General opening questions / points
Courtesies 15 minutes)
Thank them for the questiomiaire response 
Thank them for seeing you for inteiwiews 
Explanation 15 minutes)
- PhD research on tmst in resource allocation / Star Chamber 
“ Analysis of their responses + need to discuss how/ why they responded -  
appreciate their willingness to be involved -  anonymous.
Show them results at the end:2002 questionnaire 
Permission to record the inteiwiew
method: a paper sheet with questions written onto
Section 2: Star Chamber negotiations
(c) To what extent do power relationships affect trust?
Power relationships
Political (position of interest)! |financial {resourcesi -  organizational change
(d) Does the three- stage Star Chamber process affect feelings {both ways)
How?
Why?
When (if there is an effect)
( c ) Do individual Management Group / Resource Units meetings {one at time) 
affect feelings?
How?
Why?
When?
Organizational change
a. How transparent is the process?
b. Do they consider the process as a participation or pseudo­
participation?
c. Does the use of financial numbers create and incomplete picture? Or 
inaccurate? Or create distrust?
d. How important is it that you understand the personality of the other?
Section 3:
- After the 2002 meetings
- Suggestions for adjustments
(a ) Did feelings of trust change after the completion of 2002 Star Chamber 
{October 2002- later in the year) and before the 2003 Star Chamber meetings 
commenced (March 2003)
How?
When?
Why?
Section 4:Explanation of trust in relation to questiomiaire (theme)
(a) Could you explain what the word ‘trust’ means to you, in relation to others?
i. In general life / activity?
ii. Specifically in resource allocation negotiations?
iii. Are there occasions when these feelings change?
(b) How do you think other people would explain ‘tmst’?
i. In general temis?
ii. Specifically relating to your involvement in resource allocation negotiations?
iii. Are there occasions when their feelings might change?
(e) What changes / adjustments do you feel might improve the levels of tmst in 
the resource allocation system?
{democracy, transparency, equity/justice/fairness- procedural/ distributive)
Them vs average (at the end- show this @ begin / end)
Part (a) us of them 
Part (b) them of us
Show questionnaire results to gain their insight into why/how they responded 
Section 4
Thank you for giving me your time and advice (later visit?)
APPENDIX 16: Questionnaire analysis -  Resource Units
a. P aired  correla tion s P art A  and P art B o f  H eads o f  R esou rce U nits  
q u estion n a ire
Paired Samples Correlations/Resource Units
Part A Part B
correl signif corr signif
Pair 1 Q28 & Q25 0.81 0.01 Pair 1 Q I 9 & Q 8 0.86 0.01
Pair 2 Q15 &Q11 0.99 0.00 Pair 2 Q14&Q13 0.97 0.00
Pair 3 Q19&Q21 0.14 0.74 Pair 3 Q1 &Q22 0.63 0.09
Pair 4 Q 9& Q 2 0.83 0.01 Pair 4 Q28&Q18 0.69 0.06
Pair 5 Q24 & Q3 0.94 0.00 Pair 5 Q34&Q12 0.80 0.02
Pair 6 Q23 & Q33 0.55 0.15 Pair 6 Q25 & Q2 0.55 0.16
Pair 7 Q16&Q22 0.36 0.38 Pair 7 Q16& Q9 0.05 0.91
P a ir s Q3 6& Q I0 0.73 0.04 Pair 8 Q10&Q27 0.50 0.21
Pair 9 Q26 & Q32 0.46 0.25 Pair 9 Q3 & Q24 0.77 0.02
Pair 10 Q20 & Q29 -0.46 0.25 Pair 10 Q21 &Q30 0.95 0.00
Pair 11 Q18 &Q5 0.78 0.02 Pair 11 Q2 9& QI5 -0.78 0.02
Pair 12 Q17&Q7 0.77 0.03 Pair 12 Q17& Q6 0.76 0.03
Pair 13 Q34 & Q6 0.55 0.16 Pair 13 Q4&Q5 0.20 0.64
Pair 14 Q27&Q31 0.11 0.80 Pair 14 Q26 & Q32 0.97 0.00
Pair 15 Q35 & Q30 0.50 0.21 Pair 15 Q35&Q31 0.30 0.47
Pair 16 Q4&Q13 0.74 0.04 Pair 16 Q20 & Q33 -0.15 0.72
Pair 17 Q1 &Q14 0.31 0.46 Pair 17 Q23 & Q36 0.14 0.75
Pair 18 Q12&Q8 0.89 0.00 Pair 18 Q l l  &Q7 0.86 0.01
b. weighted average part 1 and Part 2 Resource Units
O rçanisational Trust Inventory  
R esou rce Units (Part 1 and Part2)
5.61.
4 .974 .89
5:44-
2.062 08
0.00 -
R U l RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8
O Part A 3.22 2.06 6.00 4.56 4.97 3.44 3.67 5.58
□  P a rlB 4.17 2.08 5.47 5.31 4.89 3.42 5.61 5.78
Resource Units
c. weighted average -  dimension of belief
Part 1 - 
affection RU1 RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RUB RU7 RUB
com petence 2.00 1.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 3.50 6.00
o p en n ess 2.00 1.00 6.50 6.50 5.50 4.00 3.00 6.50
concern 2.50 3.00 6.50 3.00 6.00 4.00 4.00 5.50
loyalty 3.50 1.50 6.00 4.00 5.50 5.00 5.00 6.00
fairness 3.00 2.00 6.50 3.00 5.00 2.50 5.50 7.00
reliability 4.50 2.50 6.00 7.00 5.50 3.00 3.00 6.00
affection-dimension of trust 
Resource Units (Part 1)
7.00 --
6.00  - -
5.00 --
4.00 --
O com petence
□ openness
■  concern
■  loyalty
□  fairness
□ reliability
RU1 RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8 
Resource units
Part 1 
cognition RU1 RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RUB RU7 RUB
com petence 2.00 4.50 6.50 6.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
o p en n ess 1.00 1.00 6.00 4.00 5.50 2.00 3.50 6.50
concern 6.00 1.00 6.50 5.50 5.00 4.00 5.00 5.00
loyalty 6.50 4.50 6.50 6.50 6.00 5.00 6.50 5.50
fairness 2.00 1.00 6.50 3.00 6.00 1.50 4.00 5.00
reliability 3.00 1.50 6.50 5.00 5.00 4.50 5.50 7.00
1
8.00 1 
7.00 -
o 6.00 - ■ “ 1co 5.00 - -1(/>c 4.00 - - - I0)E 3.00 -
2 2.00 - f
CCD 1.00 - I
8 0.00 J11.
cognition-dlmension of trust 
Resource Units (Part 1)
s  com petence
□  openness
■  concem
■  loyalty
□  fairness 
O reliability
RU1 RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8 
Resource units
Part 1 
intention RU1 RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RUB
com petence 2.00 1.00 5.00 2.50 4.00 1.50 1.50 3.00
o p en n ess 5.00 4.00 6.50 4.50 5.50 4.00 5.50 6.50
concern 4.50 3.50 6.50 5.00 4.50 3.00 1.00 6.00
loyalty 4.50 1.50 5.00 7.00 5.00 6.00 3.00 5.00
fairness 2.00 1.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 1.00 1.50 4.50
reliability 2.00 1.00 6.50 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 6.50
intention-dimension of trust 
Resource Units (Part 1)
RU1 RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8 
Resource units
H com petence
□  openness
■  concem
■ loyalty
□  fairness 
E  reliability
Part 2 
affection RU1 RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RUB RU7 RUB
com petence 4.50 1.00 6.00 6.50 6.00 3.00 7.00 6.00
o p en n ess 6.00 1.00 6.00 7.00 6.00 3.00 6.50 6.50
concern 4.00 1.00 5.50 4.50 5.00 3.00 4.00 6.00
loyalty 5.00 1.00 6.50 6.50 4.00 2.50 6.50 6.00
fairness 6.00 4.50 6.00 6.00 6.00 4.00 6.50 6.50
reliability 4.50 2.00 4.00 6.50 5.50 4.50 7.00 6.50
affection-dimension of trust 
Resource Units (Part 2)
o  com petence
□ openness
■  concem
■  loyalty
□  fairness
□ reliability
RU1 RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8 
Resource units
Part 2 
cognition RU1 RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RUB
com petence 5.50 1.00 6.50 6.00 4.50 3.50 3.50 3.50
o p en n ess 6.50 1.00 6.00 3.50 4.50 3.00 6.50 5.50
concern 4.50 1.00 5.00 6.50 6.00 4.00 5.50 6.50
loyalty 2.50 7.00 6.50 5.50 6.00 4.00 7.00 6.00
fairness 4.50 4.00 6.00 6.00 5.50 5.00 6.50 5.00
reliability 5.50 1.00 6.50 6.50 3.50 4.00 6.50 7.00
cognition-dimension of trust Resource Units 
(Part 2)
□ com petence
□  openness
■  concem
■  loyalty
□ fairness
□  reliability
RU1 RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8 
Resource units
Part 2 
intention RU1 RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RUB
com petence 4.00 1.00 2.50 1.50 2.00 2.00 4.00 6.00
o p en n ess 2.50 1.00 6.00 5.50 6.00 3.00 6.00 6.00
concern 1.00 4.00 5.50 4.50 4.00 3.00 4.50 6.00
loyalty 3.50 4.00 5.00 6.50 5.50 4.00 6.50 4.50
fairness 4.00 1.00 3.00 1.50 3.50 2.50 2.50 3.50
reliability 1.00 1.00 6.00 5.00 4.50 3.50 4.50 7.00
intention-dimension of trust 
Resource Units (Part 2)
com petence
□  openness 
concem  
I loyalty
□ fairness 
O reliability
RU1 RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8
R eso u rce  un its
D. financial position -  OTI 
ÏDRM
INCOME SUMMARY ALL RU R U l RU2 RU3 R U 4 R U 5 RÜ6 R U 7 R U 8 RU10 RU11
Gross Income
Core Income 115,305 4,333 3,051 7,914 8,954 16,329 7,398 16,825 9,410 12,904 17,359
Earned Income 23.291 1,314 6 5 4 1,098 2,558 4,178 2,422 3,663 2,042 1,987 1,789
Other Income 1 ,6 3 8 2 9 1 6 3 5 8 7 9 8 0 3 1 0 5 6 1 1 3 255
TOTAL gross income 140,234 5,676 3,721 9,048 11,599 21,487 9,824 20,692 11,513 14,904 19,403
TOTAL Strategic Allocations +5,782 +292- +387 +762 ,+ 3 8 1 +1,003 +587 + 4 6 9 + 6 0 2 + 6 4 2 +667
Allocation needed foracad RUs 
worse off than Initial ROMO of:
+ 9 5  3 +237 + 4 9 1 + 2 2 5
OTI / INCOME idrm -  Heads of resource Units
Part 1 Part 2
conel sign correl sign
Core income 0.402 0.324 0.628 0.095
Earned income 0.235 0.575 0.465 0.246
Other income 0.270 0.518 0.170 0.687
Total gross 0.375 0.361 0.591 0.123
Total strategic 
allocation
0.563 0.146 0.253 0.545
OTI / INCOME - INTERVIEWS Heads of resource Units
Low graph 
high income
Low graph 
Low income
No relevant High graph 
High 
income
High graph 
Low income
conel sign correl sign correl sign correl sign correl sign
OTI part 1 0.186 0.659 0.248 0.553 0.252 0.547 - - - "
OTI part 2 0.070 0.869 0.228 0.587 0.121 0.587 - - - -
E. a)weighted average part 1 Management Group
part 1 RUl RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RÜ6 RU7 RU8 RU9 RUIO RUl 1 RU12 RU13
MG1 5.19 4.94 5.19 5.19 5.17 5.19 5.19 5.19 5.19 5.06 5.19 5.19 5.03
MG2 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22
MG3 4.78 4.17 4.83 4.81 4.39 4.72 4.86 4.72 4.89 4.94 4.81 4.33 4.53
5.4 -  
5.2 -1
1 5 -% 4.8 -O
ô 4.6 -
Ç) 4.4 -
4.2 - 
4 -
organisational trust inventory - part A 
management group
4^  <3^ ^ ^  <=>VVW
resource units
■ MG1 
□ MG2
■ MG3
b) weighted average part 2 Management Group
Part2 RUl RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8 RU9 RUIO RUll RU12 RU13
MG1 5.11 5 5.11 5.08 5 5.11 5.11 5.11 5.11 4.72 5.11 5.11 5.08
MG2 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25
MG3 5.19 5.11 5.19 5.19 5.17 5.19 5.19 5.19 5.19 5.19 5.19 5.11 4.97
organisational trust inventory- part B 
management group
5.4
^  ^  ^  ^  ^ V V ^ W "’
resource units
■ MG1 
□ MG2
■ MG3
f. demographics
Participants of the management group (except MG5)
MGl MG2 MG3 MG4
Years in
current
position
6.5 N/A 1 3
Previous Yes N/A No No
experience
age N/A
20 -30
3 0 -4 0
4 0 -5 0
More than 50 Yes Yes Yes
gender male N/A male male
Participants Head of Resource Units
RUl RU2 RU3 RU4 RU5 RU6 RU7 RU8 RUIO R U ll
Years in
current
position
6 1.5
weeks
1 6 
months
1.5 2.5 2 2 3.5 5
Previous No No No No Yes N/A Yes No Yes No
experience
age
20 -30
3 0 -4 0  
4 0 -5 0  
More than 
50
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes Yes Yes
gender female male male male male female male male male male
APPENDIX 17: List of Nodes Nvivo- Interview Analysis
NVivo revision 2.0.161 Licensee: Department of Accounting & Finance
Project: Phd User: Administrator Date: 21/02/2004 - 14:34:26
NODE LISTING
Nodes in Set: All Nodes 
Created: 16/01/2004 - 20:53:24
Modified: 21/02/2004 - 14:33:23
Number of Nodes: 55
1 accountable open
2 agreements
3 big picture
4 common interest
5 control
6 deans appointment
7 deans in management group
8 depends on individuals
9 expectation trust
10 experience
11 finance office
12 financial position
13 financial pressure
14 gender
15 idrm change
16 idrm complexity
17 idrm problems
18 individual star chambers vs gi*oup
19 infonnation
20 interpersonal relations
21 learning process
22 management style
23 negotiation vs communication
24 no it is not the rest of the management
25 other deans
26 oti
27 oti low tmst
28 participation in decision making
29 personality
30 planning
31 position
32 power
33 pressumptions MG
34 principal's personality
35 professional vs academic
36 resource strategy committee
37 room to manoeuvre-financial
38 mles of engagement
39 self confidence
40 star chamber atmosphere
41 star chamber contact
42 star chamber content
43 star chamber papers
44 strategic direction
45 support by MG
46 surprise
47 task force
48 territorial meetings
49 training
50 transparency
51 transparency vs understanding
52 trust
5 3 trust in The University’s now
54 trust star chamber
55 vice principal
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